Joseph Di Luca

The applicant, Katrina Vanderwyk, sought an order of certiorari to quash her committal to stand trial on a count of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The application argued that the preliminary inquiry justice erred by committing her in the absence of any evidence on an essential element of the offence, specifically regarding her intent to aid an attempted murder.

The court, applying the "scintilla of evidence" standard for jurisdictional review, found that despite competing inferences and a minor error in considering certain evidence, there remained a sufficient evidentiary basis for a properly instructed jury to infer the requisite elements of attempted murder.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, upholding the committal.

Mr. Khan was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon after stabbing his wife.

The Crown conceded acquittal on attempted murder.

The central issue was whether Mr. Khan was not criminally responsible (NCR) due to a disease of the mind, specifically delirium tremens, at the time of the offences.

The court, accepting expert psychiatric evidence and applying the holistic approach from R. v. Stone and R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, found that delirium tremens constituted a disease of the mind in this case.

It concluded that Mr. Khan was unable to understand the moral wrongfulness of his acts and was therefore NCR for aggravated assault, with a conditional stay for assault with a weapon.

Joseph Crawford pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact murder.

The court considered aggravating factors, including his involvement in planning the initial assault, cleaning the murder weapon, and a lengthy criminal record.

Mitigating factors included his guilty plea, remorse, and rehabilitative potential despite a difficult background.

The court imposed a gross sentence of four years, deducting 3 years and 1 month for pre-trial custody (1.5:1 credit) and an additional 4 months for harsh custodial conditions (lockdowns, triple bunking).

The net sentence to be served was 7 months, followed by 18 months probation, a DNA order, and a lifetime section 109 order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving "Over 80," arguing the trial judge misapprehended expert toxicology evidence regarding the possibility of a rising blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) curve.

The expert testified that a hypothetical scenario where BAC was below 80 mg at the time of driving but rose to 90 mg by the time of testing was possible, though unlikely.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge accurately apprehended the expert's evidence and was not left with reasonable doubt, correctly viewing the hypothetical as a mere possibility not tied to the specific evidence of the appellant.

The plaintiff, Concord Plumbing & Heating Ltd., brought a partial summary judgment motion against the defendant Northern Structures Ltd. for $114,959.01 in unpaid invoices for mechanical work on a Canadian Tire store construction project.

The motion was brought within a larger construction lien action.

The court first granted leave to bring the motion, finding it would expedite resolution if successful.

However, the court ultimately dismissed the partial summary judgment motion, citing the risk of duplicative proceedings and inconsistent findings due to intertwined issues with Canadian Tire's deficiency claims against Northern and Concord, and the complexity of determining deficiency claims on the record presented.

The appellant, Tessa-Lyn Wookey, appealed her convictions for Dangerous Driving, Impaired Driving, and Refuse Breath Sample, as well as her sentence.

The court found legal error in the trial judge's analysis of the mens rea for dangerous driving, noting a failure to explain "how and why" the driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

For impaired driving, the court found the trial judge erred by concluding impairment was the only reasonable explanation for the driving, without considering other possibilities like dangerous or careless driving.

Consequently, new trials were ordered for Dangerous Driving and Impaired Driving.

The appeal against the Refuse Breath Sample conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge's factual findings regarding the appellant's unequivocal refusals and the officer's non-renewal of the demand were upheld, affirming that the "last chance" doctrine did not apply.

The global sentence appeal was not addressed due to the new trial orders, but the sentence for Refuse Breath Sample was deemed fit.

The accused, Stephen Douglas Shier, pleaded guilty to counselling the commission of murder not committed after attempting to hire a police officer, posing as a hit man, to kill his ex-partner.

The offence was motivated by financial distress and anger over monthly support payments following an acrimonious domestic relationship.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the calculated nature of the crime, the domestic context, and the opportunity for sober second thought, alongside mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, lack of criminal record, strong community support, and low risk of future violence.

The court imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of five years, five months, and eighteen days, along with ancillary orders.

The appellant sought to set aside his guilty pleas for dangerous driving and driving while over 80, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and undue pressure.

The court found that counsel's performance did not fall below the standard of competence and that the appellant's plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed, despite the pressures he faced, including a hunger strike, a failed surety, and family illness.

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the finality of the guilty plea.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of three charges against the respondent, Kenneth Jones, including failing to comply with a s. 161 order and two counts of failing to comply with probation.

The s. 161 order prohibited Jones from attending a "community centre." Jones attended the Evinrude Centre, which he knew was a community centre, to hear the Prime Minister speak.

The trial judge dismissed the charges, finding that Jones might not have reasonably known he could not attend in those circumstances, relying on R. v. Perron.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by misinterpreting Perron and importing an additional mens rea element not warranted for a s. 161 breach where the location's nature was not in dispute.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered, partly due to an unaddressed defence regarding an exception in the s. 161 order and public interest considerations.

The applicant sought writs of prohibition and procedendo, with certiorari in aid, arguing that the trial judge in the Ontario Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction to try offences in the Central East Region when the alleged offences occurred entirely in the Central West Region (Mississauga/Peel).

The applicant contended that without a sufficient geographical connection or a Chief Justice's order, the trial judge lacked jurisdiction, despite acknowledging province-wide jurisdiction in potentia.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the trial judge had jurisdiction.

The court clarified that regional divisions are administrative, not jurisdictional, and while the Crown generally prosecutes where the offence occurred, the court's jurisdiction is province-wide.

Concerns about "forum shopping" were noted but deemed not to affect jurisdiction, leaving open options for a change of venue or administrative transfer.

