Helen M. Pierce

The Corporation of the Municipality of Greenstone sought declarations and permanent injunctions against the respondent for contravening its Zoning By-law, Property Standards By-law, and Clean Yards By-law on two properties.

The municipality alleged the properties were being used as an unlicensed salvage yard, accumulating derelict vehicles, debris, and waste, posing health and safety hazards.

The respondent did not appear at the hearing.

The court found clear and ongoing breaches of all by-laws and granted the requested declarations and permanent injunctions, ordering the respondent to bring the properties into compliance and pay costs.

The applicants sought the court's opinion on the validity of a handwritten, improperly executed codicil and whether the Thunder Bay Regional Health Sciences Foundation was the residuary beneficiary.

The court found the codicil valid under s. 21.1 of the Succession Law Reform Act, as it clearly expressed the testator's testamentary intentions.

Applying the cy-près doctrine and considering extrinsic evidence, the court determined that the Thunder Bay Regional Health Sciences Foundation was indeed the residuary beneficiary, as it was impracticable to identify the "service organizations" mentioned in the original will and the testator had an overriding charitable intent towards the hospital.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to the Superior Court of Justice for the appointment of an umpire to resolve a dispute with Intact Insurance Company regarding the cost of replacing their collapsed rural home and Quonset hut.

The appraisers appointed by each party could not agree on a joint umpire.

The court considered the criteria for umpire selection under the Insurance Act, emphasizing impartiality and breadth of experience over local residence or travel costs.

The court appointed the plaintiffs' nominee, Glenn Gibson, due to his extensive experience as an umpire for both insureds and insurers, and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

This decision addresses the costs of a dismissed summary judgment motion.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred, was dismissed.

The plaintiff, as the successful party on that motion, sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 20.06 and Rule 57.01, determined that substantial indemnity was not warranted due to the absence of bad faith or unreasonable conduct.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $7,500.00 plus HST, payable by the defendant, finding the plaintiff's claimed costs excessive and disallowing certain disbursements as overhead.

The appellant, D.L., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, and the concurrent 18-month and two-years-less-a-day sentences.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) formula, credibility assessment, sufficiency of reasons, reliance on demeanour evidence, and the application of the Kienapple principle.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions and sentences, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's findings or application of legal principles.

A young person, A.C., appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence and provided insufficient reasons by failing to conduct a proper W.(D.) credibility analysis and to adequately consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, as well as the complainant's motive to fabricate.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge's conclusions were flawed due to the absence of a W.(D.) analysis, leading to a failure to consider significant contradictions in the complainant's testimony and the appellant's evidence regarding his belief in consent.

The court determined these failures constituted a palpable and overriding error and that the reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The conviction was quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for wrongful dismissal from a fixed-term employment contract, arguing the termination clauses were unenforceable under the Employment Standards Act (ESA).

The court found the 'for cause' clause violated the ESA by using a common law standard broader than the statutory exemption and allowing withholding of statutory pay.

The 'without cause' clause also contravened the ESA by limiting compensation to base salary and asserting absolute termination discretion.

Consequently, the termination clauses were deemed unenforceable, and the plaintiff was awarded damages for the unexpired term of the fixed-term contract, consistent with the principle that fixed-term contracts without enforceable early termination provisions obligate payment for the full term.

This case involved cross-motions between self-represented parents concerning child relocation, child support arrears, ongoing child support, and repayment of loans.

The applicant mother sought child support arrears and ongoing support, and extraordinary expenses, while the respondent father sought relocation of the children, credit for mortgage payments, and repayment of car and collateral loans.

The court dismissed the father's motion for child relocation, finding it not in the children's best interests given the mother's established primary care and better employment prospects.

The court calculated and fixed child support arrears, crediting the father for half of the mortgage payments made on the jointly-owned home.

Ongoing child support was ordered based on the father's income.

The mother's claim for moving expenses was dismissed as not falling under s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines.

The father's claim for repayment of a car loan was granted in part, while his claim for a collateral loan was dismissed.

The defendant, Terry Dyck, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff, Warren Hughes's, claim on the grounds that it was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The parties, both former investment advisors, had entered into a Joint Advisory Agreement which dissolved upon the termination of Dyck's employment.

Hughes subsequently filed a claim against Dyck for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court applied the principles for summary judgment from Hryniak v. Mauldin and the discoverability principles from the Limitations Act.

The court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, including the need to weigh evidence and assess credibility.

The motion judge concluded that the earliest date triggering Hughes's claim was his own termination from Wellington, or alternatively, Dyck's termination, both of which fell within the two-year limitation period.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the parents' appeal in a child protection matter, the successful Society sought costs.

