Thea Paula Herman

The respondent brought a motion to enforce a settlement arising from family and related civil proceedings concerning the parties’ jointly owned business.

The moving party had accepted an offer to settle shortly after a major customer issued a notice terminating its business relationship, which allegedly significantly reduced the value of the company.

The responding party argued that the offer was no longer capable of acceptance or that enforcement would be unfair and unconscionable due to the business’s diminished value and alleged bad faith.

The court held that the responding party affirmed the settlement through post‑acceptance conduct, including excluding the other party from the business and proceeding as if the agreement existed.

The settlement was therefore enforceable and not unjust or unconscionable in the circumstances.

The parties separated in March 2001 and divorced in 2006.

The respondent sought an equalization of net family property, claiming a 50 percent interest in two properties and arguing he received less than his share from the sale of the matrimonial home.

The court found the respondent had no interest in the second property, which was purchased after separation.

The equalization claim was dismissed because the respondent failed to provide reliable evidence or financial disclosure regarding his own net family property at the date of marriage and valuation date, making it impossible to determine if he received less than his entitlement.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision that used final offer selection to determine child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The appellant argued that the process was contrary to law because it was ill-suited for multiple issues, lacked sworn testimony and cross-examination, and the arbitrator's reasons were inadequate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that family law arbitrations are not required to mirror court processes, the parties were treated equally and fairly, and the arbitrator's reasons were sufficient.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision that upheld interim control by-laws and zoning amendments restricting short-term accommodations in the Town of Blue Mountains.

The moving parties argued the Board erred in its interpretation of the Planning Act, the Human Rights Code, and the doctrine of 'people zoning', and that it denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision on any question of law, concluding the by-laws regulated land use rather than personal characteristics and were a justified planning response.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The respondents in an application for judicial review brought a motion to strike over 100 paragraphs from the applicant's affidavit.

The applicant, a suspended police officer, sought judicial review regarding the disbandment of the Leamington Police Service and related severance and disciplinary issues.

The moving parties argued the challenged paragraphs were irrelevant, contained legal argument, or expressed personal opinions.

The Divisional Court agreed that the affidavit should be confined to relevant facts and non-contentious background.

The court struck the majority of the challenged paragraphs, finding they dealt with the merits of underlying charges not directly at issue, contained legal arguments better suited for a factum, or expressed unsupported personal views.

The applicant, a postgraduate medical resident in Cardiac Surgery, sought judicial review of a university Senate Appeals Committee decision requiring her to enter a six-month remediation period before advancing to the next year of her program.

She argued the decision was unreasonable and that she was denied procedural fairness due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, an inability to cross-examine witnesses, and inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the academic decision was reasonable and that the requirements of procedural fairness were met, noting courts should only interfere in university academic affairs in cases of manifest unfairness.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking contribution from the respondent father toward children's special expenses under s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines, as well as direct payment pending enforcement by the Family Responsibility Office.

The court considered whether various expenses—including extracurricular activities, swimming, skating, gymnastics, school lunches, and day camp—qualified as reasonable special expenses.

The court held that extracurricular activities and certain program costs were reasonable and consistent with the family's pre‑separation spending patterns, but declined to order contributions for school lunches and previously agreed summer camp costs.

The father was ordered to pay 80% of specified expenses and to contribute a monthly amount toward ongoing extracurricular costs pending trial.

Costs of the motion were awarded partially to the mother.

The parties separated after a high-conflict marriage and sought orders regarding custody, parenting schedules, and property equalization.

The father sought joint custody and an equal week-about schedule, while the mother sought sole custody and primary residence.

The court found the parties unable to co-parent effectively and ordered a parallel parenting regime where the mother has final decision-making authority over health and education, and the father over religion.

A parenting schedule was ordered providing significant time with both parents, though not exactly equal.

For property equalization, funds advanced by the father's parents were deemed gifts or discounted to zero due to the unlikelihood of repayment.

The father was granted 45 days to purchase the mother's interest in the matrimonial home.

The responding party was previously found in contempt for failing to provide financial disclosure.