The plaintiffs, Amber Lighting Limited and Alka Bhargava, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, Rosa Petrozza and Vito Petrozza, seeking $123,500 plus interest.

The dispute arose from a mortgage default, with the core issue being whether the defendants were entitled to these additional funds in priority to the plaintiffs' third mortgage.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a prior default judgment by Gray J. had already determined the amount owing under the second mortgage, including the additional funds.

The plaintiffs' attempt to dispute this was deemed a collateral attack on that judgment, which they had not moved to set aside despite being given the opportunity.

The appellant was convicted of impaired care or control and over 80.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that a "realistic risk of danger" is not a required element where the Crown relies on the presumption of care or control, in unreasonably finding a realistic risk of danger in obiter, and in assessing his evidence.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's analysis of de facto care or control and that the findings were not unreasonable.

The court also upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following findings that five of six judicial authorizations were invalid and police exceeded the "plain view" doctrine during searches.

The court applied the R. v. Grant framework to various items.

Computer and cell phone evidence were excluded due to serious Charter violations and high impact on privacy interests.

Observations of the computer screen were also excluded.

However, handcuffs, a forensic textbook, handwritten notes, and Rogers cell phone records were deemed admissible, as their exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, despite some Charter breaches, particularly where lawful alternative means to obtain the evidence existed.

The appellant appealed a costs award made by an arbitrator, arguing that the arbitrator erred in law by limiting the assessment of costs to only the mediation/arbitration period, thereby excluding general steps taken in the proceedings prior to that phase.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the issue raised a question of law.

The court determined that the arbitrator misapplied Rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules, which, as interpreted by case law, does not prevent a decision-maker from considering costs related to general litigation steps not requiring specific judicial intervention.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted back to the arbitrator for further consideration of costs, specifically those related to general steps and a misapprehended reserved costs order.

The defendant, T.G., brought an application seeking a discharge on all counts based on cause of action estoppel or, alternatively, a stay of proceedings for abuse of process.

The charges involved sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching against his step-daughter, with alleged incidents occurring in both York Region (Ontario) and Winnipeg (Manitoba).

T.G. argued that the charges should have been combined and prosecuted in one province, and that the bifurcation deprived him of a global resolution.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the civil doctrine of cause of action estoppel does not apply in criminal law, where the comparable doctrine is double jeopardy.

Furthermore, the court found that while the police conduct in delaying the York Region charges was "far from ideal," it did not constitute an abuse of process warranting a stay, as there was no evidence of improper purpose or vindictiveness.

The applicant, facing 22 criminal charges including attempted sexual assault and kidnapping, brought a pre-trial application challenging the validity of six judicial authorizations (search warrants and a production order) under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a Garofoli review, finding that while the affiant made full, fair, and frank disclosure, only the initial telewarrant for specific items (sunglasses and gloves) was valid.

However, specific seizures and searches conducted under this initial warrant (handcuffs, a forensic textbook, and activating a laptop screen) were deemed unlawful as they exceeded the warrant's scope or the plain view doctrine.

The subsequent five judicial authorizations, including a second telewarrant for laptop seizure, two warrants to search laptop contents, a warrant to search a cell phone, and a production order for cell phone records, were all quashed due to insufficient grounds or fatal flaws on their face.

The court emphasized that "plausibility" or "possibility" is not the legal standard for issuing warrants, which require "reasonable and probable grounds." The admissibility of the unlawfully obtained evidence will be determined in a subsequent s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Plaintiffs, a former common-law partner and her mother (who held title), brought a motion seeking an interim order for the Defendant (the other former common-law partner) to vacate the property, for the property to be immediately listed for sale, and for 50% of the net proceeds to be released to the Plaintiffs, with the remaining 50% held in trust.

The Defendant brought a cross-motion seeking similar orders for sale but with all net proceeds held in trust, claiming a 50% interest based on constructive trust principles.

The court granted the Plaintiffs' motion, ordering the Defendant to vacate, the property to be sold, and 50% of the net proceeds to be disbursed to the Plaintiffs, with the other 50% held in trust pending the resolution of the Defendant's constructive trust claim.

The Defendant's cross-motion was dismissed.

The accused, Antonio Ricciardi, brought a pre-trial application challenging the warrantless seizure of his sweatshirt by police during a court appearance.

The Crown argued the seizure was authorized under s. 489(2) of the Criminal Code as a simple seizure of evidence in plain view.

The court, applying a broad and purposive interpretation of Charter s. 8 privacy rights, held that the non-consensual removal of clothing from a person constitutes a "search and seizure," not merely a "seizure." Since s. 489(2) only authorizes a seizure and not a search, the police action fell outside its scope and violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

The defendant requested the court to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff's claim, stemming from an involuntary detention in 2010, was found to lack material facts and a plausible cause of action.

The court also determined the claim was barred by the Limitations Act, rejecting the plaintiff's discoverability argument based on a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action and related motions.

The Third Party, Frederick Page, brought a motion for summary judgment against the Defendant, Ronald Sharman, seeking dismissal of the Third Party Claim.

The claim arose from a motor vehicle collision where Sharman rear-ended the Plaintiff, Khow Chin Hew, and sought to apportion liability to Page, alleging Page's sudden stop was negligent.

The court applied the Hryniak v. Maudlin test for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

It was determined that Page's braking and left turn were not negligent, as the vehicles immediately behind him stopped safely, and Sharman was found to be following too closely given his vehicle and road conditions.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the Third Party Claim against Page was dismissed with costs.