J. R. H. Turnbull

This trial concerned the validity of the 2011 last will and testament of Audrey Rona Stewart.

The plaintiff, Ronald William Stewart, was named the sole beneficiary, while the defendant, Sandra Lee Stewart, contested the will on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence by the plaintiff, lack of knowledge and approval of contents, and revocation by an alleged 2014 will.

The court found that the Testator possessed the requisite testamentary capacity, was not unduly influenced by the plaintiff, and had full knowledge and approval of the will's contents.

Furthermore, the court found insufficient evidence to support the existence of an alleged 2014 will.

Consequently, the court declared the 2011 Will valid and dismissed the defendant's objections.

This decision addresses costs following an eight-day trial in a family law matter.

The court found divided success, noting that neither party's pre-trial offers to settle fully aligned with the final judgment.

The applicant was largely unsuccessful on the matrimonial home valuation date, while the respondent conceded the separation date late and failed to pay spousal support.

Both parties were found to have behaved unreasonably on certain issues, contributing to the necessity of a trial.

Considering the mixed outcomes and the conduct of the parties, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

This endorsement addresses two motions in a family law dispute concerning child access, child support, and property division.

The respondent father sought expanded unsupervised access, while the applicant mother sought to maintain supervised access and an advance from matrimonial home proceeds.

The court ordered a graduated transition to unsupervised access for the father, found child support arrears, directed payment of these arrears from the father's share of the matrimonial home proceeds, and ordered partial release of funds from the matrimonial home proceeds to both parties, with a larger amount to the mother.

The motion was adjourned for further review of access and costs submissions.

The court issued an amended ruling on costs following a personal injury civil jury trial.

The plaintiff succeeded on liability but was awarded only $10,000 in general damages, falling below the statutory threshold, and his claim for loss of earning capacity was dismissed.

Neither party's Rule 49 offer triggered cost consequences.

The defendant was substantially successful and was awarded partial indemnity costs.

The court assessed costs under Rule 57.01, reducing trial preparation hours and expert witness fees, and adjusting accommodation and meal expenses.

The defendant's motion for the plaintiff's lawyers to personally pay costs under Rule 57.07 was dismissed, as their conduct did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

The court also addressed the suspension of the plaintiff's third-party costs insurance policy.

The court determined costs following a 14-day trial where the applicant was substantially successful on custody and access.

The applicant sought costs, and the respondent, self-represented, opposed.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, considering the purposes of costs, the parties' behaviour, offers to settle, and legal fees.

While the applicant was largely successful and served an offer to settle, her behaviour was found to be provocative and antagonistic, leading to a 25% reduction in her awarded costs.

The respondent's behaviour was also criticized, but less severely.

The court assessed legal fees and disbursements, ultimately ordering the respondent to pay the applicant $54,594.82 in total costs and disbursements.

The defendant, Ryan Mackenzie, was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering statutory principles, mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and the significant victim impact.

The court accepted a joint submission from counsel, imposing a sentence of two years incarceration in a federal penitentiary, followed by two years of probation with specific conditions.

Additional orders included a non-communication order, weapon prohibitions, a Sex Offender Information Registration Act order, and a DNA sample order.

The plaintiff sought damages for inducing a breach of contract and defamation against the defendants, alleging false statements were made to third parties regarding his financial reliability and truck repossession, which hindered his ability to secure financing for a new truck.

The court dismissed the claim for inducing a breach of contract, finding no evidence that the defendant intended to cause a breach or that a valid contract existed at the time of the alleged inducement.

The defamation claim was also dismissed, as the court found the statements made by the defendant were truthful or not defamatory, and there was no evidence of malice or that the statements lowered the plaintiff's reputation.

The court also drew an adverse inference against the plaintiff for failing to call key witnesses and produce financial documentation to support his damages claim.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a prior judgment (2019 ONSC 19) where the plaintiff, Harry Pohl, was successful.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, considering the complexity of the eleven-day trial, the proportionality of the award to the judgment amount of $225,297.20 (plus interest), and the conduct of the parties.

Specific deductions were made for costs related to a dismissed party (Karen Palisca) and certain disbursements, including excessive witness fees and litigation software deemed office overhead.

Disbursements for IT services to recover company data were allowed as necessary for the proceeding.

Following a successful summary judgment motion for breach of a Buyer Representation Agreement, the plaintiff sought costs.

The plaintiff had served a Rule 49 offer to settle that was more favourable to the defendants than the final judgment.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, fixing total costs, disbursements, and interest at $58,855.95.

The plaintiff, Harry Pohl, sued the defendants for breach of contract, wrongful dismissal, and oppression under the OBCA, following the sale of his company, Die-Metric Tool Inc. (DMT), to corporations controlled by Walter Palisca.

The defendants counterclaimed for breach of contract.

The court dismissed Pohl's claims for breach of contract (regarding the $1.5M sale price) and wrongful dismissal, and also dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

However, the court found that Walter Palisca, as director and controlling mind, breached his statutory duty to DMT and the common law duty of honest performance by improperly diverting $225,297.20 of DMT's funds (from a bankruptcy settlement) to affiliated companies (PTL and PS) and for personal legal fees, to the detriment of DMT and Pohl as a personal guarantor.

The court also found oppression under s. 248(2) of the OBCA.

Judgment was awarded to Pohl against Walter Palisca, Palcam Technologies Ltd., and Palcam Solutions Inc. (and/or 1401763 Ontario Inc.) jointly and severally for $225,297.20.

The plaintiff, a real estate brokerage, moved for summary judgment to recover unpaid commissions from the defendants under a Buyer Representation Agreement (BRA).

