Consent and Capacity Board

The appellant, M.R., appealed from a Superior Court order upholding the Consent and Capacity Board’s finding that he lacked capacity to consent to treatment.

The respondent, Dr. Achal Mishra, moved to adduce fresh evidence showing that M.R. was found capable of consenting to treatment in July 2024 and has maintained capacity since.

The Court of Appeal found the appeal to be moot, as there was no longer a live issue, and dismissed the appeal, admitting the fresh evidence and making no order as to costs.

The appellant, J.A., appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice upholding a finding by the Consent and Capacity Board that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, upholding the dismissal of the appellant’s adjournment request and the application of the relevant legal principles regarding capacity and consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court allowed the appeal of Arlene Hastick from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the renewal of her Community Treatment Order (CTO) under the Mental Health Act.

The court found that the Board denied Ms. Hastick procedural fairness by repeatedly preventing her from asking relevant questions of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Banik, and by relying on evidence about her 2016 hospitalization while refusing to allow her to challenge or clarify that evidence.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted Board.

The appellant, G.T., challenged a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming the criteria for issuing a Community Treatment Order (CTO) under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal focused on whether there was informed consent by the substitute decision maker (SDM) and whether the Board erred by relying on uncorroborated hearsay.

The court found that the SDM was properly informed and consented to the treatment plan, and that the Board did not make a palpable and overriding error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The case concerns whether an assessor appointed under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 must provide disclosure of materials collected and reviewed prior to a capacity assessment, and whether the assessor and the Consent and Capacity Board considered the correct factors relevant to the management of property.

The court held that there is no legal obligation for the assessor to provide such disclosure in advance, and that the Board did not err in its application of the legal test for capacity.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision concerns an appeal by L.H. from a Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) decision confirming her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The court reviews the legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and the requirement for the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision.

The court finds that, where the evidence clearly demonstrates the appellant cannot recognize the possibility of being affected by a mental condition, the CCB is not required to inquire into her actual appreciation of the treatment decision’s parameters.

The appeal is dismissed, and an anonymization order is granted.

The appellant, SI, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding Dr. Jeanetta Viljoen’s finding that SI was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic drugs.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly identified and applied the statutory test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act.

The court held that corroborative evidence, as required by the Evidence Act, was present, including the notes and observations of Dr. Banks and other medical history.

The court confirmed that a second clinical opinion is not required for corroboration and that the Board’s findings were supported by the evidence.

The appellant challenged the appeal judge’s dismissal of her appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision, which had confirmed her involuntary admission to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

The appeal judge dismissed the appeal as moot because the appellant had been discharged from CAMH.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no live controversy and no special circumstances to warrant exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court rejected arguments that the appeal right would become illusory or that appellate guidance was needed on the interpretation of Box B criteria under the Mental Health Act.

F.L. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that upheld a Certificate of Incapacity, finding him incapable of managing his property.

The appeal raised issues of procedural fairness due to the joinder of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and alleged errors in law regarding the onus of proof and the application of the incapacity test.

The court dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the procedural fairness arguments from a prior case (P.P. v. Oliver) and affirming that the Board correctly applied the legal tests for incapacity, including the appreciation component, and did not improperly shift the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his challenge to his involuntary status and incapacity finding by the Consent and Capacity Board, arguing abuse of process due to alleged illegal detention and recertification after initial Board decisions in his favour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process or res judicata, as new evidence of the appellant's deteriorating condition and previously unconsidered criteria justified the subsequent certification process.

The court emphasized the flexibility of the abuse of process concept in administrative proceedings and the importance of considering all circumstances, especially new and significant evidence, when determining capacity and involuntary status under the Mental Health Act.

M.F. appealed a decision affirming his incapacity to make treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic medication.

The Consent and Capacity Board and the Superior Court of Justice had previously confirmed Dr. Milovic's finding of incapacity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly weighed the evidence, including the medical opinion that M.F.'s psychosis was due to schizophrenia, not drug-induced psychosis, despite arguments about cannabis use.

