James M. Wortzman

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike portions of the defendants’ statement of defence and counterclaim under Rules 21.01(3) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, or alternatively to compel further particulars.

The dispute arose from a joint venture involving educational and consulting seminars and real estate marketing.

The court held that the pleadings disclosed sufficient material facts and did not meet the high threshold required to strike a defence or counterclaim as scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court further found that the additional details sought by the plaintiff were evidentiary in nature and more appropriately addressed during examinations for discovery.

The motion was therefore dismissed in its entirety, though the plaintiff was granted additional time to deliver its reply.

The defendants brought a motion challenging the continuation of an injunction that had been granted on an ex parte basis prohibiting them from soliciting or doing business with the plaintiff company's customers.

The court considered whether the plaintiffs satisfied their duty of full and frank disclosure required on ex parte motions under Rule 39.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found material non‑disclosure, including failure to disclose that the parties had previously merged their businesses and operated together for approximately two years, failure to explain material terms of an employment agreement containing restrictive covenants that had expired, and failure to disclose key details contained in an attached witness statement.

The court held that merely attaching exhibits without highlighting their material contents in the affidavit did not satisfy the disclosure obligation.

Because the plaintiffs failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, the injunction previously granted was dissolved.

The plaintiff tax consulting firm sued a corporate client, its president, and its investors for unpaid fees relating to successful SR&ED tax credit applications.

The plaintiff alleged that the investors gave oral assurances to the president that they would pay the plaintiff's fees, which the president relayed to the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the claims for breach of contract and misrepresentation against the investors, finding the president's evidence regarding the oral assurances to be not credible.

The court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding no benefit was received by the investors and that the corporate veil provided a juristic reason for any benefit retained.

Default judgment was granted against the corporate client.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to add two parties and a new oppression remedy to their statement of claim in a dispute over a real estate joint venture.

The motion judge had dismissed the amendments on the basis that the appellants failed to produce evidence supporting the allegations against the proposed parties.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that on a motion to amend pleadings, the facts pleaded must be taken as true and provable, and the court should not look beyond the pleadings to require evidentiary proof at that stage.

The proposed amendments adequately disclosed causes of action for conspiracy, inducing breach of contract, and oppression.

The appellant moved to amend its statement of claim after the expiry of the limitation period to add its parent corporation as a plaintiff, arguing misnomer.

The Master and Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it was an attempt to add a new party rather than correct a misnomer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming it was not a misnomer and reaffirming that the special circumstances doctrine did not survive the enactment of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a 'Covenant and Postponement of Claim' valid and enforceable against it.

The appellant argued it was a guarantor, not a principal debtor, and was released from liability due to a failure to receive a demand notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific language of the Covenant precluded the appellant from relying on the lack of notice, and that the appellant had ratified the events that might have otherwise entitled it to release.

The appellant was substantially successful on an appeal regarding the court-ordered sale of properties.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $15,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The court directed that the costs be paid by the respondent personally rather than by the Estate, and declined to make any costs order regarding the Receiver or a prior consent motion.

The parties were joint venturers in property development who had a falling out, leading to the appointment of a Receiver to sell properties in Waterloo, London, and Oshawa.

The motion judge approved the Receiver's amended sales process, which included a stalking horse offer from the respondent, despite finding that the respondent had engaged in tactical conduct to derail the original sales process.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred by disregarding the respondent's conduct when exercising her discretion, as the conduct undermined the integrity of the court-supervised sales process.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the Waterloo property was ordered sold to the appellant in accordance with his original bid.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing its motion to add its parent company as a plaintiff after the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant argued the omission was a misnomer, while the respondent argued it was an attempt to add a new party.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the appellant was seeking to add a new party rather than correct a misnomer, which is prohibited by section 21 of the Limitations Act, 2002 after a limitation period has expired.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision awarding costs of $15,000 to the plaintiff and ordering two Brampton lien actions to proceed peremptorily.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The court held that the scheduling order was interlocutory and not appealable under the Construction Lien Act.

