Jeffrey S. Leon

Following a successful appeal setting aside a series of ex parte 'investigative receivership' orders, the successful appellants sought costs against both the original applicant and the court-appointed receiver.

The Court of Appeal held that both were liable for costs.

The applicant was liable on a partial indemnity scale because he initiated and supported the proceedings.

The receiver was held personally liable for costs on a substantial indemnity scale because it acted as a 'real litigator' and pursued an impermissibly overreaching roving receivership, losing its objectivity as an officer of the court.

The Court also clarified that substantial indemnity costs are calculated as 1.5 times partial indemnity costs under Rule 1.03, rather than as a percentage of full indemnity costs.

The applicant sought declaratory relief that its contractual option to acquire up to a 20 percent interest in an LNG terminal project remained valid despite the project's evolution from an import facility to an export facility.

Applying orthodox contractual interpretation principles, the court held the project had evolved but had not become a brand-new project, and the option therefore continued to attach to the existing development.

The court further implied a term requiring disclosure of sufficient financial information to permit the applicant to determine the value of the option and verify the exercise price, holding that such disclosure was necessary for business efficacy and consistent with the organizing principle of good faith in contractual performance.

The disclosure was made subject to confidentiality protections to be negotiated by the parties.

The defendant travel company brought a motion for summary judgment in a certified class proceeding alleging breach of contract relating to hotel reservation charges.

The representative plaintiff claimed that the defendant mischaracterized and inadequately disclosed its “Tax Recovery Charge” and “Service Fees,” including allegedly charging taxes based on a wholesale rate and embedding undisclosed profits within service fees.

The court held that the website Terms of Use formed part of the reservation contract but, properly interpreted, did not contain promises requiring disclosure of the calculation methodology, a breakdown of the combined fees, or the absence of a profit element.

The language merely described the nature of the charges and did not create contractual obligations consistent with the plaintiff’s interpretation.

Finding no breach of the express contractual terms, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Following a refusals motion in a certified class action under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the plaintiff sought costs of $14,696.25 on a partial indemnity basis.

The underlying refusals motion arose during discovery in advance of the defendant’s pending summary judgment motion and concerned questions about the calculation of a services fee and production of sample contracts.

Although the plaintiff had succeeded on the refusals motion, the defendant argued that costs should be limited and made costs in the cause pending the outcome of the summary judgment motion.

The court held that the claimed costs were excessive for the nature of the motion and accepted that costs should await the disposition of the summary judgment motion.

Costs were therefore fixed at $8,000 on a partial indemnity basis, payable in the cause.

The moving defendants sought an extension of time to deliver their statements of defence in a complex commercial action alleging conspiracy and misappropriation of corporate assets relating to an international family business enterprise.

The plaintiffs opposed the request and argued the defendants should immediately challenge the pleadings or deliver defences.

The court exercised its discretion under the Rules of Civil Procedure to extend the time, finding that jurisdiction and service motions involving foreign defendants could significantly affect the structure of the litigation.

Requiring the defendants to attack the pleadings or file defences before those issues were resolved would create inefficiency, risk inconsistent rulings, and provide little practical progress in the litigation.

The extension was granted until the final determination of service and jurisdiction motions involving the foreign defendants.

The plaintiffs and defendants were all victims of a Ponzi scheme orchestrated by an investment advisor.

The plaintiffs, who were late entrants to the scheme, provided bank drafts directly payable to the defendants, who were early entrants, under the mistaken belief they were investing in legitimate bridge financing.

When the scheme collapsed, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for the return of their money, alleging unjust enrichment and mistake of fact.

The plaintiffs brought a consolidated motion for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding whether the defendants were unjustly enriched or if the payments were made under a mistake of fact, and noting that the novel legal issues and ongoing bankruptcy proceedings required a full trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against Expedia Inc. and Expedia Canada Corporation, alleging that the defendants wrongfully charged hidden service fees and undisclosed profits on hotel bookings.

The court certified the action against Expedia Inc. for breach of contract, finding that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, there was an identifiable class, and a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

However, the court declined to certify claims under the Consumer Protection Act and Competition Act, and dismissed all claims against Expedia Canada Corporation as it was not a contracting party.

The moving party sought advice and directions under a court‑approved CCAA Plan of Arrangement governing the restructuring of Canada’s third‑party asset‑backed commercial paper market.

The administrator argued the Plan and related agreements permitted it to terminate credit default swap transactions and fund termination payments from collateral without dealer consent below specified thresholds.

A dealer noteholder opposed, asserting the agreements required negotiated consent where collateral beyond a specific trade would be affected.

The court held that the contractual language did not eliminate consent requirements and that the court’s broad CCAA jurisdiction could not be used to effectively rewrite the negotiated agreements.

The request for declaratory or corrective relief was refused.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a California judgment of approximately (US)$17 million against the defendant Jay Chiang and sought a declaration that the debt survives his bankruptcy discharge under s. 178(1)(d) of the BIA.

The plaintiffs also brought a second action alleging that Jay Chiang and numerous family members engaged in fraudulent conveyances and a conspiracy to hide assets and frustrate collection efforts.