The appellant, N.H., appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting to medical treatment for a mental disorder (antipsychotic medication and/or electroconvulsive therapy).

The Board's decision was based on N.H.'s inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions due to his mental illness, despite understanding the relevant information.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of palpable and overriding error, finding that the Board's conclusion regarding N.H.'s lack of appreciation was amply supported by the evidence, including his inconsistent testimony about his mental illness.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Board's finding of incapacity.

The respondent brought a motion to admit fresh evidence and to dismiss the appellant's appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision for delay or as moot.

The court admitted the fresh evidence without requiring leave, finding it relevant to the motion.

The court found the appeal should be dismissed for delay due to the appellant's two-year inaction and relocation to the Congo, and also found the appeal moot as the appellant had been discharged from treatment and the capacity issue was no longer a live dispute.

The motion was granted, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, S.B., appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (the Board) that upheld a physician's finding of his incapacity to manage property due to Huntington's disease.

The Board applied a two-part test under the Substitute Decisions Act, finding S.B. could understand financial information but could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his financial decisions.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the appeal on a standard of palpable and overriding error for mixed questions of fact and law.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Board correctly applied the capacity test by considering S.B.'s lack of insight into his condition's impact on his finances, coupled with his history of poor financial management and vulnerability to exploitation.

The court also rejected the argument that a pre-existing Power of Attorney nullified the capacity assessment, as this issue was not raised at the initial Board hearing.

This appeal concerned a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (the "Board") confirming the appellant's incapacity to consent to treatment.

Subsequent to the Board's decision, the appellant regained capacity, leading both parties to seek to admit new evidence.

The court admitted the new evidence but ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding it moot as the live controversy regarding the appellant's capacity had disappeared.

In the alternative, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's original decision, which had correctly applied the legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The appellant, JS, appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board: one declining jurisdiction over his appeal regarding capacity to manage property, and another upholding a finding of incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on property management capacity, finding the Board erred in declining jurisdiction due to an administrative glitch that denied JS his statutory right to prompt rights advice.

This issue was remitted back to the Board for a hearing on the merits.

The court dismissed the appeal on capacity to consent to treatment, finding the Board applied the correct test and had ample evidence to support its findings, without conflating mental illness with lack of capacity or failing to consider up-to-date evidence.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board, which upheld a psychiatrist's finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication for schizophrenia.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the legal test for capacity and made a palpable and overriding error in its factual findings.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test for capacity under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and that its factual findings regarding the appellant's inability to appreciate the manifestations of his mental condition and the foreseeable consequences of treatment decisions were supported by the evidence.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Superior Court decision affirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO) issued by the respondent psychiatrist.

The appeal challenged the Consent and Capacity Board's finding of the appellant's incapacity to consent to treatment and the validity of the CTO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's application of the two-part capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, as interpreted by Starson v. Swayze, and its assessment of the CTO's compliance with the Mental Health Act.

The court affirmed that the appellant failed to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of not receiving treatment, despite his history of non-compliance and subsequent deterioration.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) which found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who did not appear for the virtual hearing, argued that the CCB failed to consider whether he could recognize the possibility of being affected by a mental condition and erred in its corroboration finding.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard of review, the court found that the CCB had sufficient evidence to support its conclusion that the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment due to his illness, and that the corroborative evidence from his family was sufficient.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning a patient's capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, was found incapable by the Consent and Capacity Board of consenting or refusing antipsychotic medication, a decision upheld by the Superior Court.

The core issue was whether the appellant could appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decision, particularly in light of his delusional beliefs about environmental factors affecting his health.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Board correctly applied the two-branch capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Starson v. Swayze, which requires a patient to recognize how their mental condition's manifestations affect them.

The Court found no error in the Board's factual findings or its application of the legal standard, concluding that the appellant's decision was dictated by his delusions, preventing a rational appreciation of treatment benefits.

The appeal was dismissed.