Cannabis Act

The defendant was charged with seven counts arising from the execution of Cannabis Act search warrants at two residential properties on November 3, 2021.

The charges included unlawful possession of cannabis for purposes of distribution and sale at both properties, and unlicensed possession of firearms and a prohibited device at the rural property.

The defendant was found present at the rural property when police executed the warrant.

The Crown relied primarily on circumstantial evidence and DNA evidence to establish possession.

The court found that while the Crown established the presence of substantial quantities of cannabis and firearms at both locations, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed these items.

The court acquitted on all counts, finding reasonable doubts regarding the defendant's knowledge and control over the items, the handling of evidence by police, and the possibility of indirect DNA transfer.

The Crown applied for summary dismissal of the accused's application alleging institutional bias in relation to cannabis-related charges.

The accused alleged that the history of the Jesuits' involvement with Indigenous peoples created a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias, and that a question posed by Crown counsel during cross-examination regarding the Pope crystallized this bias.

The accused sought a traditional Indigenous circle for resolution of the matters.

The court granted the Crown's application for summary dismissal, finding the underlying application manifestly frivolous and that the accused failed to meet the high threshold for establishing institutional bias.

The accused was charged with possession of cannabis for the purpose of exportation contrary to section 11(2) of the Cannabis Act.

On September 1, 2023, the accused attended at Pearson Airport with two checked bags containing 29.77 kilograms of cannabis destined for export to the United Kingdom.

The central issue was whether the accused had knowledge that the bags contained cannabis.

The trial began as a jury trial but was converted to a judge-alone trial mid-trial due to disclosure issues regarding text messages.

The court found that while the accused's credibility was questionable, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the bags contained cannabis.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused sought leave to cross-examine Detective Constable William Crawford, the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) affidavit used to secure search warrants under the Cannabis Act.

The accused was charged with three counts under the Cannabis Act and six counts under the Criminal Code related to unlicensed cannabis possession and firearms offences.

The court considered five proposed areas of cross-examination: hemp checks conducted, ability to differentiate cannabis from hemp plants, interpretation of monitored conversations, failure to include certain surveillance dates, and alleged failures to be full and frank in specific paragraphs of the ITO.

The court granted leave for cross-examination regarding hemp checks and the basis for belief about plant identification, but denied leave for the other three areas.

The applicant, Matthew John Blumenstock, sought to exclude evidence seized from his residence under section 8 of the Charter, arguing that the search warrant was issued without sufficient grounds linking him or the property to drug offences.

The court reviewed the investigative background, the Information to Obtain (ITO), and the legal standards for issuing a search warrant.

Justice Spencer Nicholson found that, considering the totality of the evidence—including surveillance, phone records, and the presence of suspicious cardboard boxes—there were reasonable grounds to believe that illicit cannabis would be found at the property.

The application was dismissed.

The court sentenced Zongxiu Jiang to 18 months' incarceration for cultivating cannabis in a non-dwelling house, contrary to s. 12(6)(a) of the Cannabis Act.

The decision reviews the facts, the parties' positions, sentencing principles, and the range of sentences for large-scale cannabis operations.

The court found that, despite mitigating factors such as a guilty plea and family hardship, the gravity and scale of the commercial operation, and Jiang's role as principal, required a custodial sentence.

The court declined to impose a conditional sentence, emphasizing the paramount importance of deterrence and denunciation in such cases, and held that collateral immigration consequences could not justify a more lenient sentence.

This decision addresses a constitutional challenge to section 9(5)(a)(i) of the Cannabis Act, which prohibits discharges for indictable offences of possession of cannabis for the purpose of distribution.

The court upholds the constitutionality of the provision, finding that the infringement on liberty is not grossly disproportionate or overbroad, does not impose a grossly disproportionate sentence, and does not create a distinction based on race in its impact.

The court sentences the accused, Rene Smith, to a fine of $7,500 and makes several ancillary orders.

This decision clarifies the meaning of "export" under the Cannabis Act in the context of possession for the purpose of exporting cannabis.

The Court held that "export" means sending cannabis or industrial hemp from Canada to another country and does not require proof of commercial value or any additional purpose beyond the physical act of exportation.

The ruling emphasizes that the Act and its regulations permit exportation only for medical, scientific, or industrial hemp purposes, and that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession was intended to cause the cannabis to leave Canada.

The accused, Mario Bixhi, was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cannabis for the purpose of distributing and selling, possession of proceeds of crime, willfully resisting a police officer, and taking a weapon from a peace officer.

The case arose from a search warrant executed at Bixhi’s apartment.

The court found Bixhi guilty of the cannabis-related offences and resisting/taking a weapon from police, but acquitted him of the cocaine trafficking charge, finding a reasonable doubt as to his knowledge and control over the cocaine, given the evidence of a third party who claimed sole responsibility for the cocaine.

This decision concerns the sentencing of two individuals, Adam Luangphasi and Alexander Le, following their convictions for multiple drug-related conspiracies arising from "Project Southam." Luangphasi was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic cocaine (Carpet Conspiracy) and two counts of conspiracy to import cocaine (Guyana Conspiracy and Plane Conspiracy), where he was identified as a top principal.

Le was found guilty of conspiracy to export cannabis (Cannabis Conspiracy) and also conspiracy to traffic cocaine (Carpet Conspiracy) and conspiracy to import cocaine (Guyana Conspiracy), acting as a close colleague to Luangphasi.

The court applied sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity, emphasizing the severe societal harm caused by drug importation and trafficking.

It rejected the argument that a "dry conspiracy" (where drugs were not actually imported) warrants a significant sentence reduction if the conspiracy was not abandoned.

