John Erickson

The appellants appealed a judgment determining amounts payable to two law firms out of settlement funds held in trust, based on a Settlement Agreement.

The appellants argued the agreement was unfair and unreasonable under the Solicitors Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the agreement regarding the first firm, finding it fair and reasonable, but allowed the appeal regarding the second firm, remitting the issue of fairness and reasonableness of its fees to the Superior Court of Justice because the application judge failed to provide grounds for finding the fees reasonable and did not characterize the nature of the fee arrangement.

The applicant, a former First Nations Constable, sought judicial review of the 1998 decisions terminating her employment and her appointment as a police officer.

The application was commenced in 2007 and perfected in 2008, nearly ten years after the impugned decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for delay, finding the applicant's explanations for the delay unsatisfactory and noting that the respondents would suffer actual prejudice due to the passage of time and the unavailability of witnesses.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment for sending two unwanted letters to the complainant over an 18-month period.

He appealed, arguing that two communications do not meet the threshold of 'repeatedly' communicating under s. 264(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that 'repeatedly' means more than once, and that two communications can suffice depending on the context and history between the parties.

The court also denied leave to appeal the sentence of 18 months' imprisonment, finding it manifestly fit given the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court (General Division).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit and noting unanimous opinions that there was a significant risk the appellant would reoffend.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and wearing a face mask.

He argued that the trial judge erred by refusing to declare a mistrial following the Crown's opening address, that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated, that the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were flawed, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that curative instructions remedied any prejudice from the opening address, the appellant had waived his right to counsel, the jury instructions on reasonable doubt were sufficient when read as a whole, and there was ample evidence to support the convictions.

The appellant was charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter by a jury.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant to 15.5 years in prison, finding that the appellant knew the gun was loaded.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, as an accomplice's testimony could support the conclusion that the appellant believed the gun was unloaded.

Given the gravity of the offence, the appellant's young age, and lengthy pre-trial custody, the Court of Appeal varied the manslaughter sentence to 12 years.

A concurrent sentence for robbery was not varied.

The Court of Appeal released an addendum to address the appellant Johnson's sentence appeal, which was inadvertently omitted from the original endorsement.

As no oral or written submissions were advanced in support of the appeal, the court found it had no merit and dismissed it.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing the evidence did not establish their identity as the perpetrators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including the appellants' presence in the vehicle used during the robbery, matching physical descriptions, and possession of the victim's stolen property and firearms—permitted a reasonable inference of guilt.

The court also noted the appellants' failure to testify could be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the verdict.

The sentence appeal by Black was also dismissed.

The applicant union alleged that a sale of a business occurred between Kimberly Clark and Long Lake Forest Products Inc. regarding a sawmill operation that had been closed for over seven years.

The responding party argued that the union had abandoned its bargaining rights and that the transaction was merely a sale of assets, not a going concern.

The Board found that the union had not abandoned its bargaining rights, although no collective agreement was in force at the time of the sale.

The Board concluded that the transaction constituted a sale of a business under section 64 of the Labour Relations Act, as the purchaser acquired the capacity to carry on the predecessor's business, including the mill and access to wood supply.