Ian Scott McCuaig

The accused was charged with second degree murder after admitting to causing the death of the victim.

The defence raised not criminally responsible (NCR) by reason of mental disorder under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused suffered from Cannabis-Induced Psychotic Disorder exacerbated by prolonged substance use, and that his internal predisposition — including a vulnerable brain, prior episodes of psychosis, and features of borderline and antisocial personality disorder — contributed causally to his mental state at the time of the offence.

Applying the holistic approach from R. v. Stone and R. v. Bouchard-Lebrun, the court found the drug-induced psychosis constituted a disease of the mind and that the continuing danger factor was satisfied.

A verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder was entered.

The accused was charged with murder and brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on late disclosure and abuse of process.

The Crown failed to disclose critical DNA evidence identifying the victim's brother's DNA on a mask recovered at the scene, which had been in police possession since January 7, 2025, but was not disclosed until September 9, 2025, on the eve of trial.

Additionally, the Crown failed to timely disclose cell tower evidence and corresponding witness statements necessary to establish the accused's identity as the suspect.

The court found serious violations of the accused's section 7 Charter rights and determined that the Crown's pattern of negligence, apathy, and late preparation constituted an abuse of process that undermined the integrity of the justice system.

A stay of proceedings was granted as the only appropriate remedy.

The accused was convicted of aggravated assault, robbery, and breach of a probation order following a brutal, premeditated attack on the victim in a schoolyard.

The victim suffered permanent loss of sight in one eye and other serious injuries.

The court imposed a sentence of 5 years imprisonment for aggravated assault, with 2 years concurrent for robbery and 6 months concurrent for breach of probation.

The court rejected the Crown's submission for 6-7 years and the defence submission for 4 years, finding that 5 years was appropriate given the seriousness of the offence, the victim's life-changing injuries, the premeditated nature of the attack, and the accused's lengthy criminal record, while noting the record did not include serious prior violent offences.

The court found Rysard Rzadkowski not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of aggravated assault and weapons dangerous, following an incident in which he stabbed his landlord.

The decision turned on whether the Crown had proven the specific intent required for attempted murder.

The court concluded that, while the attack was premeditated and the injuries were life-threatening, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Rzadkowski intended to kill the complainant.

The court accepted the complainant’s account as credible and reliable, and found the accused’s explanations to be implausible and contradicted by the evidence.

The Ontario Court of Justice found Frank Dimillo guilty of multiple firearm-related offences, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life and possession of a firearm while prohibited, but acquitted him of aggravated assault.

The conviction rested primarily on the reliable and corroborated statement of his son, Blake Dimillo, who recounted the accused’s confession to shooting Morgan Richardson in the face.

Despite Blake’s in-court recantation, the judge preferred the original statement due to its precision, corroboration with physical evidence, and Blake’s motivation to tell the truth at the time.

The court carefully analyzed the circumstantial evidence, DNA findings, and the accused’s opportunity and motive, concluding the shooting was intentional and that the accused was the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt.

In this criminal proceeding, the Crown applied to admit the out-of-court hearsay statements of the complainant and the accused's son under the principled exception.

The complainant had disavowed his police statement identifying the accused as the shooter, and the son recanted his statement that he heard the accused confess.

The court denied the application for the complainant's statement, finding it lacked threshold reliability because the complainant was unavailable for meaningful cross-examination.

Conversely, the court admitted the son's statement, finding it met the threshold of procedural reliability because he was available for full cross-examination at trial.

The accused, Ross Simpson, was tried on charges of aggravated assault, robbery, and breach of probation arising from a late-night attack in a Toronto schoolyard.

The complainant, who suffered permanent vision loss in one eye, identified the accused as one of his attackers based on prior acquaintance.

The police recovered a broken baton from the scene, which forensic testing revealed contained DNA highly likely to belong to the accused.

The court found the complainant's identification evidence credible and corroborated by the physical and DNA evidence.

Accordingly, the court found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The accused, Stephan Parr and Amy Rose-Podnar, brought mid-trial applications to exclude certain evidence in their first-degree murder trial.

Ms. Rose-Podnar sought to exclude seven text messages exchanged with a co-accused, Kaveh Lozoomi-Gamroodi, after the murder.

Both accused jointly sought to exclude testimony regarding the timing and number of phone calls between themselves and Dennis Crupi, the owner of a vehicle linked to the murder scene, around the time Crupi was being interviewed by police.

The court granted both applications, finding that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, as its admission would invite impermissible speculation and inferences of bad character, potentially forcing the accused to testify to provide context.

Stephan Parr brought a motion to exclude certain shoe print evidence from his upcoming jury trial for murder.

The evidence included a police photograph of a shoe impression ("Impression F5") found at the scene, a video/photo of wet shoe impressions allegedly made by Parr, and product evidence from Adidas regarding CF Lite Racer shoes.

The Crown sought to have the jury compare Impression F5 with a product drawing of the shoes to infer Parr's presence at the scene.

The court granted the defence application, excluding the evidence on the grounds that its prejudicial value outweighed its probative value.

The evidence was based on hearsay, lacked a proper foundation (no actual shoes seized, reliance on a product schematic), and the impression itself had poor clarity and discrepancies.

The court found that a lay jury would be unable to make meaningful conclusions from the evidence, and its introduction would distract the jury and lead to impermissible reasoning.

