Keith E. Wright

The appellant appealed his convictions for second degree murder and the increase of his parole ineligibility period from ten to fifteen years.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness, the meaning of reasonable doubt, and the distinction between inferences and speculation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's instructions were adequate and substantially complied with the principles in Lifchus.

The court also found no error in principle regarding the sentence, concluding it was not manifestly excessive.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest, sexual assault, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting prior consistent statements, bad character evidence, and undisclosed evidence from his wife, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding no serious errors and applying the curative proviso where necessary.

However, applying the Kienapple principle, the court stayed the convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, leaving the incest conviction to stand.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant's conviction for attempted murder was previously substituted with a conviction for aggravated assault by the Court of Appeal.

The court received written submissions on sentencing.

The Crown sought to uphold the original three-year penitentiary term, while the appellant sought a conditional sentence of 12 to 18 months.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence given the deliberate nature of the vehicular assault and the severe injuries caused.

The court imposed a sentence of 20 months' imprisonment, factoring in a two-for-one credit for two months of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder after striking the victim with his car.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the distance and speed of the vehicle, relying on unadopted hearsay to conclude the appellant had the requisite intent to kill.

The Court set aside the attempted murder conviction and, with the Crown's consent, substituted a conviction for the lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the common law rule of jury secrecy and section 649 of the Criminal Code infringed their Charter rights by preventing them from adducing evidence of jury deliberations to impeach their verdicts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the common law rule of jury secrecy, which prohibits the admission of evidence concerning the intrinsic deliberation process but allows evidence of extrinsic influences, is consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court also found that section 649 of the Criminal Code is constitutional and that the trial judge in the appellant Pan's case did not err in declaring a mistrial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence regarding the frequency of foreign DNA under fingernails, instructing the jury on his credibility based on an admitted theft, prohibiting evidence of a third party's disposition for violence, and instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal released an addendum to address the appellant Johnson's sentence appeal, which was inadvertently omitted from the original endorsement.

As no oral or written submissions were advanced in support of the appeal, the court found it had no merit and dismissed it.

The appellant was convicted of assault, unlawful confinement, assault causing bodily harm, and sexual assault with a weapon.

He appealed on several grounds, including the defective form of the indictment and the improper conduct of Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal found that while the indictment was improperly drafted, the Crown's particulars cured the defect for most counts, except count #10.

However, the Court held that Crown counsel's cross-examination of the appellant was highly improper, sarcastic, and abusive, and improperly attacked the appellant's character.

This misconduct, combined with an improper jury address, created a real danger of a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing the evidence did not establish their identity as the perpetrators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including the appellants' presence in the vehicle used during the robbery, matching physical descriptions, and possession of the victim's stolen property and firearms—permitted a reasonable inference of guilt.

The court also noted the appellants' failure to testify could be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the verdict.

The sentence appeal by Black was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction on the basis that statements obtained following a breach of her right to counsel should have been excluded.

The court held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the appellant was eager to volunteer information for her own advantage and would have acted the same way even if given the toll-free number.

The court further upheld the finding that the breach was technical rather than serious, with police acting in good faith.

The appeal court concluded that admission of the statements would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the conviction appeal.

The appellant challenged convictions for historical sexual offences against two complainants, arguing errors in third-party records production, admission of discreditable conduct evidence outside the indictment, jury instructions on motive to fabricate, supplementary charge, and failure to charge on recent complaint.

The Court of Appeal held that the counselling records were not shown to be likely relevant, emphasizing that case-specific evidence is required and mere references to abuse or credibility-related topics are insufficient.

The court upheld the admission of evidence concerning abuse in the Bahamas and New Brunswick because the defence had made the broader relationship central to the case and the evidence had strong probative value notwithstanding its discreditable character.

The court also rejected the proposed recent complaint instruction, holding that the doctrine should not be preserved for historical sexual allegations.

Conviction appeal dismissed and sentence appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for indecent assault arising from allegations said to have occurred approximately twenty years before trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the 45.5-month delay between charge and trial infringed s. 11(b) of the Charter after applying the Morin framework, finding approximately twelve months of unacceptable institutional delay and meaningful prejudice, including inferred prejudice from the lengthy delay.

