Child protection

The Highland Shores Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order for the child L.K.D. to be placed in the custody of his father, L.D., with discretionary access for the mother, A.N. The child had previously been found in need of protection.

The mother opposed, seeking the child's return to her care and attempting to overturn the prior protection finding.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on disposition or access, concluding that placing the child in the father's custody with discretionary access for the mother was in the child's best interests, given the child's consistent wishes and the mother's lack of insight into protection concerns.

The Family & Children’s Services of St. Thomas and Elgin brought a motion to continue an interim order placing a child in temporary care, while the respondent mother cross-moved for the child's return.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe a risk of harm existed due to the mother's mental health challenges but determined the child could be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The court dismissed the Society's motion to continue the placement and granted the mother's cross-motion, ordering the child's return to her care under specific supervision conditions.

This is a child protection summary judgment motion brought by the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa seeking a finding that three children (S.L., J.L., N.C.) are in need of protection and an order for extended society care.

The parents contested the grounds for protection and the disposition.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the children being in need of protection under multiple subsections of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, and ordered extended society care.

However, the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the parents' access to the children.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto appealed a Superior Court decision that upheld an Ontario Court of Justice order concerning monthly access to children.

The Society argued that the OCJ lacked jurisdiction to entertain an enforcement motion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules after a final order had been made, contending that the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 was a complete code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the OCJ retained jurisdiction to enforce its orders, as the definition of "case" in the Family Law Rules explicitly includes "enforcements," and requiring a new proceeding for enforcement would contradict the principle of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the Superior Court judge and addressed procedural fairness concerns.

The Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of the child S.H. in kinship placement, with supervised access for the Respondent Mother.

The Mother opposed, seeking the child's return to her care, and challenged the admissibility of photographs taken by the Society, arguing a Charter breach.

The court found a serious Charter infringement regarding the photographs but, applying the R. v. Grant framework, determined that their exclusion would not place the child at risk of harm nor significantly impact the Society's case, as the narrative evidence was sufficient.

Ultimately, the court found the Mother unable to meet parenting responsibilities due to home conditions, mental health, and interaction issues, and ordered the child to remain in kinship care with Society supervision and specific terms for the Mother, while excluding the contested photographs from evidence.

This decision provides an update on an ongoing child protection application, detailing the progress of the Durham Children's Aid Society and respondent father A.V. in implementing previous court orders regarding the child J.'s care, schooling, and counselling.

It notes less positive developments with respondent parents D.F. and C.S., including a new child's removal and potential file transfer from another jurisdiction.

The court addressed an informal request by the maternal great grandparents for party status, directing them to bring a formal motion with evidence and legal submissions.

The decision also sets out a schedule for costs submissions from A.V. against the Society and adjourns the matter for further attendance.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion seeking an order to prohibit the respondent mother from making public social media postings related to the society's involvement with her children, the children's fathers, caregivers, and society employees, and to compel the removal of existing posts.

The mother opposed the motion.

The court granted the orders, finding that the mother's postings violated subsection 87(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, by identifying children and parties to the proceedings.

The court also relied on its inherent power to control its own process to protect participants from cyberbullying and maintain the integrity of child protection proceedings.

The Jewish Family and Child Services of Greater Toronto brought a motion to declare the respondent Z.Y. a "special party" under subrule 2(1) of the Family Law Rules and to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as her representative.

Z.Y., the mother of the subject child, opposed the motion.

The court reviewed the legal framework for determining mental incapacity, including provisions from the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, and relevant case law.

Based on evidence of Z.Y.'s severe mental health decline, disorganized thinking, and inability to understand the proceedings or appreciate the consequences of her decisions, the court found that Z.Y. met the criteria for a "special party" due to mental incapacity.

The motion was granted, and the PGT was appointed as Z.Y.'s representative to protect her interests and ensure proper presentation of information for the child's best interests.

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel appealed a lower court order that required it to hire a third-party professional supervision service for supervised home visits.

The Society argued that this requirement contravened s. 94(6)(c) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA), which prohibits compelling the Society to provide financial assistance or purchase goods/services for supervision orders.

Applying a correctness standard of review, the court found that the lower court's order did indeed contravene s. 94(6)(c) by obligating the Society to purchase services.

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned provision of the order was set aside.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion under section 98 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act for a psychosexual assessment of the respondent father, A.L.-S., due to his history of sexual assault convictions and concerns about risk to the child.

The maternal grandmother supported the motion, while the father opposed it, arguing it was unnecessary, invasive, and infringed his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society failed to demonstrate the assessment was "necessary" as required by section 98, noting that the father's criminal record was already before the court and his insight could be tested via cross-examination.

The court also expressed uncertainty about the assessment's methodology, particularly the reliance solely on phallometric testing, and its relevance given the existing evidence.

This is a Status Review application by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto concerning two children, AR (14) and AY (7).

The Society sought an order placing the children in the custody of their maternal aunt and uncle, with no access for the father and a restraining order against him.

The father, M.J., initially sought the children's return or liberal access, then proposed a further 6-month supervision order.

The court found an ongoing need for protection due to the father's incarceration (charged with the mother's murder), untreated mental health issues, history of family violence, and alcohol abuse.