The court enforced the California judgment in the amount of (US)$9,678,832 but declined to declare that the debt survives bankruptcy, finding no fiduciary duty was owed to the plaintiffs.

The court found Jay Chiang liable for fraudulent conveyances and conspiracy, but dismissed the claims against most of the other family members, finding they were unwitting conduits used by Jay Chiang.

The plaintiffs sought court approval of a settlement agreement resolving complex litigation and related bankruptcy proceedings arising from the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

The dispute concerned ownership and recovery of investment fund assets held by the prime broker at the time of its insolvency, including securities subject to re-hypothecation and claims advanced in multiple jurisdictions.

The court considered the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement, including its impact on investors and the risks and delays associated with continued litigation and cross-border enforcement.

Relying on principles reflected in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the court’s jurisdiction under the Courts of Justice Act, the court concluded that the compromise was fair and reasonable.

The court approved the settlement and issued vesting orders in relation to assets conveyed under the agreement.

The defendants and proposed defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's ruling on a Rule 21 motion, an order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding, and an order granting the plaintiffs leave to commence an action under the Securities Act.

The court granted leave to appeal the Rule 21 motion in relation to the pleadings of negligence and negligent misrepresentation, noting that two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions created a correctness and conflict issue.

Consequently, leave to appeal the certification order was also granted.

Furthermore, the court granted the proposed defendants leave to appeal the order allowing proceedings against them under the Securities Act, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's determination that they were de facto officers of the Income Fund.

The moving party, Lehman Brothers International (Europe), sought to stay an order refusing to permanently stay the Ontario action pending its motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The underlying dispute involved the beneficial ownership of publicly traded securities held under brokerage contracts containing an exclusive jurisdiction clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the moving party failed to show a serious issue to be adjudicated, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay, particularly given the responding parties' undertakings and the ongoing concurrent litigation in New York.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to stay the respondents' action based on an exclusive forum selection clause in their agreements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the clause applied, the respondents had shown 'strong cause' not to enforce it.

The court noted the appellant's delay in raising the jurisdictional issue, its inconsistent positions, and the risk of inconsistent verdicts between Canada and the United States.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondents.

The dispute arose from the exercise of a shotgun buy/sell provision in a unanimous shareholders' agreement.

The appellant alleged breach of fiduciary duty, theft of corporate opportunity, and other claims after learning the respondent financed the buyout by agreeing to transfer corporate properties to a lender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge applied the correct summary judgment test and correctly concluded that no fiduciary duty exists between shareholders exercising a shotgun provision, nor was there any appropriation of a corporate opportunity.

Class counsel appealed an order fixing their fees at $6.3 million plus GST, which was approximately half the amount agreed upon in their contingency fee agreements.

The motion judge had reduced the base fee by 25% and applied a multiplier of 2.6, finding the requested $12 million fee excessive in relation to the $40 million settlement recovery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge applied the proper test, considered all relevant factors, and made no palpable and overriding error in determining a fair and reasonable fee.

The appellant appealed an order regarding the interpretation of an insurance policy endorsement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge correctly resolved the ambiguity in Endorsement II to achieve commercial reality and reflect the reasonable expectations of the parties, rather than applying a strict rule of giving the same words the same meaning which would have rewritten the policy.

The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing their motion to strike a summons to witness.

The respondent had issued the summons to examine a representative of the applicants in connection with a pending motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a).

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that the evidence was potentially relevant, and concluding that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general importance.

The appellant life insurance company appealed a trial judgment awarding its former agent damages for breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and vested renewal commissions following his termination.

The trial judge found the appellant breached its fiduciary duty by freezing the agent's vested commission account and acted in bad faith in its post-termination conduct.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the vested commissions, the breach of fiduciary duty, the punitive damages award, and the dismissal of the appellant's counterclaim.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the trial judge's award of a risk premium on costs, holding that the amended Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit a risk premium to be awarded against an unsuccessful party.

In a complex CCAA restructuring of Stelco Inc., four appeals were brought regarding the distribution of assets among creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that Senior Debt Holders could enforce subordination and turnover provisions against Noteholders via trust principles, and that post-filing interest was payable.

However, the Court reversed the motion judge on two key issues: it found that a massive IT outsourcing contract was not in the 'ordinary course of business', thereby elevating its assignee to Senior Debt status, and it ruled that the distributed securities must be valued at the 'Plan value' ($5.50 per share) rather than the post-emergence market value.

Sunrise REIT initiated an auction process to sell its assets, requiring interested parties, including Ventas and HCPI, to sign confidentiality and standstill agreements.

Ventas submitted the winning bid, and Sunrise signed a purchase agreement containing a 'fiduciary out' clause allowing it to consider superior unsolicited proposals, but also requiring it to enforce existing standstill agreements.

HCPI subsequently submitted a higher bid.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's ruling that the purchase agreement obliged Sunrise to enforce HCPI's standstill agreement, thereby precluding Sunrise from considering HCPI's bid, as it was not a 'bona fide' proposal due to the breach of the standstill agreement.