Regarding costs, the court found no error in principle in the motions judge's decision to award costs against the successful defendants, as they had reversed their position on proceeding by a Rule 21 motion, resulting in costs thrown away.

The appellant operated an adult entertainment parlour.

The City of Hamilton revoked the appellant's licence for failing to actively carry on business within a reasonable time.

The appellant sought judicial review, arguing a denial of procedural fairness because the City failed to provide proper disclosure of the grounds for revocation as required by its own by-law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the City's failure to provide proper notice and disclosure tainted the hearing from the outset and denied the appellant its right to a fair hearing.

The revocation was quashed and the licence reinstated.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Hamilton to revoke their adult entertainment parlour licence.

The municipality had passed a by-law to reduce the number of such parlours, allowing revocation if a business was not actively carried on within a reasonable time.

The applicants had not opened for business because they were waiting for a liquor licence, which was delayed due to unpaid retail sales tax from another business.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no procedural unfairness, bias, or bad faith.

The court held that the municipality's finding that the business had not opened within a reasonable time was not patently unreasonable, as the delay in obtaining a liquor licence was not the municipality's responsibility.

The appellant commenced a second action against the respondents to realize on a judgment for deposit monies obtained in a prior action.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, filing five affidavits while the appellant filed no evidence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no genuine issue for trial as the appellant failed to put its 'best foot forward' by filing evidence or conducting cross-examinations.

The court also declined to interfere with the motion judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following the appellants' substantial success on appeal.

The court determined the appropriate quantum of costs to be awarded.

Costs were fixed and awarded to the appellants in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The respondent was sexually assaulted by an ultrasound technician at a private clinic.

The technician performed unauthorized tests and surreptitiously videotaped her.

At trial, a jury found the clinic negligent and vicariously liable, awarding substantial damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the finding of negligence against the clinic, concluding it was plainly unreasonable.

However, the Court upheld the finding of vicarious liability, determining that the clinic's enterprise materially increased the risk of the assault.

The Court also significantly reduced the general and aggravated damages from $175,000 to $25,000, finding the jury's award excessive.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding entitlement to a deposit for a condominium unit.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motions judge that the appellant's interpretation of the agreement, which would make the purchaser of an individual unit liable for the purchase price of the entire building or damages flowing from breaches between the developer and Skyline, made no commercial sense.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $15,000 to the respondents.

The interveners appealed a trial judgment concerning a dispute over the assets of The Holy Virgin Church.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that proposed by-law amendments were governed by the approval requirements in the Normal Parish By-laws, noting that the dispute was fundamentally religious and outside the court's purview.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge improperly exercised his discretion under s. 106 of the Canada Corporations Act to order a meeting, as the power struggle between factions did not constitute extraordinary circumstances making a meeting impracticable.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motions for an interim injunction and a certificate of pending litigation regarding a terminated commercial lease.

The Divisional Court granted an extension of time to seek leave but dismissed the application on the merits.

The court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's application of the test for injunctive relief, noting evidence supported the findings that the premises were not unique and damages would suffice.

The court also held that the failure to provide explicit reasons for dismissing the CPL did not warrant granting leave.

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement with an abatement equivalent to damages caused by the respondents' alleged breach of a promise of confidentiality.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's conclusion that the promise was collateral to the agreement and that specific performance with an abatement is not available in these circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant purchaser entered into an agreement to buy a parcel of land from the respondent vendor.

The vendor's predecessor in title had obtained a consent to sever abutting lands, conveyed the severed lands to herself, and subsequently conveyed the remaining lands to the vendor.

The purchaser requisitioned the title, arguing the conveyance to the vendor violated the subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act because the predecessor still owned the abutting lands at the time of the conveyance.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the exception in s. 50(6) of the Planning Act only applies if the remaining part is conveyed before the consented part.

Since the consented part was conveyed first, the exception did not apply, and the conveyance to the vendor violated the Act.