Fraud

The appellant appealed a two-and-a-half-year sentence for fraud, arguing the trial judge failed to consider the specific immigration consequences of a sentence of two years or more.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit given the appellant's serious criminal record for similar offences, and noting the trial judge was aware of the pending deportation order.

The appellant, a home care provider, was convicted of defrauding an elderly couple of over $35,000 and sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment.

She appealed her conviction and sentence, arguing that her s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed by a 33-month delay, and that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements from the deceased complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's s. 11(b) analysis or his admission of the hearsay evidence based on necessity and reliability.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence credit was within his discretion and the sentence was fit given the significant breach of trust.

The appellant appealed his fraud conviction following a guilty plea entered on the second day of trial, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed his trial counsel failed to adduce evidence in a section 8 Charter voir dire, failed to review disclosure, and provided improper advice, rendering his plea involuntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to meet the high threshold for ineffective assistance of counsel and that the guilty plea was voluntary and unequivocal.

The appellant and a co-accused pleaded guilty to a scheme to defraud an estate using forged documents in Small Claims Court.

The appellant received an 18-month conditional sentence and 12 months' probation, while the co-accused received a 90-day conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record for similar offences justified the disparity.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed the restitution order made at trial following a conviction for fraud.

The trial judge found the amount of fraud was at least $15,645, which was justified by the evidence.

However, the trial judge made an arithmetical error in calculating the final amount.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the restitution order to $10,845.

The respondent pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 and two counts of income tax evasion after operating a tax preparation business that submitted false charitable donation receipts, resulting in $3.28 million in improper refunds.

The sentencing judge originally imposed a sentence of one day in jail and a global fine.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the original sentence manifestly unfit given the magnitude of the fraud, the breach of trust, and the respondent's pivotal role.

The court substituted a sentence of two years' incarceration and separate fines for each count of tax evasion.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for fraud and possession of credit card data.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's conclusion that data was misappropriated by modifying point of sale equipment was unreasonable, leading to the quashing of two counts.

The court rejected the argument that possession of blocked credit card data could not support a conviction under s. 342(3) of the Criminal Code.

Fresh evidence was not admitted.

The sentence was reduced from 3.5 years to 2 years.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for a massive fraud.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentence was in accordance with a joint submission and fell within the appropriate range given the scale of the offence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his one-year custodial sentence for fraud.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by considering the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

However, the court upheld the sentence as fit, noting that the appellant abused the trust of vulnerable fellow church members, causing an elderly couple to lose their home and life savings.

Despite the appellant being a first offender and initially a victim of a fraudulent scheme himself, the principles of denunciation and deterrence warranted the custodial sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his action on the basis of res judicata, as it duplicated an earlier action dismissed in 1998.

The appellant argued that an affidavit of documents in the earlier action was fraudulent due to irregularities in the jurat date.

The Court of Appeal found that the irregularities did not suggest fraud, the argument should have been raised in the earlier proceeding, and the affidavit was irrelevant to the negligence claim against the respondent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for fraud over $5,000.

He argued the criminal proceedings were an abuse of process because they were allegedly used solely to collect a civil debt owed to the complainants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no improper purpose behind the prosecution despite some ill-advised emails from Crown counsel.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-month imprisonment and $22,500 restitution order were within the appropriate range and revealed no error in principle.

The applicant, convicted of fraud over $5,000 and sentenced to six years' imprisonment, applied for judicial interim release pending his appeal.

The sole issue in dispute was whether the appeal was frivolous under s. 679(3)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the applicant's grounds of appeal, which included complaints about the form of the count and the prosecution's theory of liability, were arguable.

The application for release pending appeal was granted.

The appellant was committed for extradition to the United States on charges of conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud, and laundering the proceeds of crime.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered his surrender on those charges, as well as conspiracy to launder money and witness tampering.

The appellant appealed the committal order and sought judicial review of the surrender order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal order, finding sufficient evidence of the offences.

However, the Court allowed the judicial review in part, setting aside the surrender order regarding conspiracy to launder money and witness tampering, as the extradition judge had made no findings to support committal on those specific charges.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their applications for certiorari to quash their committals for trial on charges of making false and fraudulent claims for GST refunds.

The preliminary inquiry judge found evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the appellants were not involved in commercial activity and generated paperwork solely to defraud the government of GST refunds.

The appellants argued that under a literal interpretation of the Excise Tax Act, they were entitled to claim GST credits even if the transactions were constructed solely to obtain public money.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding no jurisdictional error by the preliminary inquiry judge, and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant appealed a restitution order imposed by the sentencing judge on his own motion without advance notice.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the appellant's ability to pay, noting a lack of evidence regarding his expenses and income.

Given that the appellant had already served his conditional sentence and probation, and had paid over $10,000 in restitution despite only receiving $5,000 from the fraud, the appeal was allowed and the restitution order was reduced to the amount already paid.

The appellant appealed his conviction for defrauding a financing company of approximately $90,000 using an altered invoice for non-existent forestry equipment.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the equipment did not exist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, and concluding the combination of the false invoice and non-existent equipment was sufficient to found a conviction for fraud.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding an 82-year-old woman of over $1 million USD through a telemarketing scheme and was sentenced to 5 years and 3 months in prison.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment to retain new counsel, misapplying the burden of proof, and allowing cross-examination on a pre-trial Charter affidavit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no miscarriage of justice or unfair trial.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to 4 years imprisonment due to the appellant's lack of a prior record and partial restitution.

The Crown's cross-appeal seeking a fine or restitution was dismissed.

The appellants sought to enforce a Florida default judgment for damages arising from a real estate transaction against the respondents in Ontario.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the Florida judgment was obtained by fraud and its enforcement would contravene public policy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal against most respondents, holding that the fraud defence requires newly discovered facts that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence, which the respondents failed to demonstrate.

The public policy defence was also rejected.

However, the appeal was dismissed against one respondent whose absolute discharge from bankruptcy released her from the judgment debt.

The appellant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit possession of stolen property and fraud.

He argued the trial judge erred by reading an unconstitutional evidentiary presumption from s. 354(2) of the Criminal Code to the jury, failing to adequately caution the jury on post-offence conduct of a co-accused, and that Crown counsel improperly cross-examined him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in reading the full text of s. 354(2), it caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The court also found the jury charge as a whole was adequate and the cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

The appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud and was sentenced to three years in the penitentiary.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to set aside his guilty pleas on the basis of procedural irregularities and a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal found that the pleas were informed, voluntary, and intended, and that the trial judge's failure to comply with s. 726 of the Criminal Code resulted in no prejudice.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.