The defendants argued an oral collateral understanding that commissions would be paid by the seller and that the agent failed to assist.

The court found the written BRA valid and enforceable, rejecting the alleged oral understanding due to the entire agreement clause and the parole evidence rule.

The court also found that the defendants deliberately excluded the agent from final negotiations and failed to disclose property purchases through closely-held corporations to avoid commission payments.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for commissions owed on two properties, plus interest.

The applicant sought to terminate spousal support due to his impending retirement, while the respondent cross-moved for retroactive and increased spousal support.

The court found a material change in circumstances, allowing for a variation of the separation agreement.

Retroactive spousal support from 2015 was denied due to the respondent's delay in seeking variation and non-disclosure of cohabitation.

However, retroactive support was granted from January 1, 2018.

The court recognized the respondent's economic disadvantage from the marriage, warranting compensatory support, and applied the "double dipping" exception from Boston v. Boston.

The applicant was ordered to pay $1700 per month in spousal support from January 1, 2018, until December 31, 2022, based on his income of $95,000.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs due to divided success.

The defendant was convicted of sexual touching (s. 152 Criminal Code) after a non-jury trial.

This decision concerns sentencing.

The complainant was four years old at the time of the single, brief incident.

Aggravating factors included the victim's young age, vulnerability, and the defendant's position of trust, as well as the significant emotional impact on the complainant.

Mitigating factors included the historical nature of the offence (17 years prior), the defendant's lack of recent criminal convictions, the brief and isolated nature of the act, and his current role as a caregiver for his ailing father and grandmother, along with significant health issues.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of two years less a day or two years in a penitentiary, followed by probation.

The defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day, to be served in the community with house arrest for the entire period, followed by three years of probation, and various other orders including a 10-year and lifetime weapon prohibition, and a 20-year Sex Offender Information Act order.

The court issued Addendum #2 to its judgment, addressing the delay in finalizing the order and an attempt by Emad Elguindy to circumvent the lawful distribution of funds to his judgment creditors.

The court ordered the parties to appear to finalize the judgment, directed the payment of $138,000 to Irene Elguindy, and mandated the Sheriff of Peel Region to receive $130,000 owed to Emad Elguindy to satisfy registered Writs of Execution in Halton and Peel under the Creditors’ Relief Act, treating the regions as a singular district for pro-rata distribution.

The court also commended counsel for providing necessary information regarding the writs.

This addendum to judgment clarifies a typographical error in a previous judgment, confirming a plaintiff's monetary award.

It further addresses the payment of funds held in court, particularly concerning a restitution order against a defendant in favour of a third-party creditor.

The court determined it lacked authority to directly order payment to the creditor without proper enforcement steps, outlining the necessary searches and affidavit requirements for the creditor to obtain an order for payment out of court, while acknowledging the defendant's opposition to direct payment.

The plaintiffs, parents of one defendant and former in-laws of the other, sought repayment of $440,000 in alleged loans for property purchases and trust funds.

The defendants claimed the advances were gifts.

The court applied the presumption of resulting trust, finding that funds for an investment property were loans ($130,000 awarded to Emad Elguindy).

However, funds for a family residence were deemed gifts, rebutting the presumption.

The court also found a breach of trust and unjust enrichment regarding $100,000 held for one plaintiff, awarding $113,000 to Irene Elguindy.

The court noted issues with both parties' conduct and document production, denying pre-judgment interest and ordering parties to bear their own costs, with Afrodite's costs to be paid from funds available to defendants.

This is a costs endorsement following a summary judgment motion where the Smiths' defence and counterclaim were dismissed, and Kheen was granted summary judgment with full indemnity costs.

The court applied the factors stipulated in Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

It found the costs claimed by Kheen, including legal fees and disbursements, to be reasonable, necessary, and directly related to the complex litigation, which was necessitated by the Smiths' conduct in attempting to avoid their legal obligations.

Kheen was awarded $23,070 in costs (inclusive of HST) and $2,359.32 in disbursements, payable jointly and severally by Nadine Theresa Smith and Shane Davidson Smith.

The court assessed costs following a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' action and the Smiths' counterclaim, with costs payable on a full indemnity basis.

The defendants by counterclaim, Damandeep-Singh Aujla and Daman Aujla Professional Corporation, sought full indemnity costs.

The court found the proceedings complex, involving multiple parties and transactions, and noted the Smiths' lack of credibility, delay tactics, and refusal to admit key facts.

The claims against Mr. Aujla, a professional, were of great importance and impugned his integrity.

The court found the hourly rates of counsel reasonable and awarded full indemnity costs to Damandeep-Singh Aujla and Daman Aujla Professional Corporation, totaling $43,486.92, after disallowing Westlaw Research as an overhead expense.

This costs endorsement pertains to a motion brought by 1372708 Ontario Inc. to compel Ravenda Homes Ltd. and its principal, John Ravenda, to answer undertakings and questions refused during discovery in three complex proceedings.

The moving party achieved substantial success, as most outstanding discovery issues were resolved in their favour, either by court order or consent after the motion was initiated.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the moving party, reducing the amount due to some unsuccessful aspects of the motion, such as the attempt to examine an expert on a Deloitte LLP report.

The court emphasized that costs "in the cause" are only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here, and fixed costs at $19,000.00 inclusive of HST.

The respondent's motion for a non-dissipation/Mareva injunction against the applicants' worldwide assets was dismissed.

The applicants sought costs for the dismissed motion.

The court, applying Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, found the applicants were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis, as the respondent's litigation conduct was not egregious.

The court fixed costs at $12,113.88, payable at the conclusion of the trial.