Joseph Di Luca

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of $581,787.01 obtained by the plaintiff in relation to a defaulted mortgage.

The court applied the test for setting aside a default judgment and found that while the defendants had no arguable defence regarding the $500,000 principal and accrued interest, they did have an arguable defence regarding the penalties, charges, and costs awarded.

The court partially granted the motion, upholding the judgment for the principal and interest but setting aside the portion relating to penalties, charges, and costs.

The Crown sought a voluntariness determination for a video recorded statement made by the accused, who was charged with first degree murder.

The defence brought a cross-motion to exclude the statement under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the initial portion of the statement voluntary and admissible.

However, the latter portion was ruled involuntary and inadmissible because the interviewing officer used inducements and implied threats, suggesting the accused would only have credibility if he spoke during the interview.

The court also found a section 10(b) Charter breach because the officer failed to hold off on questioning after the accused requested counsel upon being detained.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender and long-term offender application following the offender's convictions for a series of violent, random attacks on women, including robbery, attempted sexual assault, and break and enter.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the offender's risk of violent re-offence was moderate and did not meet the high threshold of intractability required for such designations.

The court imposed a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 years and 6 months net after accounting for pre-sentence custody and enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The offender, a medical doctor, was convicted by a jury of trafficking in fentanyl.

He participated in a scheme with a pharmacist and others, prescribing over 4,000 fentanyl patches for financial gain.

The court found his actions constituted a severe breach of trust motivated by greed.

Emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation, the court sentenced the offender to 12 years in prison, along with ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with first degree murder after strangling his grandmother to death.

The accused suffered from schizophrenia and experienced severe delusions, believing his grandmother was part of a broad conspiracy to kill him.

The court accepted expert psychiatric evidence that the accused's mental illness deprived him of the capacity to know that others would view his conduct as morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The Crown applied for an order permitting the complainant and her mother to testify by video link from Quebec in a trial for human trafficking and sexual assault.

The defence opposed the complainant testifying by video link but did not strenuously oppose the mother's request.

The court granted the application for the mother to testify from Quebec under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code.

For the complainant, the court found it appropriate for her to testify outside the courtroom but ordered that she must do so from the Oshawa courthouse, citing concerns about managing cross-examination with documents and transcripts if she were in Quebec.

The respondent was found guilty of civil contempt for violating an interim order prohibiting him from communicating with the Town of Aurora and its officials pending a vexatious litigant application.

The court rejected the respondent's proposals to purge his contempt, finding he lacked insight and remained committed to his cause.

The court ordered the respondent to pay a fine of $1,500 and costs of $10,000, emphasizing the need for general and specific deterrence.

The accused was charged after responding to an online escort advertisement used in a police sting targeting persons seeking sexual services from minors, and after continuing a text exchange in which the purported sex worker stated she was 15.

Applying the Supreme Court’s framework in Morrison, the court held the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused actually believed, or was wilfully blind to, the person being underage.

The court found wilful blindness was not established because the accused asked questions directed to age, and the evidence left a reasonable doubt whether he believed the stated age or merely proceeded recklessly in the face of the risk.

Because recklessness was insufficient for luring mens rea, the accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused, charged with firearms offences, brought a Charter application challenging the search warrant for his residence.

The warrant was based primarily on information from a confidential informant who stated the accused kept a handgun in his vehicle.

The affiant officer asserted a generalized belief that the accused might transfer the firearm to his home, but omitted a material fact from surveillance that a satchel suspected of containing the firearm was left in the vehicle.

The court found the Information to Obtain lacked sufficient grounds to search the home, resulting in a section 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court excluded the firearm and ammunition, finding the serious Charter-infringing conduct and impact on privacy outweighed the societal interest in adjudication on the merits.

Dr. Otto, charged with fentanyl trafficking, faced a parallel professional discipline investigation by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

During the CPSO investigation, Dr. Otto provided a statutorily compelled statement and patient files.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of this compelled statement and the use of the patient files in the criminal trial, arguing for its use for impeachment purposes if Dr. Otto testified.

The defence sought exclusion of the statement for all purposes and challenged the production order used to obtain the CPSO file.

The court found the statement voluntary and not made to a person in authority, but nevertheless excluded it for all purposes under s. 24(1) of the Charter, applying the principles from R. v. White and R. v. Soules.

The court upheld the production order for the CPSO file, finding sufficient grounds even after excising information derived from the compelled statement.

The patient files were deemed admissible as they were created as part of a regulated profession, not compelled by the state in an adversarial context.

This supplementary ruling on a bail application for Peter Vanderveen finalized the bail conditions and surety arrangements.

Bail was set at $100,000 with no deposit, supported by three sureties.

The conditions included strict residency requirements, restrictions on movement, prohibitions on firearms and ammunition, mandatory attendance at a Bail Compliance Program, geographical limitations to Ontario, no-contact orders with specified individuals, and continuous GPS monitoring by Recovery Science Corporation at the applicant's expense.

