Herman J. Wilton-Siegel

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board finding that he failed to pay the lawfully required rent.

The tenant argued that the landlord failed to provide proper 90-day notice of the rent increase, that a letter stating a lower rent amount was binding, and that the Board lacked jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law.

The Board correctly determined that the 90-day notice period commenced with the delivery of the proposed rent increase, and the finding that the lower rent amount in the letter was a clerical error was a factual determination not reviewable on appeal.

No costs were awarded due to the landlord's clerical error.

The plaintiff appealed a costs award made at a status hearing, arguing a denial of natural justice because he was not given an opportunity to make submissions.

The defendant cross-appealed the status hearing judge's refusal to dismiss the action for delay.

The Divisional Court found that the status hearing judge erred by failing to apply the proper test for dismissal for delay, specifically regarding whether the defendant suffered non-compensable prejudice.

The cross-appeal was granted, the original order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a re-convened status hearing before a different judge.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal which held that non-earner benefits received by the respondent following a motor vehicle accident were exempt from income calculations.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that non-earner benefits do not qualify as an exemption for 'pain and suffering' under paragraph 43(1)4(i) of the General Regulation.

The court concluded that the benefits must be included in the calculation of income for the purposes of determining eligibility for income support.

The applicant children's aid society sought judicial review to quash a decision of the Child and Family Services Board.

The Board had assumed jurisdiction to hear a parent's complaints regarding procedural fairness and kinship placement decisions made by the society during ongoing child protection proceedings.

The Divisional Court applied a correctness standard of review and held that the Board lacked jurisdiction under section 68.1(8)(a) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court found that because the child protection proceedings were before the court, all substantive issues and related procedural fairness concerns were ultimately subject to the court's jurisdiction, precluding the Board from conducting a review.

The application was granted and the Board's decision was set aside.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $20,000 in costs to a self-represented defendant following the discontinuance of an action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that under the Court of Appeal's decision in Fong v. Chan, a self-represented litigant must demonstrate an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity to receive costs for work ordinarily done by a lawyer.

As there was no evidence that the defendant incurred an opportunity cost, the motion judge erred in principle.

The $20,000 costs award was set aside, and the defendant was limited to recovering his disbursements.

The applicant, a Toronto city councillor, brought an application for judicial review to quash municipal by-laws authorizing the reimbursement of legal expenses for three other councillors.

The expenses related to compliance audits of election campaign finances and defamation actions.

The Divisional Court held that the by-law reimbursing expenses for the compliance audits was ultra vires, as the expenses were not incurred in the councillors' capacity as members of council.

However, the court upheld the by-law reimbursing expenses for a defamation action brought by a sitting councillor, finding it was reasonably connected to her duties.

The application was granted in part.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside an Anton Piller order that had been granted ex parte.

The motion judge had set aside the order on the grounds that the appellant failed to demonstrate a threat of serious damage and failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure of material facts, including alternative means of preserving evidence and the true reasons for a lost client contract.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusions that the appellant failed to satisfy the strict conditions for an Anton Piller order and breached its duty of disclosure.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board that ordered it to cease transferring hydro payment obligations to the tenants.

Following the Board's decision, the Ontario Energy Board ruled that the landlord's activities were unauthorized under the Electricity Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that any concerns about implementing smart sub-metering under the new rules should be addressed by applying to the Board for a variation of its order.

The applicants sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions which found that a 1965 Working Agreement did not confer bargaining rights on them.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the Divisional Court upheld the Board's interpretation that the agreement merely bound the employer to abide by the provisions of the collective agreements, rather than binding the employer to the collective agreements themselves.

The court also dismissed arguments regarding a denial of natural justice due to delay, finding no prejudice was demonstrated.

Both applications were dismissed.

The employer sought judicial review of an interest arbitration award, arguing the arbitration board breached procedural fairness by considering post-hearing wage settlement data without allowing further submissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the board used the public information in a supplementary and confirmatory manner.

The court held that this approach was consistent with the flexible duty of fairness and the legislative nature of interest arbitration.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal finding the respondent to be a person with a disability under s. 4(1) of the ODSPA.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal erred in law by accepting the respondent's self-assessment of his emotional disability and restrictions in daily living activities without the mandatory medical verification by a prescribed professional.

The decision was set aside and the matter remitted for a re-hearing before a different Tribunal member.

The appellant sought to overturn a decision of the Vice-Chair of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission refusing to adjourn scheduled hearings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an appeal lies only from a final decision of the Board, not an interlocutory decision refusing an adjournment.

The court also noted that even if treated as an application for judicial review, it would be premature.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action against the administrators of a message board and several anonymous John Doe defendants.

The plaintiff successfully moved for an order requiring the administrators to disclose the e-mail and IP addresses of the anonymous defendants.

The administrators appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that where a disclosure order engages Charter values such as freedom of expression and privacy, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of defamation and the court must balance the public interest in disclosure against these Charter rights.

At the opening of a judicial review hearing, the applicant moved for leave to adduce fresh evidence and subsequently sought an adjournment to bring the new evidence before the Information and Privacy Commissioner for reconsideration.

The respondents did not oppose the adjournment.

The Divisional Court vacated a prior order to permit the motion and granted the adjournment.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision denying him long-term benefits for depression allegedly caused by a workplace injury.

The applicant argued he was denied natural justice because the Tribunal relied on a hearsay letter from his daughter, and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal is permitted to admit hearsay evidence and the applicant had ample notice of the letter.

The Court also held that the Tribunal's conclusion that non-work-related factors outweighed the contribution of the workplace injury was reasonable and supported by ample evidence.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay $25,000 to the respondent for breach of a software development contract.

The appellant argued there was no contract because the trial judge found no consensus ad idem on the project's scope, and that rescission was improperly ordered.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that an enforceable contract existed for the product the appellant intended to deliver, which the appellant repudiated.

The court upheld the order for restitution due to a total failure of consideration.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal regarding the interpretation of s. 28(1) of Regulation 470 to the Funeral Directors and Establishments Act, which requires a funeral establishment's corporate name to be 'clearly disclosed to the public' on business signs.

The Tribunal had found that a large discrepancy in font size between the business name and the corporate name meant the corporate name was not clearly disclosed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal erred in law by focusing on relative font size rather than whether the corporate name was readable from the vantage point from which the sign was intended to be read.

The matter was remitted to the Complaints Committee for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an Agreement to Lease was a valid and binding contract and that he was in breach for failing to commence tenant improvements.

The appellant argued that the respondent repudiated the agreement by insisting on a draft lease with terms significantly different from the Agreement to Lease.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish that the disputed terms in the draft lease were incompatible with the financial principles of the Agreement to Lease, and therefore the agreement remained enforceable when the respondent terminated it due to the appellant's default.

The appellant tenants appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Divisional Court found that the Board member erred in law by concluding he lacked jurisdiction to award a rent abatement for a cockroach infestation, despite the tenants not specifically requesting it in their original materials.

The court also found the member erred by basing the $1,000 fumigation compensation award on a finding unsupported by evidence.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board to determine the appropriate rent abatement and reasonable fumigation compensation.