Impaired driving

This is an addendum to a trial judgment addressing a Charter breach issue that the trial judge initially failed to apply to certain charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, refusal to provide a breath sample, obstruction of police, breach of recognizance (two counts), simple possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine for trafficking, possession of fentanyl for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The trial judge initially found the accused guilty on five charges but failed to apply the defence's Charter application under s. 10(b) and s. 24(2) to those charges.

Upon realizing this error during sentencing, the judge reopened the convictions to apply the Charter analysis.

The judge found that police breached the accused's right to counsel at the police station and excluded evidence on certain charges, resulting in acquittals on simple possession of cocaine, breach of recognizance for drug possession, and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The accused remained convicted on impaired driving, obstruction of police, and breach of recognizance for curfew violation.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The Crown alleged impairment by oxycodone and/or alprazolam based on civilian witness observations of erratic driving, police observations at the scene and during arrest, breath testing showing zero alcohol, a drug recognition evaluation, and toxicology evidence.

The accused testified she consumed the medications as prescribed for chronic pain and anxiety, but had limited recollection of the relevant period.

She alleged she may have been involuntarily drugged by a former partner.

The court found the accused voluntarily consumed the drugs and that her ability to operate the vehicle was impaired by the drugs, resulting in a conviction.

The accused, an Indigenous woman with a history of trauma, abuse, and substance addiction, was sentenced following guilty pleas to impaired driving causing bodily harm, possession of cocaine, failing to comply with bail conditions, and theft.

The court imposed a blended sentence consisting of 24 days intermittent custody on weekends for impaired driving, a four-month conditional sentence for drug possession, concurrent probation orders, a three-year driving prohibition, a DNA order, and a ten-year firearms prohibition.

The sentencing decision applied Gladue principles, recognizing systemic disadvantages and the offender's efforts toward rehabilitation while balancing denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but abandoned the sections 8 and 9 arguments before trial.

The court found no breach of the accused's section 10(b) right to counsel, rejecting arguments that police "funnelled" the accused to duty counsel or that the telephone consultation lacked privacy.

On the trial proper, the accused testified he consumed two double vodka drinks in the 10 minutes before leaving the restaurant, raising a bolus drinking defence.

The court rejected this evidence as incredible and unreliable, finding it inconsistent with the bartender's testimony and contrary to common sense.

The court convicted the accused based on the toxicology evidence and the common sense inference that people do not normally consume large quantities of alcohol immediately before driving.

The accused was charged with impaired driving.

A Charter application was brought challenging the reasonable and probable grounds for the breathalyzer test based on the possibility of residual mouth alcohol affecting the accuracy of the roadside device.

The court distinguished the case from R. v. Becker on three grounds: the presence of a passenger who admitted to drinking, the beverages being at room temperature rather than cold, and the officer's administration of a residual mouth alcohol disclaimer to which the accused responded that consumption was an hour prior.

The court found no Charter breach and entered a finding of guilt.

The defendant was found passed out in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with a running engine and breath readings of 217 and 201 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood.

She was charged with impaired driving and having over 80 mg of alcohol while in care and control of a motor vehicle.

The Crown conceded that the defendant's testimony discharged the statutory presumption of care and control.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care and control while impaired.

The court found that the defendant had no intention to drive, had entered the driver's seat only to close the open door and subsequently became ill, and had a credible backup plan to use Uber if necessary.

The court acquitted the defendant on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after police conducted a roadside stop for speeding.

Officers detected an odour of alcohol on the driver's breath and requested an approved screening device (ASD).

Although the officers informed the driver that another officer would attend with an ASD, they did not advise him of his right to counsel or make a formal demand at that time.

A formal ASD demand was made 12 minutes later, which registered a fail.

The driver was arrested and subsequently provided breath samples showing alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The driver applied to exclude the breath test results under sections 8, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no section 8 violation but determined there was a section 10(b) violation warranting exclusion under section 24(2).

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown conceded that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was not engaged because the Crown failed to prove the defendant actually occupied the driver's seat.

However, applying the risk analysis from R. v. Boudreault, the court found a realistic risk that the defendant would drive while impaired, based on her intoxication, proximity to her vehicle, possession of keys, and lack of a concrete and reliable alternative plan.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found that the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to special circumstances arising from his limited English proficiency and the police's failure to secure an interpreter.

The evidence of the refusal was excluded and that charge was dismissed.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired care or control based on evidence that he occupied the driver's seat, attempted to move the vehicle, and displayed signs of impairment.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the defendant drove the vehicle.

The central issue was whether the defendant, found in the driver's seat with the engine running, was in care or control of the vehicle.

