Impaired driving

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his continued detention after a lawful traffic stop was arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, and that the breathalyzer technician's observations of his impairment should have been excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the initial detention was lawful under s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and the continued detention was justified to investigate his dangerous driving.

The court held that the technician's observations were not conscriptive evidence and did not arise from a Charter violation.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample after she unequivocally refused a roadside demand.

She appealed, arguing the demand was invalid because the police officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) with him and there was no evidence one could be made available 'forthwith'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code is complete upon an outright refusal to a valid demand.

The Crown is not required to prove that an ASD was present or could have been made available forthwith when the accused has already categorically refused to comply.

The appellant pled guilty to multiple counts of impaired and dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a high-speed collision that killed three people and seriously injured another.

The trial judge imposed an eight-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was outside the four- to five-year range established by previous jurisprudence for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that previous cases do not cap sentences and that the catastrophic consequences, combined with the appellant's prior driving record and ignored warnings, justified the eight-year sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the police officer lacked adequate grounds to make a breath demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude that the totality of the information relied on by the officer provided adequate grounds for the demand.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80'.

At the time of his arrest, he demanded to speak only to his specific counsel of choice.

When the police could not reach that lawyer after an hour, the appellant refused offers to contact another lawyer.

The trial judge found no s. 10(b) Charter breach because the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising his right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, a chronic alcoholic with a lengthy criminal record, pled guilty to impaired driving, driving while disqualified, and public mischief.

The trial judge sentenced him to 30 months in addition to 18 months of pre-trial custody credited on a 1:1 basis, resulting in a global sentence of four years.

The appellant appealed, arguing he should have received 2:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, granting 1.5:1 credit for the first eight months of pre-trial custody to account for parole considerations, reducing the penitentiary term from 30 months to 26 months.

The court upheld the 1:1 credit for the remaining 10 months and quashed an illegal probation order.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the respondent's conviction for care and control while impaired and substituted an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge overstepped her appellate jurisdiction by effectively retrying the case, as there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding of impairment.

However, because the trial judge failed to address the respondent's exculpatory evidence and improperly relied on an inculpatory statement, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing he did not have care and control of the vehicle.

The trial judge applied the law from R. v. Toews and found a real risk that the extremely impaired appellant could have woken up and driven the vehicle.

The summary conviction appeal court judge upheld this finding as not unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to address or reconcile contradictions in the arresting officer's testimony concerning the appellant's manner of speech and movements, which formed the basis for the conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision, arguing that once a breathalyzer technician submits a breath sample and the instrument produces a result, the sample is automatically deemed 'necessary to enable proper analysis' under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, removing any discretion to reject it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statute contains no such limitation and agreeing that the trial judge erred in concluding the technician lacked discretion to reject an unsuitable sample.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding an impaired driving charge.

At trial, the defence expressly conceded there were no Charter issues and did not object to the admissibility of evidence.

On appeal, the appellant attempted to argue that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, affecting the presumption in s. 258(1)(c).

The Court of Appeal held that this Charter argument was not open to the defence given their position at trial, and the non-Charter argument was answered by the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Rilling.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that acquitted the accused of driving over 80.

The accused had been stopped by police for failing to signal a turn and was followed into his underground parking garage, where he was arrested and provided breath samples.

The appeal judge had found Charter breaches regarding arbitrary detention, unlawful search, and right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the police were acting in the lawful execution of their duties, were entitled to follow the accused into the garage in continuous pursuit, and that the accused's right to counsel was not violated.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court's order requiring it to pay $12,000 in costs to the respondent.

The respondent had successfully avoided a minimum jail sentence for impaired driving after the summary conviction appeal court stayed the sentence, despite finding the minimum penalty provision constitutional.

The summary conviction appeal court awarded costs against the Crown, characterizing the appeal as a test case.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and set aside the costs order, finding that the appeal was not a test case as the respondent had a vital personal interest in avoiding incarceration, and there was no Crown misconduct to justify the award.

The Crown appealed a non-custodial sentence imposed on a repeat drinking and driving offender with a lengthy criminal record.

The trial judge had found exceptional circumstances based on the respondent's remarkable rehabilitative strides and four years of sobriety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's decision not to incarcerate the respondent, though it clarified that general deterrence applies equally to hardened alcoholics and cautioned against automatically equating residential treatment with pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed her conviction for mischief.

The trial judge had convicted her of both mischief and impaired driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Judge acquitted the appellant of impaired driving but sustained the mischief conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant, finding that the trial judge's finding of mischief was inextricably linked to the conclusion that she was impaired, and the evidence of requisite knowledge for mischief was very weak.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that allowed a Crown appeal and ordered a new trial.

The central issue was the sufficiency of an information to obtain a warrant following a single-car accident where the appellant had consumed alcohol.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that the information was sufficient based on the totality of the circumstances, including an anonymous tip about erratic driving and evidence of alcohol consumption.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and impaired driving, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the Crown disproved self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, as the appellant stabbed his assailant without warning when he could have escaped.

The court also upheld the rejection of the necessity defence for impaired driving.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part, reducing the impaired driving sentence from one year to four months concurrent, based on a Crown concession.

The court declined to interfere with the trial judge's refusal to impose a conditional sentence for the assault.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding the validity of an 'alert' demand.

The appellant argued that the officer making the demand must know or believe the person was operating or in care and control of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming prior authorities that such knowledge or belief is not required for an officer to make an 'alert' demand.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge noted the trial judge failed to elaborate on his conclusions and their foundation, but dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's failure to give adequate reasons for rejecting the defence evidence frustrated the appellant's appeal rights, contrary to the standard in R. v. Sheppard.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered on both the impaired driving and 'over 80' charges.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction for impaired driving.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred in law by re-weighing the evidence regarding whether the police officer had objective reasonable grounds to make a breath demand.

The trial judge's finding that reasonable grounds existed, based on a civilian tip and the officer's observations of swaying, odour of alcohol, and bloodshot eyes, was reasonably open to him.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.