Edward C. Conway

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a summary judgment motion to enforce mortgage debts and seek possession of a commercial property after the defendants defaulted.

The defendants argued the motion should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to initially adduce the standard charge terms, engaged in negotiations that invalidated the Notice of Sale, and included amounts in the Notice of Sale that violated the Interest Act.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the standard charge terms were known to the parties, the negotiations did not constitute enforcement steps, and while the Notice of Sale contained accounting errors (including an improper 24% holdover interest rate), these defects did not invalidate the notice or preclude summary judgment.

The court granted summary judgment for the principal amounts, adjusted interest rates, and allowable fees, and issued an order for possession.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for a mandatory interlocutory injunction regarding a residential heat pump, the parties could not agree on costs.

The defendants sought costs between partial and substantial indemnity, citing the plaintiffs' conduct including a last-minute adjournment and lengthy cross-examinations.

The court found the conduct did not warrant elevated costs but considered it in fixing the quantum.

The court awarded the defendants costs of $17,773.21 on a partial indemnity basis, finding it to be a fair and reasonable amount.

The appellant mother travelled to Ontario from Dubai with her two children for a visit, but subsequently informed the respondent father that she would not return.

The father commenced proceedings in Ontario seeking a return order under s. 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The trial judge declined jurisdiction under ss. 22 and 23 of the Act, ordered the children returned to Dubai, and dismissed the mother's constitutional challenges to s. 40(3).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the mother's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the risk of serious harm under s. 23, and upholding the constitutionality of the return order provision under both division of powers and the Charter.

The plaintiff, an unregistered real estate salesperson, sued the defendant brokerage for unpaid commissions.

The court found that the plaintiff had performed services in connection with trades in real estate, but his claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and wrongful dismissal were barred by section 9 of the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002, which prohibits actions for remuneration by unregistered persons.

Although the action was dismissed, the court ordered the successful defendants to pay the plaintiff's full indemnity costs due to their reprehensible conduct in hiring an unregistered person and needlessly prolonging the litigation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a mandatory interlocutory injunction to compel their neighbours to relocate a heat pump, alleging the noise and vibration constituted a nuisance and caused health issues.

The court applied the modified RJR-MacDonald test for mandatory injunctions.

The motion was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a strong prima facie case, largely due to insufficient medical and expert evidence linking the heat pump to their complaints, and failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

Following a trial where the applicant father successfully obtained an order for the return of the parties' children to Dubai, the court determined the issue of costs.

The father sought $486,000 on a partial and full recovery basis, relying on an offer to settle.

The respondent mother argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount due to her limited financial means.

The court found the father was entitled to costs and had beaten his offer to settle, but fixed costs at $250,000 on a partial indemnity basis to ensure the award was proportionate and within the mother's reasonable expectations and ability to pay.

The father brought a motion for an interim parenting schedule within the mother's motion to change proceeding.

The father sought a 2-2-3 equal timesharing arrangement, which the parties had previously agreed to in negotiations before the mother changed her mind.

The father also sought an order requiring the mother to disclose international travel and comply with COVID-19 quarantine directives, after discovering she had travelled internationally multiple times without notice and failed to quarantine upon return.

The court granted the father's motion, ordering interim joint custody, a 2-2-3 timesharing schedule, and compliance with travel and quarantine directives, finding it in the child's best interests.

The mother's request for an order requiring the father to sign the child's passport was dismissed.

In a family law trial concerning whether two young children should be returned to Dubai, the respondent mother brought an application to adduce expert opinion evidence from a psychotherapist.

The proposed evidence concerned the potential emotional and psychological impact on infants separated from their primary caregiver.

The applicant father opposed the admission of the evidence.

Following a voir dire, the court applied the test for expert evidence and found the proposed expert was properly qualified and capable of giving fair, objective, and non-partisan evidence.

The court granted the application, permitting the expert to testify strictly on the potential impact of separation from a primary caregiver, but prohibited her from opining on the specific attachment of the children to either parent.

The applicant sought costs for two motions: a recusal motion brought by the respondent and a motion to strike brought by the applicant.

The applicant was successful on both motions.

The court rejected the applicant's claim for full indemnity costs, noting that the Family Law Rules do not provide for a general approach of close to full recovery.

The court awarded the applicant partial indemnity costs, fixing the amount at $40,930.53 based on reasonableness and proportionality.

Following a motion for interim spousal support where the applicant was successful, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The court noted that the respondent unnecessarily complicated the proceedings by conducting a forensic audit of the applicant's finances, which drove up costs.

Although the respondent had made offers to settle, they included conditions the applicant could not accept.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $85,000.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support.

The respondent opposed, arguing the parties had reached an agreement to waive support in exchange for 49.9% of his successful software company.

The court found the applicant had a prima facie claim for support, as the alleged agreement was unlikely to meet the Miglin threshold.

To address the respondent's temporarily reduced income and the ongoing litigation costs, the court ordered the respondent to release undisputed corporate dividends and pay $300,000 in lump sum interim spousal support.

The defendants sought costs following a motion regarding a sealing order and restricted production of a document.

The court found that the plaintiff acted unreasonably by refusing to consider an informal proposal and a formal offer to settle that mirrored the eventual order.

The court awarded the defendants costs fixed at $5,000 on a partial indemnity basis from the date the informal proposal was made.

The plaintiff corporation sought a sealing order and a 'counsel eyes only' order for a 34-page document containing sensitive financial information.

The document had previously been disclosed to the individual defendant during family law proceedings involving the plaintiff's principal.

The court granted the sealing order to protect the plaintiff's commercial interests and the integrity of the government procurement process.

On consent, the corporate defendant was denied access to the document.

However, the court refused to deny the individual defendant access, finding that he needed to see the document to ensure trial fairness and to respond to the plaintiff's allegations.