Drug trafficking

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) seeking exclusion of drugs and other items seized following his arrest for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him and that the subsequent searches of his person, vehicle, and backpack were unlawful, breaching ss. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances including confidential informant tips, corroborating surveillance, and the observation of a distinctive backpack linked to drug trafficking, the arresting officer had objectively reasonable and probable grounds.

Even if a Charter breach had been established, the court concluded that the Grant factors would favour admission of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of possession of 90.7 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a two‑year custodial sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for drug trafficking offences.

The defence requested a conditional sentence based on significant post‑offence rehabilitation, including educational achievements, community work with youth, and stable employment.

The court held that the offender’s exceptional rehabilitative progress, lack of reoffending, and strong community support justified restraint in sentencing.

A conditional sentence of two years less a day to be served in the community was imposed, followed by probation.

Following convictions for trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of proceeds of crime, the accused brought a post‑trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the basis of police entrapment and also renewed an application for further disclosure regarding a confidential informant.

The court considered whether a police “cold call” offering an opportunity to sell drugs occurred before the officer had reasonable suspicion that the accused was engaged in drug trafficking.

The court held that the exchange between the undercover officer and the accused during the initial call gave rise to reasonable suspicion before any offer to purchase drugs was made.

The accused therefore failed to establish entrapment or a breach of s. 7 of the Charter.

The renewed disclosure request relating to confidential informant information was also dismissed as an impermissible fishing expedition into privileged material.

The Attorney General applied under the Civil Remedies Act for forfeiture of a 12‑unit residential apartment building alleged to be an instrument of unlawful activity.

Extensive police evidence showed persistent drug trafficking, frequent search warrants, arrests, and widespread criminal activity occurring throughout the building and surrounding areas.

The court found the property was used for unlawful activity likely to result in the acquisition of property through drug trafficking and therefore qualified as an instrument of unlawful activity under the statute.

The owner failed to establish that he was a responsible owner, having taken inadequate steps to prevent or address the criminal activity despite knowledge of it.

The court concluded that forfeiture was not clearly contrary to the interests of justice and ordered the property forfeited to the Crown.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police recovered crack cocaine from a safe and a smaller quantity from a witness during a domestic incident investigation.

The Crown relied heavily on the evidence of a key witness who repeatedly recanted and altered her account of events, including statements to police, testimony at the preliminary inquiry, and testimony at trial.

The court found the witness unreliable due to significant inconsistencies and admissions of lying.

Although circumstantial evidence linked the accused to a safe containing cocaine, other individuals had access to the apartment and may have handled the safe.

The court held that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge or control of the cocaine.

The accused brought a pretrial application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay of approximately 22¾ months between arrest and the start of trial.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and assessed the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Much of the delay was attributed to neutral intake periods, inherent time requirements of the case, and systemic delay within accepted administrative guidelines.

Although the accused remained in pretrial custody for nearly 22 months, the court found the delays adequately explained and largely unavoidable.

Balancing the accused’s liberty interests against the strong societal interest in adjudicating serious firearms and drug trafficking charges, the court held that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was not breached.

During a criminal trial for drug trafficking offences involving cocaine and cannabis, the Crown sought to qualify an RCMP officer as an expert to provide opinion evidence regarding drug trafficking indicators, drug jargon, and related matters.

The defence objected, arguing the proposed evidence lacked relevance and necessity and that the witness lacked independence due to police bias.

Applying the test for expert evidence in R. v. Mohan, the court held that some proposed opinions were relevant and necessary to assist the jury, including opinions regarding the level of trafficking indicated by seized items and the use of drug-related jargon.

However, opinions concerning cocaine purity, the role of weapons in trafficking, and evidence relating to hashish or trafficking hierarchies were excluded as irrelevant or unnecessary.

The officer was qualified to give expert opinion evidence only on limited issues.

The offender was sentenced following jury convictions for multiple offences including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and several breaches of firearms prohibition orders.

Police located drugs, cash, and a loaded handgun in a safe in an apartment connected to the offender, and cocaine in a vehicle he was driving.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record involving firearms and drug trafficking offences and was already subject to prohibition orders at the time.

Applying principles of denunciation, deterrence, and totality, the court imposed a global sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.

Credit of approximately 29 months was granted for pre‑sentence custody, including limited enhanced credit for triple bunking and lack of yard access.

The applicant sought a bail review to set aside a detention order following charges involving firearms and narcotics discovered in a storage locker and apartment rented in the applicant’s name.

The reviewing court found that the lower court erred in relying on secondary grounds based on an alleged breach of a residence condition, as there was no charge for the alleged breach and the evidence did not establish that the applicant lived at the apartment.

However, the detention order was upheld on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code due to the apparent strength of the circumstantial case, the seriousness of the alleged offences, and the impact that release could have on public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant’s lengthy pre‑trial custody and anticipated trial date were considered but were insufficient to undermine the basis for continued detention.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana, crack cocaine, and MDMA for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered the drugs in a locked briefcase during a vehicle search following arrest for possession of a marijuana cigarette.

The accused sought exclusion of the drugs under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter, arguing the police unlawfully searched a locked briefcase without a warrant.

The court found the officers credible and accepted their evidence that a strong odour of fresh marijuana emanated from the vehicle and the briefcase, giving them a reasonable basis to search it as an incident to arrest.