She failed to purge her contempt, did not attend subsequent hearings citing medical issues, and failed to pay outstanding costs orders.

The moving party moved to strike her pleadings.

The court found a consistent pattern of non-compliance and struck the responding party's pleadings, granting the moving party leave to proceed with an undefended trial.

Costs of $15,000 on a full recovery basis were awarded to the moving party.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision granting the plaintiffs' motion to amend their statement of claim to convert their individual environmental contamination action into a class proceeding.

The defendants argued the court lacked jurisdiction to convert an individual action to a class proceeding, applied the wrong test for the amendment, and improperly allowed the addition of potentially statute-barred claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision that the court had jurisdiction, that the Rule 26.01 test for amendments applied, and that limitation period issues were best left for the certification stage.

The municipal defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment.

The underlying action involved a motor vehicle accident, and the defendants argued the claim was statute-barred as it was commenced more than two years after the accident.

The motion judge found a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiff, who was severely injured and confused about the accident location, could have discovered the identity of the responsible municipalities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's fact-specific application of the discoverability rule under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing its motion to add its parent company as a plaintiff after the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellant argued the omission was a misnomer, while the respondent argued it was an attempt to add a new party.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the appellant was seeking to add a new party rather than correct a misnomer, which is prohibited by section 21 of the Limitations Act, 2002 after a limitation period has expired.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his application for judicial review, arguing he did not receive the required notice.

The court accepted that the notice was sent to an incorrect postal code and set aside the dismissal, without prejudice to the respondents bringing a separate motion to dismiss for delay.

The court also granted the applicant leave to amend his application to include the final decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, and dismissed his request for relief regarding the conduct of opposing counsel.

The applicant, a police inspector, brought an application for judicial review challenging the refusal of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services to investigate his allegations of police misconduct, and the Minister's refusal to request such an investigation.

The Commission and the Minister brought a motion to dismiss the application against them.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the applicant lacked standing because the Police Services Act does not grant him the right to request an investigation.

Furthermore, the court held that even if the applicant had standing, the application could not succeed because the respondents owed no duty to the applicant, their decisions did not affect his legal rights, and the remedies of mandamus, certiorari, and judicial review of a statutory power of decision were therefore unavailable.

The appellant, a motor vehicle salesperson, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the Registrar to revoke his registration.

The revocation followed the appellant's criminal conviction for counselling a customer to commit arson to destroy a leased vehicle.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal's decision was fully supported by the evidence.

The court held that a single isolated mistake involving a serious industry-related criminal offence could reasonably support the belief that the appellant would not carry on business with honesty and integrity.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order removing their counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The motion judge had found that the law firm had a current client relationship with one of the responding parties, a corporate affiliate of the moving parties' opponents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the correct legal principles regarding conflicts of interest and that her decision was highly fact-specific.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to remove and replace the administrator of a condominium corporation.

The applicant argued the motion judge erred in principle in applying the test for replacing an administrator under the Condominium Act.

The Divisional Court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, noting she had properly assessed the evidence and applied the correct test.

The court also found the matter did not transcend the interests of the parties.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order denying its request for full costs indemnification in a derivative action.

The applicant argued that leave was warranted due to a conflicting case, Turner v. Mailhot.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the alleged conflicting authority merely represented a difference in outcome, not a difference in principle, and that the motion judge had appropriately considered the circumstances of the case.

The Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application for judicial review concerning the interpretation of catastrophic impairment.

The applicant opposed the motion, arguing OTLA's interest was indirect and the case involved straightforward statutory interpretation.

The court granted the motion, finding that OTLA had expertise, could provide a broader perspective on the legislative scheme, and its participation would not prejudice the parties.

Leave to intervene was granted subject to conditions.

The appellant appealed two orders of a Master refusing to amend the style of cause after the action was dismissed and ordering the parties to sign an implied release that was without prejudice to the plaintiffs' claims in other actions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's determination that he lacked jurisdiction to amend the style of cause post-dismissal, and that it was reasonable to conclude the plaintiffs would not have given a release compromising other claims.