Abuse of process

The respondents brought a motion to quash an appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing the appellants' application as an abuse of process.

The appellants argued the appeal belonged in the Divisional Court because the original proceeding was brought under the Business Corporations Act.

The court determined that the 'lynchpin' of the underlying application was a claim for breach of a joint venture agreement, not a corporate remedy.

Consequently, the order appealed from was a final order disposing of contractual claims, meaning the appeal properly lies to the Court of Appeal under section 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion to quash was granted.

The applicants brought a motion to extend the time to deliver a Notice of Appeal and for an interim order that the respondents pay $10 million US pending a reference hearing.

The court dismissed the motion to extend time, finding the applicants filed no evidence to satisfy the test for an extension.

The court also dismissed the request for an interim payment, noting that the applicant had previously sought the same relief multiple times, which had been dismissed as an abuse of process, and that the applicant was subject to an order requiring leave to bring such motions, which had not been obtained.

The appellant brought two appeals from the Landlord and Tenant Board and one application for judicial review regarding a Human Rights Tribunal decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the proceedings as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeals, which raised no questions of law, and lacked jurisdiction to award damages on a judicial review application.

All three proceedings were dismissed.

The tenant appealed a consent eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board on the last day before enforcement, triggering an automatic stay.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was devoid of merit and an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court found the tenant was 'gaming the system' to avoid paying rent, quashed the appeal, lifted the stay, and awarded substantial indemnity costs to the landlord.

Metrolinx brought a motion to quash Unimac's application for judicial review of a security for costs order made by a Master in a construction lien action.

Unimac alleged procedural unfairness based on communications between the Master and Metrolinx's counsel, and errors in the Master's treatment of evidence.

The Divisional Court found the communication complaints to be utterly devoid of merit and the evidentiary complaints to be matters for an appeal, not judicial review.

Since the Construction Lien Act prohibits appeals of interlocutory orders, the court held that the judicial review application was an abuse of process attempting to circumvent this prohibition.

The motion to quash was granted.

The appellant lawyer was investigated by the Law Society for alleged involvement in mortgage fraud.

After a five-year delay, the Hearing Panel dismissed the disciplinary application, finding the delay caused the appellant serious psychological harm.

The Appeal Panel overturned this decision, finding the Hearing Panel misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's cross-examination and applied the wrong legal test.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the court restored the Hearing Panel's decision, holding that the Appeal Panel failed to show deference and that the unchallenged expert evidence clearly established the appellant suffered significant psychological harm due to the inordinate delay.

Following the quashing of the defendant's appeals, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the defendant's conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The court reviewed the standard for elevated costs and found the defendant's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $6,000.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board dismissing its Requests for Hearing regarding the removal of vascular ultrasound services from its licences.

The Board had dismissed the requests due to an inordinate 15-year delay causing prejudice, and found the requests moot because the appellant failed to comply with Minutes of Settlement that provided a mechanism to restore the services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and its application of the test for administrative delay correct.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside orders of single judges that quashed his application for mandamus and allowed interveners to participate.

The applicant sought to compel three police forces to investigate alleged criminal conduct by the CN Police Service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, affirming that mandamus does not lie to compel police to investigate specific crimes, as police discretion in such matters is not subject to judicial dictation.

The court also upheld the costs awards and strongly criticized counsel for filing voluminous, uncoordinated materials, citing the culture shift required by Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel that affirmed findings of professional misconduct and the revocation of her licence to practice law.

She argued that the Hearing Panel lacked jurisdiction due to improper transition from the old discipline regime to the new one, and that she was denied procedural fairness when refused access to an RCMP file.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the transition provisions were properly applied, the appellant suffered no prejudice, and she failed to demonstrate the relevance of the RCMP file or overcome the doctrine of abuse of process regarding her prior litigation.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court order dismissing her action against her former paralegal for alleged breach of contract and negligence.

The Deputy Judge had dismissed the action at a settlement conference, finding it to be an 'abuse of process' because it related to a previously settled claim against her former lawyer.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Deputy Judge provided insufficient reasons and erred in characterizing the action as an abuse of process.

The court noted there is no per se rule that negligence actions against legal representatives involving re-litigation of issues from a previous proceeding are an abuse of process.

The dismissal order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial before a different judge.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) Chair dismissing their Request for Review of a Hearing Officer's decision.

The Hearing Officer had approved an Official Plan amendment allowing residential development on lands, parts of which were designated as a cultural heritage landscape.

The moving party argued the OMB erred by not giving deference to the factual findings of the Conservation Review Board (CRB) regarding the extent of the heritage landscape, raising issue estoppel and abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no question of law, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the OMB decision, and that the matter was not of sufficient general importance.

The respondent physicians brought a motion to restrain the appellant from bringing further appeals or motions in the Divisional Court without leave, pending the determination of an application to declare her a vexatious litigant.

The appellant had commenced multiple actions arising from the same events, filed lengthy and incomprehensible documents, made scandalous allegations against judges and counsel, and failed to pay over $34,000 in outstanding costs awards.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, invoking its inherent jurisdiction and statutory powers to prevent an abuse of process, and stayed all related proceedings by the appellant unless leave is obtained.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission finding they contravened the Securities Act by trading in securities without registration or a prospectus, and by misrepresenting that the securities would be listed on an exchange.

The appellants argued the transactions were good faith loans exempt from the Act, and raised numerous procedural and fairness arguments including abuse of process, bias, and failure to disclose evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Commission's conclusion that the transactions were disguised sales was reasonable, and rejecting all procedural and fairness challenges.

The applicant sought judicial review of three Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions that dismissed his five applications alleging discrimination and reprisal by the respondent church, and declared him a vexatious litigant.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and found no errors of law or unreasonable findings of fact in the Tribunal's decisions.

The application for judicial review was dismissed, and costs of $3,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The respondent union brought a motion to dismiss four applications for judicial review commenced by the self-represented applicant.

The applicant had failed to set any of the applications down for a hearing, resulting in delays ranging from over two to nearly five years.

The court found the delay to be unacceptable and that it caused obvious prejudice in the employment context.

The court also noted the applicant's history of abusing tribunal processes and acting as a vexatious litigant.

The motion was granted, the applications for judicial review were dismissed, and the applicant's cross-motion was dismissed.

The Independent Police Review Director brought a motion to quash a summons to witness issued to an investigator and for a declaration that counsel to the OIPRD was not required to bring the investigative file to her cross-examination.

The underlying application for judicial review sought to defer interviews of two police officers facing criminal charges until after their criminal trial.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence sought from the investigator and the investigative file was not relevant or necessary for the judicial review application, as it exceeded the narrow focus of the proceeding.

The applicants brought two applications for judicial review of decisions by the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

At the hearing, the applicants requested an adjournment based on irrelevant proceedings and offensive submissions.

The court refused the adjournment and directed the applicants to proceed.

When the applicants refused to proceed, the court dismissed the applications and suggested that the respondents consider bringing a vexatious litigant application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendant vehicle owner sought leave to appeal the dismissal of its summary judgment motion.

The owner argued that the driver's criminal conviction for operating a motor vehicle without consent precluded re-litigating the issue of consent, making the claims an abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the insurer had led evidence to the contrary raising a genuine issue for trial, and that a full appreciation of the evidence required a trial.

The applicants continued their application to seek a contribution towards costs from the decision-maker.

The Divisional Court found that while the continuation was not an abuse of process, the applicants failed to establish a factual foundation to seek costs from the decision-maker.

The application was dismissed without costs.