Children's Aid Society

The applicant children's aid society moved to terminate a supervision order placing two children in the care of a family friend.

The children's lawyer opposed termination, arguing the children's anxiety about potentially returning to their father constituted a new protection concern, and alternatively sought a custodial order under s. 102 of the CYFSA.

The court found the original protection concerns had been resolved, that the children were no longer in need of protection, and that the society was not required to proceed by summary judgment.

The court declined to make a s. 102 custody order, noting it would be inequitable where the father had not filed materials and the proposed custodian was a non-party.

The supervision order was terminated and the cross-motion dismissed.

The applicant sought custody of two children and sought to restrict the respondent's access to supervised visits only, citing concerns about physical discipline and anger management.

The respondent sought to restore what he characterized as the status quo of every weekend access.

The court found that the status quo was the applicant having custody with the respondent exercising weekend access and paying chart child support.

The court rejected the applicant's request for supervised access, finding insufficient evidence to warrant such restriction.

The court established an access schedule of every other weekend and midweek Wednesday visits, with special Christmas access provisions.

The court emphasized the importance of both parents supporting the children's relationship with the other parent and discouraged cross-examination of children about their time with the other parent.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking resumption of court-ordered access to his child, make-up access, permission to amend his response to seek sole custody, transfer of residence if access continued to be denied, police enforcement of access, disclosure of Children's Aid records, and costs.

The respondent mother had denied all access since September 16, 2018, claiming the child had made allegations of mistreatment.

The Children's Aid Society investigated but did not verify the allegations.

The court found the mother in breach of the April 25, 2017 order and applied Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules to impose sanctions.

The court granted make-up access on specified dates, permission to amend the response, and allowed the applicant to serve the Children's Aid Societies for disclosure.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a declaration that North Bay is the proper jurisdiction, return of the children to the District of Nipissing, interim custody, and alternative weekend access.

The applicant opposed the transfer and brought a cross-motion for a restraining order.

The court found that the children's ordinary residence is Mattawa in the District of Nipissing, where they had lived their entire lives prior to being taken by the applicant without warning.

The court determined there was no immediate danger to justify hearing the case elsewhere and transferred the matter to North Bay.

The court found the applicant's allegations of assault lacked credibility, noting the Crown had discharged the respondent at his preliminary inquiry.

The restraining order motion was adjourned to be heard in the proper jurisdiction.

This is a focused hearing on access issues following a summary judgment motion in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court had previously made G.C.A. and E.A. crown wards, with a genuine issue remaining regarding G.C.A.'s access with the mother and maternal grandmother.

The focused hearing addressed the terms and conditions of access for G.C.A. with his mother and maternal grandmother, resulting in a detailed access order with graduated hours, overnight visits on specified occasions, and conditions regarding medication compliance and the presence of third parties.

The applicant mother sought disclosure of the complete records of the Children's Aid Society regarding investigations into allegations that her children were sexually abused by a step-sibling.

The respondent father and the CAS opposed the motion.

The court applied the Stavro test for third-party disclosure and considered principles of proportionality and fairness.

The court granted partial disclosure of CAS records related to the specific investigation of the sexual abuse allegations, but denied disclosure of all statements made by the respondent to the CAS, finding the request was overbroad and amounted to a fishing expedition.

In a child protection proceeding, the child’s father and step‑mother brought a motion seeking an order placing the child in their care and custody.

The court treated the motion as a temporary care and custody hearing under s. 51 of the Child and Family Services Act because no prior temporary care and custody hearing had been held.

Although the evidence established reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm, the court found that the risk could be adequately addressed through a supervision order while the child remained with the mother and step‑father.

The court emphasized continuity of care, the stage of the proceedings, and the society’s position that supervision was appropriate.

The motion seeking placement with the father and step‑mother was dismissed.

The moving parties sought to strike the plaintiff’s 213‑page statement of claim brought against numerous defendants arising from domestic conflict, criminal proceedings, and child protection litigation concerning the plaintiff’s child.

The court found the pleading defective for failing to clearly identify causes of action, material facts, or specific allegations against individual defendants.

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D., the court held that a Children’s Aid Society and its employees owe a duty of care to the child, not the parent, and therefore the negligence claims against the CAS defendants disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court further held the action constituted an abuse of process because it attempted to re‑litigate issues already determined in multiple prior child protection proceedings and collateral attacks on those orders.

The claims were also barred by statutory immunities, deficiencies in pleading intentional torts, lack of standing to sue on behalf of the child, and limitation periods.

The appellant mother appealed an interim family court order dismissing her motion for contempt against the father and reinstating the father’s access to the children.

She alleged factual errors, unfairness, and insufficient reasons by the motions judge, and challenged the imposition of a police enforcement clause.

The appellate court reviewed the record and found no material error of fact or law and no basis to interfere with the motion judge’s determination that contempt had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court emphasized the limited scope of appellate review in custody and access matters.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.

Following dismissal of a child protection motion brought by a child welfare agency seeking emergency supervision and assessment orders under the Child and Family Services Act, the respondents sought costs.

The court found the agency’s investigation and litigation position fell far below the required standard of fairness and reasonableness expected of a statutory child protection authority.

The application was characterized as a fishing expedition driven by concerns raised by school authorities rather than legitimate child protection issues.

Applying rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court concluded that a substantial costs award was warranted.