Considering the children's consistent wishes to remain with their aunt and uncle and have no contact with their father, and the aunt and uncle's ability to meet the children's needs and provide stability, the court granted the Society's requested orders.

The Ottawa Children's Aid Society and Kristine Pearce brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss an action and strike the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff, M. E.-H. The defendants argued the action constituted an abuse of process as an impermissible collateral attack on prior child protection orders, and alternatively, that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, Charter breaches, misfeasance in public office, breach of confidentiality, nervous shock, and defamation, stemming from the apprehension of his children and the subsequent child protection proceedings.

The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the action on both grounds, finding it to be an abuse of process and that the claims lacked a reasonable cause of action, particularly noting that a Children's Aid Society owes no duty of care to parents in child protection matters.

The Children's Aid Society initiated a Status Review Application concerning two children, S.W. (17) and S.H. (6), who were previously under a supervision order with their mother.

The Society sought termination of the order for S.W. and extended society care (later custody to kin) for S.H. The mother and S.H.'s father opposed, seeking return of the children.

The court found both children remained in need of protection due to the parents' persistent instability, mental health issues, and lack of engagement.

It ordered the termination of the order for S.W. (who was doing well with paternal family in New Brunswick) and granted custody of S.H. to the kin caregivers (L.B. and Q.B.) in New Brunswick, with incidental orders for access and authority to obtain identification without parental consent.

This appeal concerns whether the appellants, who have cared for an Indigenous child (J.T.) since infancy, are entitled to bring an application for parenting orders under the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA).

The motion judge allowed the application, but the appeal judge overturned, finding the appellants were "foster parents" precluded from bringing such an application and that a valid customary care agreement existed.

The Court of Appeal found that Dilico Anishinabek Family Care acted without legal authority by maintaining de facto guardianship after temporary care agreements expired and that subsequent agreements were not valid customary care agreements due to lack of consent from all parties.

The Court held that judicial oversight is required and that the appellants are entitled to pursue their CLRA application, regardless of whether they are characterized as foster parents or customary caregivers, as the CLRA provides an avenue for determining the child's best interests, incorporating national standards for Indigenous children.

The appellant father (B.K.) appealed a final order from the Ontario Court of Justice that placed his children in the care and custody of the respondent mother (D.A.) subject to the Society's supervision.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding who had pre-intervention charge of the children and the children's true wishes, and alleged misconduct by the Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL).

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings of fact and mixed fact and law, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection proceedings.

The court also dismissed the appellant's motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the required standard of being highly relevant and decisive to the children's best interests.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion for final orders regarding the child E., including joint custody to the father and paternal grandmother, decision-making authority to the father, and discretionary supervised access for the mother.

The mother opposed, seeking joint custody and generous unsupervised access.

The court applied the Hryniak framework for summary judgment, with the caution required in child protection cases (Kawartha principles).

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's untreated mental health issues, history of instability, and failure to engage with services.

The court granted the Society's requested orders, finding them to be in the child's best interests, and dismissed the mother's opposing requests.

The appellants, C.O. and N.P., appealed convictions for failure to provide necessaries of life and an order for a new trial on unlawful confinement, stemming from the unsanitary conditions in their apartment and the confinement of their four-year-old daughter, J. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, affirming that risk of harm is an element of the necessaries offence under s. 215(2)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code and that the conditions of confinement are relevant to the "lawful authority" defence under s. 279(2).

The court found the trial judge erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the health risks posed by the cumulative unsanitary conditions.

The matter was remitted for sentencing on the necessaries charge.

The applicant maternal grandmother sought an order under s. 81(4) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) to have her granddaughter brought before the court for child protection, alleging the child was not adequately protected in her father's care.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds to believe the child was in need of protection due to a pattern of neglect by the father and that court intervention under the CYFSA was necessary, as protection could not be adequately achieved through existing Children's Law Reform Act (CLRA) proceedings.

The court ordered that the threshold tests for a protection application were met, an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) order be made, and the CLRA proceedings be stayed.

This case involved two motions in a Status Review proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society sought to change the placement of child A.A-L.C. to the maternal grandmother, V.C., while the respondent father, J.T., sought placement of his biological child, J.C-T., in his care.

Both children were currently in the care of their mother, A.C., under supervision orders.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that despite the mother's non-compliance with supervision terms and some inappropriate behavior, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a change in circumstances requiring the children's removal from her care, particularly given the lack of evidence of direct harm to the children and the importance of sibling bonds.

The Children's Aid Society of Brant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking continued protection findings for the child T.E.H., an order for deemed custody to the paternal aunt L.H., specific access orders for the mother and siblings, no access for the mother's partner, and discretionary access for the father.

The court found T.E.H. to be in continuing need of protection due to risk of emotional harm.

It granted deemed custody to the paternal aunt, L.H., prioritizing the child's best interests and Indigenous cultural identity.

The court made temporary access orders for the mother and siblings, but declined to make a "no access" order for the mother's partner or a discretionary access order for the father, emphasizing the court's obligation to impose specific terms and conditions for access.