The defendant testified she was in the vehicle to smoke and continue a conversation with her boyfriend, with the engine running for heat on a cold night.

The court found the defendant rebutted the presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code based on her credible evidence supported by corroborating witnesses, a concrete plan to spend the night at the location, and the presence of a sober adult in the passenger seat.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a realistic risk of danger existed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial proceeded on a blended hearing addressing two main issues: whether breath testing was conducted as soon as practicable, and whether there was a Section 8 Charter breach related to video surveillance of the cell area and the presence of a police officer during the accused's use of the toilet.

The court found no breach of the "as soon as practicable" requirement and determined that even if a privacy breach occurred, the evidence should not be excluded under Section 24(2).

The accused was convicted and sentenced to a $1,000 fine, a $300 victim fine surcharge, and a one-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol concentration on June 23, 2014.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol based on the evidence presented.

Additionally, the trial judge found that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, rendering the breath analysis results inadmissible.

Both charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while exceeding the legal blood alcohol limit.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of her vehicle, which was stuck in a snowbank at the end of a residential driveway.

She had called for a tow truck and was waiting inside the vehicle with the engine running for warmth.

The trial judge found that the accused rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code by establishing that her occupancy of the driver's seat began for the purpose of awaiting the tow truck, not for setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found no realistic risk of danger to the public, as the vehicle was immobilized and incapable of being set in motion.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial addressed four issues: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make a screening demand; whether the officer could reasonably rely on the screening test result given the mouth alcohol effect; whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated; and whether the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found no Charter violations and that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable.

The accused was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought a fifteen-month jail sentence, while the defence sought an intermittent sentence of ninety days plus probation.

The court imposed an eleven-month jail sentence with a two-year driving prohibition.

The sentencing considered the serious injuries to the victim, including permanent disability and chronic pain, balanced against the defendant's own significant injuries from the collision, his guilty plea, community service, and remorse.

The court rejected the defence position that the defendant's medical condition warranted an intermittent sentence, finding that while medical factors could place the defendant lower in the sentencing range, they did not justify a fundamentally different outcome.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial focused on the identity of the driver and whether the evidence proved care and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown's case relied on a McDonald's employee's observations, the arresting officer's testimony, and Breathalyzer results.

The defence called the accused's brother and cousin who testified regarding the evening's events.

The court found the accused guilty of care and control over 80 but acquitted on the impaired charge and found insufficient evidence regarding the McDonald's incident.

The accused was sentenced to the minimum fine of $1,000 plus a $150 surcharge and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, unrepresented, defended on the basis that his Charter rights were violated through racist treatment by police.

The court rejected this defence.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by law.

The court identified three periods of inadequately explained or unexplained delay totalling approximately 20 minutes, which undermined the Crown's ability to rely on the presumption of identity.

Without evidence of the accused's blood alcohol level at the time of driving, the court found the accused not guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with excess blood alcohol following an incident on December 23, 2011.

The Crown relied on observations of weaving and running a red light, along with physical indicators such as bloodshot eyes and alcohol odour, to establish impairment.

The defendant was acquitted of the impaired charge due to strong countervailing evidence of non-impairment, including coordination, clear speech, and controlled movements.

However, the defendant was convicted of the over 80 offence based on breath technician evidence of readings of 184 and 170 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, with the court finding the Intoxilyzer 8000C was properly functioning and the external printer accurately recorded the results.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control of an automobile and care and control with excess alcohol.

The Crown alleged the defendant had a blood alcohol reading of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant testified he consumed only two drinks and re-entered his vehicle solely to retrieve his phone to call a tow truck after discovering two flat tires.

The court found the defendant not credible, rejected his evidence regarding alcohol consumption and intent, and found he had been operating the vehicle within ten minutes of police arrival.

The court concluded the defendant was in care and control of the vehicle with a blood alcohol reading of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, and that despite the flat tires, there remained a realistic risk of danger.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts, with the care and control with excess alcohol count stayed pursuant to the Keinapple principle.

The accused brought a motion pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis that his right to be tried within a reasonable time, as guaranteed by section 11(b), had been infringed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "over 80" contrary to section 253(1) of the Criminal Code.

The information was sworn on December 19, 2011, and the trial was scheduled for January 28, 2013, representing a delay of 13 months and 9 days.

The court applied the analytical framework from R. v. Morin and found that while there was Crown delay in providing visual disclosure (approximately one month and 13 days), the total institutional and Crown delay of nine months and 27 days fell within the Morin guideline of eight to ten months for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found minimal prejudice to the accused and balanced this against the serious nature of impaired driving offences and the public interest in a trial on the merits.

The application was dismissed.