Julianna A. Greenspan

The respondent pleaded guilty to breaking and entering a dwelling-house and committing sexual assault under s. 348(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge initially imposed a SOIRA order but later rescinded it, concluding that s. 348(1)(b) was not a designated offence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while s. 348(1)(b) is not listed as a designated offence, the respondent was sentenced under s. 348(1)(d), which is a designated offence.

Therefore, the SOIRA order was mandatory.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after two pounds of the drug were found in her luggage upon returning from Panama.

She appealed her conviction and four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her credibility and seeking to admit fresh evidence of photographs to corroborate her story.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it related to a non-essential aspect of her testimony.

The conviction and sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in his credibility assessment and the sentence was within the acceptable range.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for second degree murder and aggravated assault arising from a fatal attack in a rest home, arguing that the jury unreasonably rejected his NCR defence based on schizophrenia and conflicting expert evidence.

The court held that, although the evidence could have supported an NCR finding, there was also evidence capable of supporting the jury’s conclusion that the appellant had not met his burden on a balance of probabilities.

The court further held that the jury charge adequately distinguished the NCR and mens rea inquiries, properly limited the use of protected assessment statements, and did not misdirect the jury on malingering or recall evidence.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The Czech Republic sought the appellant's extradition for robbery and property damage.

At the committal hearing, the appellant alleged he was tortured by Czech police and forced to sign a false confession, arguing this violated his s. 7 Charter rights and constituted an abuse of process.

The extradition judge refused to consider the torture allegations, ruling they were matters for the Minister of Justice at the surrender stage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the subsequent Khadr decision, allegations of abuse by the requesting state implicate the extradition court's integrity and must be addressed by the extradition judge.

A new committal hearing was ordered.

L'État requérant a demandé l'extradition de l'appelant vers la République tchèque pour des infractions de vol qualifié et de dommages matériels. À l'audience d'incarcération, l'appelant a allégué avoir été torturé par la police tchèque pour signer de faux aveux et a demandé un sursis d'instance en vertu de l'art. 7 de la Charte.

La juge d'extradition a refusé d'examiner ces allégations, concluant qu'elles relevaient du ministre de la Justice à l'étape de l'extradition, et a ordonné l'incarcération.

La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel, concluant que, selon l'arrêt Khadr, les allégations de torture par l'État requérant engagent l'intégrité du tribunal canadien et doivent être examinées par le juge d'extradition.

Une nouvelle audience d'incarcération a été ordonnée.

The Republic of Poland sought the extradition of the applicant for fraud-related offences.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging abuse of process on the basis that Canada had previously attempted a 'disguised extradition' through deportation proceedings at Poland's behest, and that the Attorney General of Canada had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by improperly withholding relevant documents.

The court found that the deportation proceedings were indeed a disguised extradition initiated solely to appease Poland, and that the Attorney General's defiance of a production order constituted an abuse of process.

A stay of proceedings was granted.