S. McCooeye

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion under section 98 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act for a psychosexual assessment of the respondent father, A.L.-S., due to his history of sexual assault convictions and concerns about risk to the child.

The maternal grandmother supported the motion, while the father opposed it, arguing it was unnecessary, invasive, and infringed his Charter rights.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society failed to demonstrate the assessment was "necessary" as required by section 98, noting that the father's criminal record was already before the court and his insight could be tested via cross-examination.

The court also expressed uncertainty about the assessment's methodology, particularly the reliance solely on phallometric testing, and its relevance given the existing evidence.

The father (P.W.) appealed a trial judge's decision finding his children in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and placing them in the mother's custody with supervised access for the father.

The father argued the trial judge erred in applying the Act, misapprehended evidence, and erred in judicial notice and risk assessment.

The Children's Aid Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the trial judge's flexible approach to evidence and findings.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of need for protection and the disposition, upholding the flexible approach to evidence in child protection cases and deferring to the trial judge's factual findings and assessment of the children's best interests.

This is a ruling on a voir dire held in a summary judgment motion in a child protection application.

The Children's Aid Society sought findings that two children were in need of protection, an order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised paternal access.

The voir dire addressed the admissibility of two letters from Office of the Children's Lawyer counsel containing the views and wishes of the children.

The court applied the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule to determine which statements were admissible, requiring that statements describe the contemporaneous emotional state of the children without describing the cause of that state.

The applicant society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of three First Nations children (ages 13, 10, and 7) following their apprehension by warrant due to domestic violence in the home.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion.

The court applied the statutory framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, determining that reasonable grounds existed to believe the children were at risk of harm and could not be adequately protected by a non-removal order.

The court considered placement with the maternal grandfather as a relative under the statutory preference for kinship placements and found it to be in the children's best interests, subject to conditions including the removal of adult siblings from the grandfather's home.

This is a motion by the respondent father to vary an interim access order in a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The father sought to increase his access to his 13-year-old daughter, A., from five hours every second Sunday to weekly access.

The Children's Aid Society opposed the variation, arguing the father had not demonstrated material change in circumstances and that the child's stability and therapeutic needs required maintaining the status quo.

The court found that significant changes in circumstances had occurred since the original order was made, including the father's active participation in the case, improved family support, employment prospects, and the child's expressed wishes to spend more time with her father.

The court granted the variation, increasing access to weekly visits while maintaining supervision and conditions appropriate to the child's best interests.

This is a ruling on a motion brought by the respondent father in a status review proceeding under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The father sought an order that his 13-year-old daughter have interim access to him, framed as the child being the access holder rather than the father.

The court ruled that the motion claim was improperly before the court because the father had not made a corresponding claim in his Answer for a final order, had not complied with statutory notice requirements, and was not bringing the motion under the proper procedural framework.

The court found that while the father has standing to bring such applications under the statute, he must do so in compliance with the applicable statutory and procedural requirements.

A child protection matter involving two children where the Children's Aid Society sought conditions restricting contact between the children and SM, the mother's new partner, due to concerns about domestic violence, substance abuse, and non-compliance with a voluntary safety agreement.

The court granted a temporary order for care and custody with conditions under section 94(2)(b) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, allowing the children to remain with the mother subject to supervision and specific terms.

The decision addresses significant procedural issues regarding short notice in child protection proceedings and the distinction between direct applications and traditional apprehensions.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a parenting capacity assessment under section 98 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The central issue was what documentation should be provided to the assessor prior to conducting the assessment.

The father's counsel argued that providing extensive background materials would create confirmatory bias, while the Society contended that such information was necessary for a meaningful assessment.

The court held that while not all affidavit materials need be automatically provided in advance, the assessor must have discretion to request any information deemed necessary to properly answer the assessment questions.

The court ordered that a brief factual summary, discussions with child protection workers, and any further materials requested by the assessor be provided.

In a child protection status review proceeding, the court determined whether a four-year-old child should be placed in temporary care and custody with a non-parent third party (the father's ex-girlfriend) or with the Children's Aid Society in foster care.

The father had breached multiple conditions of a supervision order, including being intoxicated while caring for the child.

The court rejected placement with the paternal grandmother due to jurisdictional concerns (she resided in Michigan), rejected placement with the mother due to her unsuitability as a caregiver, and ultimately ordered placement with the ex-girlfriend subject to a supervision order by the society.

The court emphasized the statutory preference for kinship placements over society care and the importance of maintaining the child's connections with significant persons in his life.

The applicant sought sole custody, child support, equalization, and a restraining order in an uncontested trial after the respondent failed to file an answer or provide financial disclosure.

The court granted the applicant sole custody of the parties' special needs child, with no access to the respondent.

Income was imputed to the respondent at $50,000 for child support purposes, and he was ordered to pay table support and 75% of section 7 expenses.

The court also ordered an equalization payment of $11,625 to the applicant and issued a restraining order against the respondent due to his past abusive behaviour and threats.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of a child protection proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The child subject to the proceeding (H.S.) was identified as non-status and not an Indian or native child under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction under its ministerial designation to provide services in this case.

The court held that jurisdictional compliance with the Minister's designation cannot be overridden by efficiency or duplication of services arguments, and that the court has authority to determine whether a society has jurisdiction to be the applicant in a child protection proceeding.

This decision addresses a motion by Children's Aid Society of Algoma (Algoma CAS) seeking to substitute Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services (Nogdawindamin CAS) as the applicant in child protection proceedings.

The motion arises from the recent designation of Nogdawindamin, a native agency, as a children's aid society effective April 1, 2017.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, which contains both geographical and personal jurisdictional components, as well as conditions restricting certain functions pending consultation and coordination with other First Nations communities.

The court determined that the children and mother in this case, as registered or eligible members of Batchewana First Nation, fall within Nogdawindamin CAS's jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of its designation.

The motion was granted, and the proceeding was transferred to Nogdawindamin CAS with ancillary orders for change of solicitors and amendment of the title of the proceeding.

This is a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act involving five children from blended family situations.

The court addressed temporary care and custody motions brought by the Children's Aid Society and the father pursuant to section 51(2) of the CFSA.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of physical abuse, inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, and substance use.

The court made mixed determinations regarding temporary placements: one child remained with maternal grandparents despite an unfavourable kin assessment; one child remained with paternal grandparents; one child remained with biological father; and two children were placed with their biological mother.

The court emphasized that consent orders cannot be rubber-stamped without proper legal foundation and that the most vulnerable child required protection despite parental completion of some programming.

The applicant father and respondent mother brought competing motions regarding the mother's request to relocate their child to Sudbury.

The mother had moved to Sudbury for better economic opportunities and to live with her new partner.

The court considered the father's history of a severe drinking and driving incident, which raised concerns about his sobriety and the child's safety in his care.

Finding no such risks with the mother's plan, the court granted interim custody to the mother and permitted the child's relocation to Sudbury, with access to the father.

No costs were awarded as the court questioned the urgency of the mother's initial move.