The court also held that a challenge to the validity of the preliminary inquiry and indictment could not be raised for the first time on appeal once the indictment had been presented.

It further held that the trial judge erred in a Corbett ruling by permitting sanitized cross-examination on prior similar sexual offence convictions where the defence attack was directed to credibility, not character.

The conviction was set aside, a new trial ordered, and the proceedings stayed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, narrowing its argument to whether the trial judge unreasonably found that the respondent might have acted differently absent admitted breaches of the right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's finding under s. 24(2) was open on the record, particularly given the prolonged custodial detention, language barrier, and delayed meaningful access to counsel information.

Applying the governing approach to uncertainty in causation following a s. 10(b) breach, the court held that the Crown had not displaced the inference that timely compliance could have changed the respondent's conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions requiring defence counsel to address the jury before the Crown where the defence called evidence.

In a second degree murder appeal involving expert evidence on whether the deceased died by suicide or strangulation, the appellant argued that the order of addresses infringed the rights to make full answer and defence and to a fair trial after the Crown relied on an inference not addressed in the defence closing.

The majority held that ss. 651(3) and (4) do not violate ss. 7 or 11(d) of the Charter because the accused answers the evidence and the Crown’s theory of the case, not the Crown’s final rhetoric, and the order of address is not shown to confer an inherent advantage.

The Court further held that trial judges may cure improper closings through jury instructions and, in the clearest cases of unfairness, may allow a limited reply.

The appellant challenged his conviction for possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking on the basis that drugs were discovered during a warrantless search of his girlfriend's apartment.

The Court held that a claim under s. 8 of the Charter requires the accused to establish a personal reasonable expectation of privacy, assessed on the totality of the circumstances.

On the facts, the appellant was merely an occasional visitor, contributed nothing to household expenses, lacked authority to regulate access, and had denied ownership of the seized drugs in the courts below.

Because no personal privacy interest of the appellant was infringed, he could not invoke s. 24(2) to exclude the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to put the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury and misdirected the jury on the issue of consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that even if the defence should have been put to the jury, the jury's conviction negatived that defence based on how the issue of knowledge of absence of consent was framed.

The Court agreed with the Ontario Court of Appeal that there was no misdirection on the issue of consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for perjury to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal from the bench, finding no merit in any of the grounds of appeal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for second degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing after key youth witnesses recanted their videotaped police statements implicating the accused.

The Supreme Court reconsidered the orthodox common law rule limiting prior inconsistent statements to credibility use only and held that, for witnesses other than the accused, such statements may be admitted substantively on a principled hearsay basis where reliability and necessity are established through a voir dire.

The majority required threshold guarantees addressing hearsay dangers, while concurring reasons proposed a more flexible reliability framework.

Because the trial judge had considered himself bound by the orthodox rule and had not assessed substantive admissibility under the new approach, a new trial was ordered.

The appeals concerned the constitutionality of the former rape-shield provisions in Criminal Code ss. 276 and 277, which restricted defence use of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct in sexual offence prosecutions.

The Court held that s. 276 violated ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because its blanket exclusion could bar relevant defence evidence whose probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and that the provision was not saved by s. 1.

Section 277, which barred sexual reputation evidence to support or attack credibility, was upheld as targeting an illegitimate use of evidence.

The Court also held that preliminary inquiry judges lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions, so the appeals from the committals nevertheless failed and the matters were to proceed to trial.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import a narcotic based largely on intercepted private communications.

The trial judge refused to open the sealed packets containing the affidavits supporting the wiretap authorizations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an accused is entitled to access the sealed packet, subject to editing to protect informants, to make full answer and defence.

The Court established that a trial judge may review the authorization to determine if it complies with s. 8 of the Charter, and if unlawful, the evidence must be excluded under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the accused may cross-examine the affiant with leave of the trial judge if necessary to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered because the appellant was denied the right to cross-examine.