Katherine E. Swinton

The appellant mother appealed a final order granting Crown wardship with no access for the purpose of adoption of her child.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding the child was in need of protection, improperly applied expert psychological evidence, and placed undue weight on her mental health history and lack of cooperation with the child protection agency.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that Crown wardship was the only viable plan to protect the child and serve the child's best interests.

The appellants appealed an order approving a settlement agreement between them and the respondent school under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants argued that the dispute resolution mechanism proposed by the school did not match what was agreed upon and that the father lacked mental capacity when consenting.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the motion judge, as there was no evidence of incapacity and the agreement was in the minor's best interests.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's decision declaring her child a Crown ward without access.

The mother argued the trial judge erred by placing too much importance on her young age, ignoring her efforts to remedy parenting deficiencies, and failing to properly apply the tests for the child's best interests, maximum time in care, and termination of access.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual conclusions or application of the law, including the consideration of the child's African Francophone heritage and the assessment of alternative plans.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order finding her two children in need of protection and making them Crown wards.

The motion judge had also denied access to the younger child and ordered supervised access for the older child.

On appeal, the mother argued there were genuine issues for trial, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the older child's wishes were misrepresented.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions regarding the risk of harm, the mother's failure to obtain mental health treatment, and the best interests of the children.

The court also found no merit to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application following a summary trial, in which he claimed damages against a non-profit housing shelter and its manager for negligence, breach of Toronto Shelter Standards, and violations of ss. 2, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to support the claims.

The court also found no unfairness in the conduct of the trial.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellant landlord appealed a summary judgment order requiring it to return the balance of the respondent tenant's security deposit.

The motions judge had found that the landlord was barred from claiming Additional Rent adjustments for the 2012, 2013, and 2014 lease years because it failed to provide notice within 180 days of its financial year end, as required by the lease.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's interpretation of the lease, finding it consistent with the language and the six-month limitation on tenants seeking readjustment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a Director's Delegate decision which held that the respondent insured was entitled to interest at 2% per month on overdue statutory accident benefits.

The insured's accident occurred after the New Regulation (O. Reg. 34/10) came into effect, but her policy was issued before that date.

The Divisional Court found the Delegate's decision unreasonable, holding that the clear wording of the New Regulation applied to all accidents occurring on or after September 1, 2010, rebutting any presumption against interference with vested rights.

The application for judicial review was granted and the Delegate's decision was quashed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion for certification of a proposed class proceeding against the manufacturers of the anti-coagulant drug Pradaxa.

The appellants alleged the respondents breached a duty to warn that there was no antidote for the drug.

The motions judge found that the duty to warn was not a common issue, concluding there was no basis in fact that the failure to warn was a source of harm common across the class.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the motions judge did not err in principle or impermissibly weigh competing expert evidence, but correctly applied the 'some basis in fact' test using undisputed evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board reconsideration decision that dismissed its application for certification in the construction industry.

The Board had refused to allow the union to amend an incorrect application filing date, finding that the amendment would cause material prejudice to the employer.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's discretionary decision to relieve from compliance with its rules was reasonable and entitled to deference, and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The Registrar appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that ordered the Registrar not to revoke the registration of a real estate salesperson who admitted to stealing from a client's home.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision unreasonable.

The Tribunal erred by relying on opinion evidence from a therapist who was not qualified as an expert, refusing to view relevant video evidence of the theft, and imposing unreasonable monitoring conditions that failed to protect the consumer public.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order finding her nine-year-old child in need of protection and granting Crown wardship with access.

The child had been apprehended five times due to the mother's serious mental health decompensations and lack of a viable safety plan.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's finding that the predictable interruptions in care caused a risk of emotional harm to the child.

Finding no reviewable errors of fact or law, the court dismissed the appeal.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a motions judge in a judicial review proceeding arising from an employment dispute with Tim Hortons Inc. The applicant argued that his wife should be added as a party, that the record of proceedings was incomplete, and that the respondents' facta should be struck.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error by the motions judge.

The court confirmed that the applicant's wife was not a proper party to the employment litigation, the record of proceedings was complete, and there was no basis to strike the facta or find a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's finding that she was an independent contractor rather than a dependent contractor.

The appellant conceded the trial judge used the correct legal test from McKee v. Reid’s Heritage Homes Ltd., but argued he erred in its application.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge properly considered the factors of economic dependency, exclusivity, and permanency, and that his findings were open to him on the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $8,000.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for the production of corporate documents, including financial statements, at the respondents' expense.

On appeal, the appellant narrowed his request to the financial statements of three corporations, claiming to be a 15% shareholder.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the relief sought was premature given a pending appeal of an earlier decision between the parties, and that there was no demonstrated prejudice to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an application judge's discretionary decision to order the sale of a property rather than its partition, and brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence, finding it could have been obtained prior to the hearing with reasonable diligence.

The appeal was also dismissed, as the appellants failed to identify any error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the application judge's conclusion that an order for sale was appropriate given the number of owners and the nature of the land.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating his tenancy and ordering eviction for breaching a prior conditional order.

The prior order granted relief from eviction on the condition that the tenant not exhibit conduct substantially interfering with the landlord's reasonable enjoyment, such as making profane comments.

The Board found the tenant breached this condition by swearing at the superintendent and subsequently yelling at and insulting the superintendent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and the tenant raised no questions of law.

The Director of the Independent Health Facilities Program appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board.

The Board had found that the Director lacked jurisdiction under s. 20.1(2)(c) of the Independent Health Facilities Act to amend the respondent's licence to eliminate mammography and fluoroscopy services because the respondent had never commenced providing them, and thus could not have 'ceased' to provide them.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's literal interpretation of 'ceased' was unreasonable and ignored the statutory context and purpose, which is to allow the Director to control the provision of services.

The Director's decision to amend the licence was reinstated.

The applicant applied for judicial review of a decision by the Appeals Committee of the National Dental Examining Board of Canada, which dismissed his appeal after he failed the Assessment of Clinical Skills Examination for the third time.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness due to inadequate reasons and the lack of an oral hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Appeals Committee provided adequate reasons addressing the applicant's specific concerns and that the appeal process did not require an oral hearing under the circumstances.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ottawa Community Housing Corporation and the City of Ottawa that required him to pay parking charges in addition to his rent-geared-to-income.

The applicant argued that parking charges must be included in the geared-to-income rent calculation under the Housing Services Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that while the Housing Services Act does not authorize adding parking charges to geared-to-income rent, it does not preclude a separate contractual agreement for parking under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court held that any dispute regarding the validity of the parking charges or the tenancy agreement must be determined by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaint that his former employer violated s. 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act by dismissing him in reprisal for raising harassment allegations.

The Board found the applicant was dismissed for insubordination and failure to follow employer rules, not for asserting rights under the Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, based on clear and logical reasons, and supported by the evidence.