John Erickson

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The Crown sought to rely on the presumption under s. 258(1) of the Criminal Code based on the accused occupying the driver's seat when police arrived.

The court found the presumption was rebutted because the accused was initially outside the vehicle, was directed into the car by police for safety reasons, and the vehicle was inoperable.

The court further found that even without the presumption, the Crown failed to prove care or control beyond a reasonable doubt because the vehicle posed no realistic risk of danger given its location in a remote ditch, its inoperability, and the absence of any attempt by the accused to operate it.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant, a former First Nations Constable, sought judicial review of the 1998 decisions terminating her employment and her appointment as a police officer.

The application was commenced in 2007 and perfected in 2008, nearly ten years after the impugned decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for delay, finding the applicant's explanations for the delay unsatisfactory and noting that the respondents would suffer actual prejudice due to the passage of time and the unavailability of witnesses.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment for sending two unwanted letters to the complainant over an 18-month period.

He appealed, arguing that two communications do not meet the threshold of 'repeatedly' communicating under s. 264(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'repeatedly' means more than once, and that two communications can suffice depending on the context and history between the parties.

The court also denied leave to appeal the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, finding it manifestly fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court (General Division).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and noting unanimous opinions that there was a significant risk the appellant would reoffend.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and wearing a face mask.

He argued that the trial judge erred by refusing to declare a mistrial following the Crown's opening address, that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated, that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were flawed, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that curative instructions remedied any prejudice from the opening address, the appellant had waived his right to counsel, the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were sufficient when read as a whole, and there was ample evidence to support the convictions.

The appellant was charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter by a jury.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant to 15.5 years in prison, finding that the appellant knew the gun was loaded.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, as an accomplice's testimony could support the conclusion that the appellant believed the gun was unloaded.

Given the gravity of the offence, the appellant's young age, and lengthy pre-trial custody, the Court of Appeal varied the manslaughter sentence to 12 years.

A concurrent sentence for robbery was not varied.

The Court of Appeal released an addendum to address the appellant Johnson's sentence appeal, which was inadvertently omitted from the original endorsement.

As no oral or written submissions were advanced in support of the appeal, the court found it had no merit and dismissed it.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing the evidence did not establish their identity as the perpetrators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including the appellants' presence in the vehicle used during the robbery, matching physical descriptions, and possession of the victim's stolen property and firearms—permitted a reasonable inference of guilt.

The court also noted the appellants' failure to testify could be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the verdict.

The sentence appeal by Black was also dismissed.