Jessica R. Szabo

This appeal concerned a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) affirming a finding that the appellant was incapable of consenting to antipsychotic and mood-stabilizing medications.

The appellant, who was self-represented, did not appear at the appeal hearing, but amicus curiae provided submissions.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding mootness but ultimately found the appeal was not moot due to the appellant's ongoing interactions with the mental health system and the potential relevance of a prior capable wish.

The court reviewed the CCB's application of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, and its consideration of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The court found no reviewable errors by the CCB, concluding that the CCB's finding on the appellant's inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of treatment was sufficient, and that the appellant's religious beliefs were a manifestation of his mental condition, not a genuine religious objection.

The appeal was dismissed.

L.L. appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment.

The Board had determined that L.L. met the criteria for involuntary detention and lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision about treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medications, primarily due to a mental disorder (likely bipolar I with psychotic elements).

The Superior Court dismissed L.L.'s appeal, upholding the Board's finding of incapacity and its procedural fairness.

The court also addressed the admission of fresh evidence and the Board's decision not to appoint amicus curiae, finding no error in either.

The respondent brought a motion to admit fresh evidence and to dismiss the appellant's appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision for delay or as moot.

The court admitted the fresh evidence without requiring leave, finding it relevant to the motion.

The court found the appeal should be dismissed for delay due to the appellant's two-year inaction and relocation to the Congo, and also found the appeal moot as the appellant had been discharged from treatment and the capacity issue was no longer a live dispute.

The motion was granted, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board.

The first disposition, which transferred him to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH), was dismissed as moot by the Court of Appeal as it had been superseded.

The second disposition, which ordered his detention at the highly secure Waypoint Centre for Mental Health Care due to worsening behaviour and significant threat to public safety, was upheld.

The court found the Board's decision reasonable, emphasizing that public safety, including the safety of hospital staff and co-patients, is the paramount consideration under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, and deferred to the Board's expertise in managing the risk posed by the individual.

This is an appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board concerning a restriction of liberty hearing for an appellant found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCR) for aggravated assault.

The appellant, who has schizophrenia, had his liberty restricted and was transferred to a more secure forensic unit after his mental health deteriorated due to discontinuing medication.

The appellant argued that the Board failed to consider his liberty interests and other needs, including a request for a lateral transfer to another unit, and that the Board's findings were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board considered all required factors and that there was sufficient evidence to support the transfer to a more secure unit, including testimony from the treating psychiatrist regarding the appellant's unmanageability and risk of harm.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the restriction of liberty was necessary to be reasonable.

This is an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning a patient's capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment.

The appellant, diagnosed with schizophrenia, was found incapable by the Consent and Capacity Board of consenting or refusing antipsychotic medication, a decision upheld by the Superior Court.

The core issue was whether the appellant could appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decision, particularly in light of his delusional beliefs about environmental factors affecting his health.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Board correctly applied the two-branch capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Starson v. Swayze, which requires a patient to recognize how their mental condition's manifestations affect them.

The Court found no error in the Board's factual findings or its application of the legal standard, concluding that the appellant's decision was dictated by his delusions, preventing a rational appreciation of treatment benefits.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued he did not have a mental illness and his beliefs about being persecuted by foreign intelligence were real.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board did not err in concluding the appellant suffered from a delusional disorder and that his complete lack of insight into his condition rendered him incapable of appreciating the consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who had been found Not Criminally Responsible for uttering death threats, suffered from a delusional disorder and refused antipsychotic medication, denying he had a mental illness.

Applying the Vavilov framework, the Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's decision on a standard of palpable and overriding error.

The court found no error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant's refusal of treatment was a result of his delusional disorder, rendering him unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting or refusing to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The central issue was the second branch of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, specifically whether the Appellant could "appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences" of his decision, given his delusional beliefs about environmental afflictions and the effects of medication.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that capacity requires an objectively reasonable appreciation of risks and benefits, not one rooted in delusions, even for an intellectually capable individual.

Stanley Almeida, a patient with delusional disorder, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment.

Dr. Andrew Morgan, his psychiatrist, brought a motion for an interim order to administer intravenous antipsychotic medication (Invega Sustenna) pending the appeal's resolution.

The court denied Almeida's adjournment request, citing urgency due to his deteriorating health and the unlikelihood of counsel being available quickly.

Applying the criteria under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act, the court found that the treatment would substantially improve Almeida's condition, benefits outweighed risks, it was the least restrictive option given his non-compliance, and it was necessary before the appeal.

The motion was granted, authorizing treatment until the appeal is resolved, and the appeal was expedited.

J.W. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to mental disorder treatment.

Despite J.W.'s non-attendance and lack of engagement in the appeal process, the Superior Court of Justice proceeded with the appeal, admitting fresh evidence regarding J.W.'s hospital attendances and the respondent's efforts to contact her.

Applying appellate standards of review, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's factual findings and denied the appeal, upholding the incapacity finding.

J.G. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to mental disorder treatment.

Despite J.G.'s non-attendance and failure to advance the appeal, the Superior Court of Justice proceeded, admitting fresh evidence regarding J.G.'s post-discharge condition and the respondent's efforts to contact him.

Applying appellate standards of review, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's factual findings regarding J.G.'s mania and grandiosity preventing him from appreciating his condition or treatment consequences.

The appeal was denied.

W.S., a 20-year-old with significant mental health issues, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that found her incapable of managing property.

The Board's finding was based on her inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of acquiring alcohol, leading to self-harm.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board committed an error of law by characterizing the decision to acquire alcohol as a decision in property management without other evidence of property management issues, and that the physician's assertion of W.S. "repeatedly running out of money" was uncorroborated.

The court emphasized that capacity to manage property must relate to financial matters, not solely to control behavior unrelated to property.

The Board's finding of incapacity was set aside.

The appellant, Anderson Tung, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medications due to his inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of his decision.

The Board's finding was based on evidence of his delusions and denial of mental illness.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's decision under a reasonableness standard, finding sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the appellant lacked capacity to appreciate the consequences of his treatment decision.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision concerning the appellant's capacity to consent to treatment.

The court found the appeal moot because the appellant had been discharged from the hospital almost five years prior, had no further contact with the mental health system, and the issue of capacity is time-specific.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, concluding there was no live controversy, no practical effect on the parties' rights, no continuing adversarial relationship, and no special circumstances, including reputational concerns, to warrant the use of judicial resources.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated May 25, 2017.

The appellant challenged the Board's removal of the possibility of community living from her disposition conditions.

The Board had acted on a joint position to detain the appellant in the secure unit with potential transfer to the general forensic unit but not to the community.

The appellant's treating physician testified that community living was not a realistic goal given the appellant's recent incidents of unauthorized absence and violence towards hospital staff, and that the frustration of an unattainable condition had contributed to the appellant's anger and violent behavior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it entirely reasonable to remove the community living condition based on the evidence.