Harvey T. Strosberg

The moving party sought to vary a 1999 divorce judgment that ordered him to pay $388,000 in spousal support, of which he had paid only $160,000 before defaulting in 2001.

He argued that the failure of his business, his health issues, and his new family constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion to change the support amount, finding that the business failure was foreseeable and his health issues did not impact his earning capacity.

However, the court granted his request to strike a default provision in the judgment that doubled the outstanding support plus $50,000, finding it to be an unenforceable penalty clause.

This decision concerns a consent certification motion in a class action arising from a six-alarm electrical fire at 650 Parliament Street, Toronto, which displaced hundreds of tenants.

The court certified the action as a class proceeding against the core defendants, Parwell Investments Inc. and 650 Parliament (LHB) Investments Limited, on the common issue of negligence.

The certification was granted based on the parties' agreement, satisfying the requirements of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including an identifiable class, common issues, preferability of a class proceeding, and suitable representative plaintiffs.

The order defined the class, appointed representative plaintiffs, declared negligence as the cause of action, and outlined specific common issues related to the defendants' duty and breach of care concerning the building's design, construction, operation, maintenance, and electrical systems.

No costs were awarded for the motion.

This decision addresses two motions: one by defendant Martini to compel the examination of Gheorghe Leferman (sole officer/director of the plaintiff, Romcan Limited) as a witness under Rule 39.03 for a pending motion for a further and better affidavit of documents, and another by defendant Shulgan to compel Mr. Leferman's examination for discovery.

The court granted Martini's Rule 39.03 motion, limiting the scope of examination to specific areas where Mr. Leferman had improperly introduced hearsay evidence, and deemed requests for personal documents premature.

Shulgan's motion for examination for discovery was also granted, finding that he had met the preconditions and the benefits of early discovery outweighed the burden of a second examination for Mr. Leferman.

Martini's motion for a further and better affidavit of documents was adjourned.

Costs were divided for Martini's motion due to mixed success, while Shulgan was awarded $5,000 for his entirely successful motion.

The defendant, Ontario, brought a motion to transfer the plaintiff's civil action for wrongful conviction from Toronto to Woodstock.

The plaintiff had been wrongfully convicted of manslaughter in Woodstock in 1971 and spent over three years in prison before being exonerated in 2015.

The court applied the holistic balancing test under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding that the plaintiff's damages were sustained outside Woodstock and that forcing him to return to the site of his wrongful conviction would be unjust, the court dismissed the motion, preserving the plaintiff's presumptive right to choose the venue.

The court approved the $31.2 million in legal fees, disbursements, and taxes agreed upon by class counsel and the defendants (Volkswagen Group Canada Inc. et al.) following the $2.1 billion "dieselgate" class action settlement.

The fees were deemed reasonable and separate from the class members' recovery, ensuring the settlement remained generous and in the best interests of the class.

The court approved a $2.1 billion class action settlement for Canadian owners and lessees of VW 2.0-litre diesel vehicles affected by the "defeat device" fraud.

The settlement provides cash payments and options for vehicle buyback or emissions modification, with the buyback option generally offering a larger recovery.

The court found the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, exceeding what members would likely recover under provincial consumer protection legislation or tort law.

The representative plaintiffs moved for approval of a $2.375 million settlement in a class action concerning the under-dosing of chemotherapy drugs at several hospitals.

The defendants, who supplied and administered the drugs, denied liability, arguing there was no evidence of clinical impact on patient outcomes and that the plaintiffs' psychological harm did not meet the legal threshold for a recognizable psychiatric illness.

The court approved the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class given the significant litigation risks, the lack of evidence showing clinical harm, and the recommendations of experienced class counsel.

The court also approved class counsel's requested fees of $400,000.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a proposed class action for settlement purposes regarding Volkswagen's installation of a 'defeat device' in certain diesel vehicles.

The court found that the requirements under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act were met, including an identifiable class and common issues.

The court also determined it had jurisdiction to certify a national class, noting the efficiency and comity of doing so.

The motion for certification, along with the approval of an unprecedentedly comprehensive notice plan, was granted.

The Attorney General of Canada and the Joint Committee representing Class Members brought competing applications regarding the allocation of approximately $236 million in excess capital held in the trust fund established by the 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Settlement Agreement.

Canada argued the excess capital should be returned to it, while the Joint Committee sought to allocate the funds to increase benefits for Class Members.

The court dismissed Canada's application, finding that the excess capital allocation provision was intended to provide an opportunity to bridge compensatory gaps for Class Members.

The court approved seven of the Joint Committee's nine recommendations for allocating the funds, including increases to fixed payments and loss of services compensation, to be implemented by way of special distribution.

The Steering Committee, an unincorporated group of physicians and scientists, sought to intervene in a joint hearing of motions concerning the allocation of actuarially unallocated funds from the 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Settlement Agreement.

The Committee proposed allocating funds to its "National HCV Initiative" which aimed to benefit all Canadians with HCV, not just class members.

The court dismissed the intervention request, finding that the Steering Committee was a stranger to both the Settlement Agreement and the underlying litigation, lacking privity of contract or any substantive right to participate in the administration of the settlement.

Two competing groups of plaintiffs, KMG and RGG, brought class actions against Barrick Gold Corporation for securities misrepresentations related to environmental violations at a Chilean mine.