The defendant, Ahmed Noor, admitted to discharging a firearm but claimed self-defence and lacked intent to endanger life.

The court found that while Noor intentionally discharged the firearm with intent to endanger life, the Crown failed to disprove his claim of self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, Noor was found not guilty of intentional discharge of a firearm but guilty of related firearm and bail breaches based on admitted facts.

The Crown applied to have the offender, Vezio Cardullo, declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention following his guilty pleas to sexual assault causing bodily harm, overcoming resistance by choking, and uttering threats.

The defence conceded the dangerous offender designation but opposed an indeterminate sentence, proposing a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The court found the offender to be a dangerous offender under all three pathways of the Criminal Code, citing his extensive criminal history, including prior sexual assaults, and the brutal nature of the predicate offences.

However, based on expert evidence indicating the offender's treatability and motivation for change, the court determined that a determinate sentence of 17 years' imprisonment (9.5 years net from judgment date) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order would adequately protect the public, rather than an indeterminate sentence.

The applicant, Marcus Akin Connell, sought to exclude evidence (a loaded handgun) under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The evidence was obtained following police detention, search, and arrest for breach of a release order.

The Crown conceded multiple Charter breaches, including arbitrary detention (s. 9), unreasonable search and seizure of identification (s. 8), and denial of rights to counsel (s. 10(a) and 10(b)).

Applying the three-stage Grant test, the court found the police conduct to be at the serious end of the spectrum due to mistaken beliefs about their powers and obligations, and the impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests was also high, particularly given his intoxicated state and prior experiences as a racialized male.

Despite the reliability and importance of the evidence to the Crown's case, the court concluded that admitting it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was therefore excluded.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder case, the court ruled on the admissibility of the accused's statements to police, ante-mortem statements of the deceased, and character evidence.

The court found the accused's statements were voluntary and not obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The deceased's statement 'No, it's my brother' was admitted for state of mind but not for its truth.

The court also allowed some evidence of the deceased's prior violent acts to support the accused's self-defence claim, while permitting the Crown to lead balancing evidence of the accused's disposition for violence.

The accused, charged with importing cocaine, brought a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The accused argued there was no evidence he caused his suitcase to clear customs or intended to import the drugs, as he was merely transiting through Canada to London.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the actus reus of importing commences when drugs cross the border into Canada, and the mens rea requires only an intention to bring the drugs into Canadian territory, not an intention to clear customs.

The court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to find the accused guilty.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for sentencing after the defendant was found in civil contempt for breaching multiple court orders requiring him to remove defamatory internet postings and cease publishing further defamatory statements.

The defendant engaged in a years-long campaign of vilification and deliberately flouted the court's orders, only purging his contempt shortly before sentencing.

The court found that a fine or conditional sentence would be inadequate given the defendant's history of non-compliance and the need for deterrence.

The defendant was sentenced to four months of incarceration without remission.

The accused was tried on two counts of sexual interference involving an 11-year-old complainant: one count for sexual touching and one count arising from two kissing incidents.

The court granted the Crown's cross-count similar fact application, holding the evidence on each count was probative of the other and provided context for the complainant's conduct.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and relying heavily on the complainant's immediate disclosure to her mother as a spontaneous utterance, the court rejected the accused's denial and found that inconsistencies in peripheral details did not undermine the core allegations.

The court also rejected the defence theory of fabrication based on family conflict and motive.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his conviction and sentence for willfully promoting hatred against identifiable groups (Jews and women) and bail pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed grounds, including challenges to the videoconference hearing, findings on the elements of the offences, and application of aggravating factors, did not raise questions of law alone or lacked sufficient merit/significance to the administration of justice.

Consequently, the application for bail pending appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants, the publisher and editor of Your Ward News, appealed their convictions and sentences for wilfully promoting hatred against Jews and women.

They argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in imposing consecutive six-month sentences.

One appellant also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, the verdicts were reasonable based on the overwhelming message of hatred in the publication, trial counsel was competent, and the consecutive maximum sentences were fit given the separate legally protected interests of the two targeted groups.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, kidnapping, and other offences, sought a bail review after being detained for two years.

The court found that the prolonged pre-trial custody constituted a material change in circumstances, warranting a de novo hearing.

The court concluded that the applicant was releasable on the secondary ground, as the proposed plan of 24/7 house arrest with two sureties was sufficient to mitigate the risk of re-offending.

Furthermore, balancing the tertiary ground factors, including the strength of the Crown's case and the gravity of the offences against the strict release plan and the applicant's lack of a criminal record, the court held that continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant was ordered released on strict conditions.

The applicant, Phoenix Panton-Sawyers, sought a writ of habeas corpus, certiorari, and mandamus to quash an assessment order made under s. 672.11 of the Criminal Code.

The assessment was ordered after her conviction for assault and breach of probation, to determine if she was not criminally responsible due to mental disorder.

The applicant argued the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to make the order due to insufficient evidence.

The court first addressed a preliminary procedural issue regarding virtual presence for habeas corpus applications during the COVID-19 pandemic, finding virtual presence sufficient under s. 774.1 of the Criminal Code.

On the merits, the court found that the trial judge had jurisdiction, as there was a significant body of evidence—including the irrational nature of the assault, the applicant's history of violent conduct, and her ongoing diagnosis of schizophrenia with non-compliance with medication—to reasonably doubt her criminal responsibility and necessitate an assessment.

The application was dismissed.