Costs of $12,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered against the agency.

This decision addresses a costs issue following a temporary care and custody motion in a child protection proceeding.

The court had previously found that the society improperly apprehended several children without a warrant immediately after a justice of the peace refused an apprehension warrant, criticizing the society’s reliance on an incorrect statutory provision and its disregard for the earlier judicial decision.

Although costs are not presumptively awarded in child protection matters under r. 24(2) of the Family Law Rules, the court held that costs may be appropriate where a society engages in procedural misconduct or irregularity causing unnecessary litigation.

The court concluded that the society’s misuse of statutory authority and resulting wrongful apprehension directly caused the respondent to incur additional legal expenses.

A costs award of $3,250 inclusive of disbursements and HST was ordered against the society.

Child protection proceedings in which a children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment declaring several children in need of protection and seeking their return to the mother under a supervision order.

The evidence demonstrated extensive past concerns including exposure to domestic violence, substance abuse, neglect of medical and hygiene needs, and inappropriate discipline.

The mother consented to a finding of protection and supervision, while another responding party opposed the motion and requested a trial or placement of one child in his care.

The court held that the evidence overwhelmingly established the children were in need of protection and that no genuine issue requiring a trial existed.

Applying the statutory requirement to consider the least disruptive measures, the court ordered the children returned to the mother under supervision.

In a child protection proceeding involving two children, the mother brought a motion seeking a parenting capacity assessment of the father who sought custody of one child.

The Society, the father, and counsel for the younger child opposed the request, arguing that sufficient evidence already existed and that the request amounted to a fishing expedition.

The court reviewed the legal framework under s. 54 of the Child and Family Services Act and Ontario Regulation 25/07, emphasizing that such assessments are discretionary and should only be ordered where reasonably necessary to assist the court.

The judge found that the evidentiary record already provided comprehensive information about the parents and the children, and that no unresolved clinical issues required expert evaluation.

The motion for a parenting capacity assessment was therefore dismissed.

Child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act concerning a young child previously removed from the mother’s care following a suicide attempt and alcohol addiction.

The child had been placed with maternal relatives and later returned to the mother on an interim basis while she engaged in addiction treatment and counselling.

The court found the child in need of protection under s. 37(2)(b)(i) but concluded that the least intrusive order consistent with the child’s best interests was a 12‑month supervision order placing the child with the mother.

Evidence demonstrated significant progress by the mother in addressing mental health and substance use issues.

The court also ordered therapeutic intervention and structured steps to re‑establish access between the child and the father, whose participation in the proceedings had been limited.

A father appealed a summary judgment order of the Ontario Court of Justice that made two children crown wards without access for the purpose of adoption in a child protection proceeding.

The father argued the motions judge misapplied the summary judgment test and that a triable issue existed regarding reunification.

The Superior Court held that the correct legal test had been applied and that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The record showed long-standing concerns about the father’s judgment, instability, criminal conduct, and inability to provide safe parenting.

The appeal was dismissed and the crown wardship order remained in effect.

In a high-conflict family law matter, the respondent mother sought to suspend the applicant father's access to two young children based on allegations of physical assault and threats, citing criminal charges pending against him.

The applicant father sought to change custody in his favour.

The court dismissed both motions, finding the evidence inconclusive and conflicting.

The court reinstated the consent final order from July 2011 with a police assistance clause, holding that access should only be suspended in extreme circumstances and that the presumption of regular access by a non-custodial parent is in the best interests of children.

The court also imposed restrictions on future motions without leave.

In a child protection proceeding, the parents brought a motion seeking full documentary disclosure from the Children’s Aid Society and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

Although the Society ultimately consented to the requested disclosure after the motion commenced, the court considered whether costs should be awarded against the Society.

The court held that while child protection agencies do not have immunity from costs awards, costs should only be ordered where the Society conducts itself unfairly in carrying out its statutory responsibilities.

The court found that the Society’s delayed and piecemeal disclosure required the parents to bring an unnecessary motion and risked delaying the trial in a case involving a child already in care for over a year.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore ordered against the Society.

Two applications sought interpretation of an insurance policy issued to a Children’s Aid Society concerning legal expense coverage for foster parents charged with Criminal Code offences.

The applicants argued that the $500,000 aggregate limit applied per policy year, allowing stacking across successive policy periods in which defence costs were incurred.

The insurer argued that the legal expense rider was a claims‑made policy triggered only in the policy period when the criminal proceedings commenced and that coverage was limited to a single $500,000 aggregate limit.

The court held that the wording of the rider allowed aggregate limits to accumulate across policy periods but concluded that the foster parents ceased to qualify as “insureds” after their termination.

As a result, recovery remained limited to the $500,000 aggregate available under the 2008–2009 policy.

Child protection proceedings under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two young children in the care of the Children’s Aid Society.

The applicant sought Crown wardship with a view to adoption following prolonged periods in care, repeated missed access visits, unstable housing, substance‑exposure concerns, and failure by the mother to cooperate with services or attend trial.

Evidence showed a history of neglectful living conditions, inability to maintain consistent contact with the children, and unsuccessful kinship placement assessments.

The court found the children to be in need of protection under s. 37(2) of the Act and determined that their physical, emotional, and developmental needs required permanency through adoption.

Crown wardship without access was ordered.