The parents argued that costs should not be awarded in child welfare proceedings and that they acted in good faith.

The court found that the parents engaged in bad faith litigation by making baseless allegations of professional misconduct, racism, and collusion against the Society's counsel and the court.

To express disapproval of this reprehensible conduct, the court awarded the Society substantial indemnity costs fixed at $44,703.60.

The plaintiff in the Severance action moved for an order extending the time to set two related motor vehicle accident cases down for trial until December 31, 2024.

All parties consented except the Ministry of Transportation and Carillion Canada.

The court found that the opposing defendants would not be prejudiced by the extension, whereas the plaintiffs and other defendants would suffer prejudice if forced to set the actions down while a leave to appeal decision regarding discovery refusals was pending.

The motion to extend the time was granted.

The plaintiffs moved for an order extending the time to set two motor vehicle accident cases down for trial until December 31, 2024.

All parties consented except the Ministry of Transportation and Carillion Canada.

The court found that the opposing defendants would not be prejudiced by the extension, whereas the plaintiffs and other defendants would suffer prejudice if forced to set the action down while an appeal regarding a refusals motion was pending.

The motion to extend the time was granted.

The appellant, a not-for-profit corporation, appealed an application judge's order setting terms for its upcoming annual general meeting and board elections following a disrupted meeting and internal governance dispute.

The appellant argued the terms regarding membership eligibility and election procedures were inconsistent with its by-laws.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge had broad discretion under the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act to impose terms for fair elections and made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings regarding membership.

This decision addresses the final stages of a corporate winding-up application for Norall Group Inc. and Norall Group Contracting Inc., including the passing of accounts and the determination of outstanding costs.

The court resolved disputes regarding an interim dividend and an interim distribution order, finding that a respondent shareholder was not entitled to a priority distribution due to significant outstanding costs owed to the applicants.

The corporations were ordered wound up, and the applicants were appointed trustees to complete the process, with the respondent's shareholder entitlement deemed nil due to her outstanding liabilities.

This endorsement addresses a costs motion brought by the respondent following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to change a final order.

The respondent sought full recovery costs of nearly $20,000.

The court considered the principles under Family Law Rule 24, including the parties' behavior, proportionality, and the intertwining of issues with a contempt motion and a second motion to change.

The court disallowed costs for secretarial assistance and found that full indemnity costs were not warranted due to shared blame for the dysfunctional relationship.

The court fixed costs at $1,000.00, inclusive of disbursements and HST, to be paid by the applicant to the respondent, enforceable as a set-off against child support.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend its statement of claim to add a new defendant, Wasaya Petroleum LP, to its action, and to compel answers to questions refused at discovery.

The proposed defendant and existing defendant objected on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired.

The court found that the plaintiff had sufficient information to discover the claim against the proposed defendant several years prior, based on band council resolutions and pleadings in a related action.

The motion to amend was dismissed as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and the motion to compel answers was dismissed as irrelevant.

The plaintiff, 1401380 Ontario Limited O/A Wilderness North Air, brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add Wasaya Petroleum LP as a party defendant and to compel Wasaya Airways LP to answer a refused discovery question.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the limitation period for adding Wasaya Petroleum LP had expired.

The court determined that the plaintiff had sufficient information to discover the claim against Wasaya Petroleum LP much earlier than asserted, specifically by September 2016, and failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay.

Consequently, adding the party was prohibited under section 21(1) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The discovery question was deemed irrelevant given the dismissal of the motion to amend.

The accused, an Indigenous man, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after fatally stabbing the victim once in the chest during an argument while heavily intoxicated.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence, arguing the offence was near-murder, while the defence proposed four to seven years.

Applying Gladue principles and weighing the accused's remorse, guilty plea, and history of trauma against the aggravating factors of intoxication and use of a weapon, the court imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant, Jacqueline Pommer, sought final orders for ongoing and retroactive spousal support from the respondent, Joseph Caron, who was noted in default and did not appear.

The court, applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, determined the respondent's income from 2019 to 2023 and ordered him to pay significant retroactive spousal support totaling $122,704, along with ongoing monthly support of $2,603.

The applicant's other claims, including equalization of net family property and child support, were abandoned and dismissed.

The applicants challenged their deceased father's wills on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by the respondent (their sister).

They also sought disclosure of medical records.

The respondent moved for dismissal of the application.

The court dismissed the applicants' motion for medical record disclosure, finding it an intrusion on privacy and a "fishing expedition." The court also dismissed the challenge based on testamentary capacity, finding the solicitor's file provided sufficient evidence of capacity.

However, the court found that the applicants met a minimal evidentiary threshold to question the wills' validity on the ground of undue influence, allowing that claim to proceed to a determination under Rule 75.06.