Peter Vanderveen, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail pending trial.

The Crown opposed release solely on the tertiary ground (public confidence in the administration of justice), conceding no primary or secondary ground concerns due to a robust surety plan including electronic monitoring.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. St-Cloud and R. v. Antic, assessed the strength of the Crown's case (weak for first-degree murder, arguable for second-degree, strong for manslaughter), the gravity of the offence, the circumstances of the commission, and the potential sentence.

Considering Vanderveen's age, community ties, minor criminal record, remorseful statement, and the comprehensive release plan, the court found that a reasonable, informed person would not lose confidence in the administration of justice by granting bail.

The application was granted, and Vanderveen was released on a $100,000 recognizance with three sureties and restrictive conditions.

The defendant, Dr. George Otto, brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence following findings of s. 8 Charter violations related to search warrants and production orders for electronic devices in a fentanyl trafficking case.

The court applied the R. v. Grant framework, balancing the seriousness of the state's conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

While acknowledging significant privacy impacts, the court found the police conduct was not deliberate or flagrant, and the evidence was reliable and crucial to the Crown's serious case.

Ultimately, the court determined that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and its exclusion would.

This ruling addresses a Crown application for voluntariness of a post-arrest videotaped statement and a defence motion to exclude the statement under sections 10(a) and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defence failed to establish a section 10(a) Charter violation.

The statement was deemed admissible, as the descriptions of the offences provided to the defendant were found to be unobjectionable and sufficient to convey the nature of his jeopardy, despite his claims of misunderstanding.

This application concerned the passing of accounts and seeking compensation by Linda and Ted Austin, who served as Powers of Attorney for Property and Personal Care for Isabel and Wayne Daniel.

The Daniels, an elderly couple with no next of kin, received extensive care and financial management from the Austins for over 20 years.

Following Wayne Daniel's passing and Isabel Daniel's move to assisted care, Isabel suggested the Austins seek compensation.

The court approved compensation for administering Wayne Daniel's estate, statutory compensation as Powers of Attorney for Property, and compensation for personal care services, totaling $757,659.87, along with legal fees.

The defendant, Andrew Fitton, was charged with aggravated assault and failing to provide necessaries of life for his infant daughter, Gabriella.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, alleging Fitton intentionally inflicted severe brain injuries and then failed to seek immediate medical attention.

The defense argued that the Crown failed to prove Fitton caused the injuries and that it was reasonably possible the mother, Kendra Antonia, was responsible.

The court found that while symptoms were present when the child was with Fitton, they were non-specific and could be otherwise explained.

The court also found Kendra Antonia's credibility to be problematic, noting inconsistencies and a reluctance to seek medical attention.

Ultimately, the court could not exclude the possibility that Kendra inflicted the injuries later in the day.

As such, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Fitton caused the injuries or failed to provide necessaries of life.

Fitton was found not guilty on both counts.

The applicant, a doctor charged with fentanyl trafficking, brought a pre-trial motion under s. 8 of the Charter challenging several search warrants and the manner in which his electronic devices were searched.

The court upheld the initial transmission data warrants and the warrant to search the applicant's home.

However, the court found multiple s. 8 violations regarding the search of the electronic devices, including a lack of specific grounds to search all 15 seized devices, an overly broad authorization to search for photographs, the unauthorized obtaining of a medical software password from a service provider, and the failure to file a Report to Justice.

The application was allowed in accordance with these findings.

Dr. George Otto, charged with fentanyl trafficking, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions (ss. 492.2 and 487.016) authorizing the seizure/production of prospective and historical transmission data.

The core issue was whether the "reasonable suspicion" standard for judicial authorization met the requirements of s. 8 of the Charter.

The court concluded that the "reasonable suspicion" standard was sufficient, finding the data obtained in this case to be minimally intrusive and not revealing core biographical information.

The motion seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality was dismissed.

The defendants brought a Rule 21.01 motion to determine if alleged defamatory statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The plaintiff failed to appear or file materials, and his request for adjournment was dismissed due to a finding that he was "playing games with the process." The court found that the statements, made in a direction to opposing counsel regarding the disbursement of funds in matrimonial and assessment proceedings, were intimately connected to judicial proceedings and thus covered by absolute privilege.

The action for defamation was dismissed with costs.

The applicant, Katrina Vanderwyk, sought an order of certiorari to quash her committal to stand trial on a count of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The application argued that the preliminary inquiry justice erred by committing her in the absence of any evidence on an essential element of the offence, specifically regarding her intent to aid an attempted murder.

The court, applying the "scintilla of evidence" standard for jurisdictional review, found that despite competing inferences and a minor error in considering certain evidence, there remained a sufficient evidentiary basis for a properly instructed jury to infer the requisite elements of attempted murder.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, upholding the committal.