The motion judge granted carriage to RGG, finding their broader claims and superior state of preparation were in the best interests of the class.

KMG appealed the carriage order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge articulated the correct test, did not err in law or principle, and committed no palpable and overriding factual errors in his assessment of the carriage factors.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order that stayed their proposed class action (the Labourers Action) and granted carriage to a competing proposed class action (the DALI Action).

The underlying actions alleged securities misrepresentations by Barrick Gold Corporation.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's approach to assessing the complexity of claims and the state of preparation conflicted with established case law and provided good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

In the administration of a settled national class action concerning compensation claims, class counsel sought approval of a protocol allowing class members to submit late compensation claims despite the expiry of the original deadline under the settlement agreement.

The court had previously provisionally approved the protocol subject to approvals by courts in other jurisdictions.

The remaining issue concerned costs related to the protocol approval motion.

Only the moving party made submissions and requested that there be no order as to costs.

The court accepted the unopposed submission and ordered that there be no order as to costs.

The plaintiffs brought certification motions under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 relating to falling balcony glass panels from three condominium developments in Toronto.

Owners and residents alleged negligence, nuisance, and breach of contract against developers, builders, and related entities after balconies were sealed and glass panels replaced following safety concerns.

The defendants consented to certification subject to three caveats regarding class definition wording, certification of an aggregate damages issue, and the viability of a collateral contract claim against a developer.

The court certified the actions as class proceedings, rejecting the proposed change to the class definition and permitting the collateral contract claim to proceed as a common issue.

However, the court declined to certify a proposed aggregate damages issue due to appellate authority interpreting s. 24(1)(c) of the Class Proceedings Act as prohibiting random sampling of class members to determine damages.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for directions to determine whether a judge of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice could sit outside Ontario to hear a motion concerning a pan-Canadian class action settlement.

The Attorney General of Ontario objected, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to hold a hearing outside its territorial boundaries.

The court held that where it has subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, it possesses the inherent jurisdiction to control its own process, which includes the discretion to sit outside the province.

The court found that holding a joint hearing with supervisory judges from British Columbia and Quebec in Alberta was in the interests of justice to promote judicial economy and avoid inconsistent orders.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to approve a $9 million class action settlement and Class Counsel's fee agreement regarding a C. difficile outbreak at the defendant hospital.

The outbreak affected approximately 223 patients, 91 of whom died.

The court reviewed the settlement terms, which allocated funds based on the duration and severity of symptoms, and considered factors such as litigation risk, the recommendation of experienced counsel, and the single remaining objection.

Finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, the court approved the settlement and the proposed legal fees of 21.5%.

In a class proceeding arising from a major propane facility explosion, the plaintiffs sought to amend their statement of claim and certify claims against additional defendants associated with the ownership and leasing of the facility property.

The court considered whether the proposed amended pleading satisfied the s. 5(1)(a) requirement of the Class Proceedings Act by disclosing a reasonable cause of action.

Claims in strict liability and nuisance against the property-owning defendants were struck because the pleadings failed to meet the legal prerequisites and improperly characterized the alleged nuisance.

Negligence claims under the Occupiers’ Liability Act were also dismissed because the alleged damages occurred off the premises and the statute only applies to persons entering the premises.

However, the court held that the plaintiffs had properly pleaded a viable common law negligence claim based on the defendants’ alleged rights of control and failure to intervene in unsafe operations.

Certification against the remaining defendants proceeded solely on the basis of the common law negligence cause of action.

In a certified class proceeding arising from explosions at a propane facility, class counsel moved for an order restraining an insurer and its counsel from communicating directly with class members during the court‑approved opt‑out period.

The insurer’s counsel had sent letters stating the insurer would opt insured class members out of the class action and pursue their claims through a subrogated action.

The court held the communications were misleading, interfered with the solicitor‑client relationship between class counsel and class members, and violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court reaffirmed that insureds retain control of litigation until fully indemnified for both insured and uninsured losses.

An order was made prohibiting the insurer and its counsel from communicating with affected class members without court approval or consent of class counsel during the opt‑out period.

The proposed representative plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class proceeding for settlement purposes against certain defendants in alleged price‑fixing within the static random access memory (SRAM) industry.

The action alleged breaches of Part VI of the Competition Act, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with economic interests.

A national settlement had been reached with certain defendants, providing payment to class members and cooperation in the ongoing litigation against remaining defendants.

The court considered the certification criteria under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and found they were satisfied for settlement purposes.

The court approved certification against the settling defendants and approved the proposed notice and notice plan, setting a date for settlement approval proceedings.

The plaintiffs, representing a class of Barbados participating policyholders, brought an action against Manulife following the transfer of their policies to Life of Barbados (LOB) in 1996 and Manulife's subsequent demutualization in 1999.

The plaintiffs claimed that Manulife owed them a duty of care and a fiduciary duty to protect their rights to participate in the demutualization.

The court found that while it was reasonably foreseeable that Manulife would demutualize, no duty of care or fiduciary duty was owed to the plaintiffs because their rights as policyholders were lawfully extinguished by the transfer agreement, which was approved by regulators in Barbados and Canada.

The action was dismissed.