Luangphasi received a global sentence of 18 years imprisonment, while Le received a global sentence of 9 years imprisonment, with specific concurrent terms for each count.

Ancillary orders for DNA and firearms prohibitions were also imposed.

The defendants pleaded guilty to an offence under s. 12(6) of the Cannabis Act after police discovered a large-scale illegal cannabis grow operation.

The Crown sought conditional sentences of imprisonment, while the defence argued for conditional discharges and probation, emphasizing the defendants' limited role as labourers, lack of prior criminal records, and significant potential immigration consequences.

The court considered the large size of the operation as an aggravating factor but found the defendants' moral culpability to be low.

Balancing the principles of sentencing, including denunciation, deterrence, and the least restrictive sanctions, alongside the severe collateral immigration consequences (potential deportation), the court determined that conditional discharges were appropriate and not contrary to the public interest.

The applicant, Tiffani Martin, sought to exclude evidence (fentanyl, cocaine, and hashish) seized from her purse, arguing violations of her ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including arbitrary prolonged investigative detention, arbitrary arrest for possession of a restricted weapon without reasonable and probable grounds, delayed notification and facilitation of the right to counsel, and an unlawful search of her purse (not incidental to arrest nor a lawful inventory search).

Applying the R. v. Grant factors for s. 24(2) Charter exclusion, the court determined that the seriousness and impact of the police misconduct outweighed society's interest in admitting the reliable evidence.

Consequently, the drug evidence was excluded, which is anticipated to lead to the applicant's acquittal on the drug trafficking charges.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging infringements of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) rights following a vehicle stop and search that led to charges for drug and firearm offences.

The court found that the police search of the vehicle was unlawful and unreasonable due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds under the Cannabis Act, and that the applicant's detention became unlawful and arbitrary, infringing his ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the seriousness of the charges and the high reliability and importance of the evidence to the prosecution's case outweighed the Charter breaches, leading to the admission of the seized evidence.

The appellant challenged provisions of Quebec's Cannabis Regulation Act that completely prohibit the possession and cultivation of cannabis plants in a dwelling-house, arguing they fell under federal criminal law power or were inoperative due to federal paramountcy.

The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions are a valid exercise of provincial jurisdiction under ss. 92(13) and (16) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding their pith and substance is to ensure the effectiveness of the state monopoly on cannabis sales to protect public health and security.

The Court further held that the provisions do not frustrate the purpose of the federal Cannabis Act, because Parliament's exemption of up to four home-grown plants does not confer positive rights to cultivate, and the provincial objectives are compatible with the federal scheme's goals of combating illicit cannabis activity.

The three defendants, Tuan Tai Le, Ba Loc Nguyen, and Phap Hong Nguyen, pleaded guilty to cultivating cannabis plants in excess of the amount permitted by law at a licensed grow operation.

The Crown sought a six-month incarceration, while defence counsel requested absolute discharges.

The court found that the defendants were manual labourers with minimal moral culpability, having mistakenly believed their work was lawful due to cannabis legalization.

They suffered significant collateral immigration consequences, including loss of legal status and inability to work or return home.

The court dismissed the Crown's request for incarceration, finding it disproportionately punitive, and granted absolute discharges to all three defendants, deeming it in their best interests and not contrary to the public interest.

The defendant, Aziel Bailey, was charged with possessing over 30g of cannabis for distribution, contrary to s. 9(2) of the Cannabis Act.

The trial focused on whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in possession of the large quantity of cannabis found in the residence he fled.

The court assessed the credibility of police witnesses and the defendant.

The defendant's testimony, which attempted to explain his presence in the residence and his flight, was rejected as implausible and untruthful.

Based on the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's flight, the contents of his satchel, the presence of drugs in adjoining residences, the smell of cannabis, and his non-compliance with police commands, the court concluded that the defendant was fully aware of and maintained control over the cannabis.

The court found the defendant guilty.

The Crown applied for an adult sentence for a young person, M.B., who was found guilty of numerous serious offences, including a targeted shooting and subsequent firearm and drug offences.

The court considered the two-part test under section 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act: whether the Crown rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and whether a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The court found that M.B.'s actions, while serious, did not demonstrate adult maturity or sophistication, citing his background as a refugee, cognitive challenges, susceptibility to negative peer influence, and amateurish conduct during the offences.

The court also noted M.B.'s significant progress and rehabilitation while in custody.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, and the application for an adult sentence was dismissed, with the court concluding that a maximum youth sentence could adequately hold M.B. accountable.

Craig Colton pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking and possession offences.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence (24-30 months), while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court determined Colton was a street-level trafficker, not mid-level, and considered his personal circumstances, including childhood trauma, addiction, and rehabilitation efforts.

The judge concluded that an upper reformatory sentence was fit and that a conditional sentence, with strict conditions including home confinement and electronic monitoring, would adequately achieve sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence while fostering rehabilitation.

The court considered the defendant's request for costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for an interim injunction.

The plaintiff, acting in person, resisted costs, claiming to be a "pauper." The court applied the principles of indemnity and access to justice, noting that the plaintiff's motion was unmeritorious and not brought in the public interest, especially given the imminent passage of the Cannabis Act.

The court found the defendant's requested costs of $3,000, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable, despite the defendant's actual costs being higher.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $3,000 in costs.

The plaintiff, a minister of the Assembly of the Church of the Universe, sought an interim injunction to prevent prosecution under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Cannabis Act, arguing that such prosecutions infringed his right to freedom of religion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction, particularly in light of the recent legalization of cannabis for personal use.