Jessica R. Szabo

The Appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting or refusing to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The central issue was the second branch of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, specifically whether the Appellant could "appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences" of his decision, given his delusional beliefs about environmental afflictions and the effects of medication.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that capacity requires an objectively reasonable appreciation of risks and benefits, not one rooted in delusions, even for an intellectually capable individual.

Stanley Almeida, a patient with delusional disorder, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment.

Dr. Andrew Morgan, his psychiatrist, brought a motion for an interim order to administer intravenous antipsychotic medication (Invega Sustenna) pending the appeal's resolution.

The court denied Almeida's adjournment request, citing urgency due to his deteriorating health and the unlikelihood of counsel being available quickly.

Applying the criteria under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act, the court found that the treatment would substantially improve Almeida's condition, benefits outweighed risks, it was the least restrictive option given his non-compliance, and it was necessary before the appeal.

The motion was granted, authorizing treatment until the appeal is resolved, and the appeal was expedited.

W.S., a 20-year-old with significant mental health issues, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that found her incapable of managing property.

The Board's finding was based on her inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of acquiring alcohol, leading to self-harm.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board committed an error of law by characterizing the decision to acquire alcohol as a decision in property management without other evidence of property management issues, and that the physician's assertion of W.S. "repeatedly running out of money" was uncorroborated.

The court emphasized that capacity to manage property must relate to financial matters, not solely to control behavior unrelated to property.

The Board's finding of incapacity was set aside.

J.W. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to mental disorder treatment.

Despite J.W.'s non-attendance and lack of engagement in the appeal process, the Superior Court of Justice proceeded with the appeal, admitting fresh evidence regarding J.W.'s hospital attendances and the respondent's efforts to contact her.

Applying appellate standards of review, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's factual findings and denied the appeal, upholding the incapacity finding.

J.G. appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to mental disorder treatment.

Despite J.G.'s non-attendance and failure to advance the appeal, the Superior Court of Justice proceeded, admitting fresh evidence regarding J.G.'s post-discharge condition and the respondent's efforts to contact him.

Applying appellate standards of review, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's factual findings regarding J.G.'s mania and grandiosity preventing him from appreciating his condition or treatment consequences.

The appeal was denied.

The appellant, Anderson Tung, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medications due to his inability to appreciate the foreseeable consequences of his decision.

The Board's finding was based on evidence of his delusions and denial of mental illness.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, upholding the Board's decision under a reasonableness standard, finding sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the appellant lacked capacity to appreciate the consequences of his treatment decision.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision concerning the appellant's capacity to consent to treatment.

The court found the appeal moot because the appellant had been discharged from the hospital almost five years prior, had no further contact with the mental health system, and the issue of capacity is time-specific.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, concluding there was no live controversy, no practical effect on the parties' rights, no continuing adversarial relationship, and no special circumstances, including reputational concerns, to warrant the use of judicial resources.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated May 25, 2017.

The appellant challenged the Board's removal of the possibility of community living from her disposition conditions.

The Board had acted on a joint position to detain the appellant in the secure unit with potential transfer to the general forensic unit but not to the community.

The appellant's treating physician testified that community living was not a realistic goal given the appellant's recent incidents of unauthorized absence and violence towards hospital staff, and that the frustration of an unattainable condition had contributed to the appellant's anger and violent behavior.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it entirely reasonable to remove the community living condition based on the evidence.