Relying on authorities such as Cloutier v. Langlois, R. v. Caslake, and R. v. Zucatti, the court held that common law powers of search incident to arrest extend to forcibly opening a locked briefcase where the search is reasonably connected to the arrest.

No Charter breach occurred and the drug evidence was admitted.

The accused was charged with three counts of trafficking crack cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and three counts of possession of proceeds of crime under the Criminal Code arising from controlled purchases conducted by an undercover officer over three consecutive days.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the individual known as “Cinderella” who sold the drugs, pointing to several investigative deficiencies including failure to preserve buy money and failure to conduct a lineup.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the surveillance evidence, photographs, and continuity of observation established identification beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also accepted the evidence of the undercover officer regarding the drug transactions and proceeds.

Convictions were entered on all trafficking and proceeds of crime counts.

The accused brought a motion to sever multiple drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking counts so that each would be tried separately before a jury.

The defence argued that the accused intended to testify on some counts but not others and that a joint trial would undermine the right to remain silent by exposing the accused to cross‑examination on all counts.

Applying the interests of justice framework from R. v. Last, the court considered both the accused’s fair trial rights and society’s interest in efficient proceedings.

The court concluded that trying the possession counts together with the earlier trafficking counts could create unfairness if the accused chose to testify on some counts but not others.

Counts 3 and 4 were severed from counts 1 and 2, while counts 1 and 2 remained joined for trial.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after drugs were discovered beneath the driver’s seat of a vehicle.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the accused had knowledge or possession of the drugs, particularly with respect to the driver who was not directly linked to incriminating text messages.

The court considered circumstantial evidence including text messages arranging a drug transaction, the presence of six cell phones, the planned meeting location, and cash found in another vehicle connected to the transaction.

Applying the definition of possession under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code as incorporated into the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court concluded that both accused had knowledge of the drugs and intended to use them in a drug deal.

The Crown proved possession for the purpose of trafficking beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000, possession of cocaine and cannabis for the purpose of trafficking, possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of a recognizance.

Police executed a search warrant at a residence co-owned by the accused and discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, cash, and packaging materials.

The principal issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs found in the residence.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised control over the drugs or knew of their presence, particularly given evidence that other individuals resided in or frequented the home and one individual occupied the bedroom where drugs were found.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant sought exclusion of drug evidence discovered during a warrantless vehicle search, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Police stopped the vehicle after observing evasive driving in a neighbourhood known for drug activity and seeing the driver make movements inside the car.

The court held that the circumstances amounted only to suspicion and did not provide reasonable grounds to arrest or search.

Additional questioning after the applicant requested counsel constituted further Charter breaches.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the trafficking charge.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine contrary to s. 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime contrary to ss. 354(1)(a) and 355(b) of the Criminal Code.

The evidence consisted largely of surveillance observations and the recovery of police buy money from the accused following an undercover drug purchase arranged through intermediaries.

The defence argued that the case relied on circumstantial evidence and proposed alternative inferences inconsistent with guilt.

The court rejected those alternatives as speculative and held that circumstantial evidence must be assessed according to whether guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, not by the strict Hodge’s rule formulation.

Finding that the only logical inference from the evidence was that the accused supplied the cocaine and received the buy money, the court entered convictions on both counts.

Following a jury conviction for trafficking in crack cocaine, possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime, the court considered an appropriate sentence for a street-level transaction involving a very small quantity of drugs.

The offender had a prior criminal record but no previous drug convictions and had reportedly overcome earlier heroin addiction through treatment programs.

The court weighed aggravating factors including trafficking in a vulnerable neighbourhood and the harmful nature of crack cocaine against mitigating factors such as the small quantity involved, the absence of recent criminal activity, and evidence of rehabilitation.

Applying the sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity under the Criminal Code, the court concluded that a conditional sentence was appropriate.

A conditional sentence of 12 months with a period of house arrest followed by probation was imposed.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to trafficking in a Schedule I substance (Oxycontin) under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of proceeds of crime under the Criminal Code.

Police executed search warrants at two residences and seized large quantities of oxycodone pills with an estimated value of approximately $35,000, along with cash proceeds.

The offender had no prior criminal record and pleaded guilty early, but the court found significant aggravating factors including the large quantity of a hard drug and trafficking motivated by financial gain rather than addiction.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in prescription opioid trafficking and rejected a conditional sentence.

A custodial sentence followed by probation was imposed.

The accused was charged with trafficking in cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime following an undercover police drug purchase.

An undercover officer testified that she purchased cocaine from a man matching the accused’s description using pre-recorded marked money, and surveillance officers identified the accused as the person involved in the transaction.

The defence called multiple civilian witnesses who stated the accused did not engage in a drug transaction and remained with them on the way to purchase pizza.

The court found that although the accused matched the description of the person observed by police, the marked $20 bill allegedly recovered from him was neither photographed nor preserved as evidence.

In the absence of this best evidence and given the competing testimony, the court concluded the Crown had not proven identity and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown sought mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash preliminary inquiry discharges on several drug and firearms-related offences.

The court examined whether the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the evidence and by exceeding the limited weighing permitted when assessing circumstantial evidence under the committal test.

The reviewing court found that the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider key evidence linking the accused to a residence containing methamphetamine and failed to consider direct expert evidence linking firearms to gun boxes found in a storage unit.

Those failures constituted jurisdictional error requiring intervention.

However, the court held there was insufficient evidence to support committal of one accused on ammunition-related charges tied to the storage unit.