Hart Shouldice

The accused was charged with sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose, and inviting a person under 16 to touch for a sexual purpose.

The complainant, aged 14 (believed 15 by the accused), initiated contact to "catch a paedophile" and sent explicit content.

The court found the complainant's credibility problematic, dismissing the sexual assault and touching charges (Counts 1 and 2) due to reasonable doubt, despite finding the events "probably happened." However, the court found the accused guilty of inviting a person under 16 to touch for a sexual purpose (Count 3) based on overwhelming text evidence, emphasizing that a 36-year-old should understand a 15-year-old's sexual invitations as manifestations of immaturity.

Marco Clayton, accused of human trafficking, sought judicial interim release (bail) mid-trial before a judge (Justice Wadden) other than his trial judge (Justice Fraser).

The Crown opposed, arguing only the trial judge had jurisdiction under s. 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Justice Wadden found he had jurisdiction because no prior detention order existed, distinguishing the case from precedents where s. 523(2)(a) applied to vacate existing orders.

However, he declined to exercise this jurisdiction for policy and practical reasons, emphasizing that the trial judge is best positioned to assess bail grounds based on the ongoing trial evidence, and to avoid fragmentation and inefficiency.

The application was adjourned to the trial judge's next scheduled appearance.

Following a trial where the offender was found guilty of sexual assault involving penetrative intercourse, the court delivered its sentencing decision.

The victim suffered profound and lasting physical, emotional, psychological, and financial harm.

The Crown sought a minimum of 3 years imprisonment, while the defence proposed a 24-month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives, rejecting a conditional sentence due to the violent and invasive nature of the crime and numerous aggravating factors.

Despite the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, and potential immigration consequences, the court imposed a sentence of 5 years in the penitentiary, along with ancillary orders for DNA, a 10-year weapon prohibition, and a 25-year SOIRA order.

The Crown applied for a bail review of a justice of the peace's decision to release the accused, who was charged with multiple serious offences involving the prolonged abuse of a child.

The reviewing judge found that the justice of the peace committed legal errors by misapprehending the timeline of the offences, failing to consider the gravity of the charges, and refusing to assess the potential for a lengthy sentence.

Conducting a fresh analysis under the tertiary ground, the court concluded that pre-trial detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, given the strength of the Crown's case, the heinous circumstances of the alleged offences, the accused's prior criminal record, and the lack of a meaningful release plan.

The application was granted and the accused was remanded into custody.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's decision detaining him on secondary and tertiary grounds for charges relating to domestic violence and firearms.

The reviewing judge found the bail judge erred in law by faulting the proposed sureties for not knowing about unproven allegations, effectively violating the presumption of innocence, and by failing to consider the strength of the Crown's case.

Conducting a de novo hearing, the reviewing judge found the proposed sureties were suitable and that the secondary and tertiary grounds did not justify detention.

The applicant was ordered released on bail.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assault and assault causing bodily harm against the complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, improperly used corroborative evidence, and applied uneven scrutiny to the defence and Crown evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, noting that different types of testimony require different critical evaluations.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty of assault, sexual assault, mischief, and two counts of failing to comply with a probation order.

The offences involved choking the complainant and anally penetrating her without consent while she was at his apartment.

The offender was on probation at the time and had a significant prior criminal record involving violence.

The court weighed the aggravating factors, including the inherent violence of the sexual assault and the offender's limited insight, against mitigating factors such as family support.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of four years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order and a 20-year SOIRA registration.

The accused, Eric Richard Marshall, was charged with assault, sexual assault, mischief, and two counts of failing to comply with probation orders stemming from incidents on October 19-20, 2017.

The trial involved contradictory evidence between the complainant (PB) and the accused.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses, finding the complainant's evidence credible and corroborated by external evidence (e.g., Facebook messages, 911 call, DNA evidence), while rejecting the accused's testimony due to significant inconsistencies and lack of believability.

Applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.), the court found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all five counts.

The accused, C.L., was found guilty of sexual assault after a jury trial.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's age (17), the nature of the assault (intercourse), and the accused's disregard for the victim's feelings, balanced against mitigating factors such as the accused's youth (20 at the time of offence, 25 at sentencing), lack of prior criminal record, and a positive pre-sentence report indicating low risk of reoffending.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and considering the usual range for similar offences, the court imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment.

This ruling addresses final jury instructions in a criminal trial.

The court decided not to leave the partial defence of provocation to the jury due to a lack of air of reality, specifically regarding the absence of an identifiable indictable offense by the victim and suddenness.

However, the court found an air of reality for self-defence, warranting its submission to the jury, based on the accused's belief of threatened force and purpose of protection, despite concerns about the reasonableness of the force used.

A 'rolled-up' instruction, combining provocation, intoxication, fear, and suddenness for the mental intent of murder, was granted.

Limiting instructions were provided for the accused's after-the-fact conduct, clarifying its relevance to self-defence and intoxication but not to the intent for murder.

The accused, an Indigenous person, was found guilty after trial of driving a motor vehicle while disqualified and breaching a bail condition prohibiting him from driving.

The Crown sought six months consecutive on both counts.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of six months less one day followed by three years of probation, applying Gladue principles.

The court found that despite the accused's significant criminal record, he was at a unique point in his life with a supportive partner, a newborn daughter, and engagement with Indigenous community resources, presenting a genuine opportunity for rehabilitation through a restorative approach rather than incarceration.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, brought a pre-trial application (voir dire) to exclude his statement to the police, arguing that his Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9) were breached due to a warrantless entry into a dwelling house for his arrest.

The court found that the police lawfully entered the dwelling based on the occupant's invitation and that the accused was found in plain view.

Consequently, no Charter breach occurred.

Even if a breach had been established, the court determined that admitting the statement would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) of the Charter, considering the good faith of the police, the minor nature of any potential breach, and society's interest in adjudicating serious offences on their merits.

The application was dismissed, and the statement was deemed admissible.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code to admit a videotaped statement of the complainant, who was 17 at the time of the alleged sexual assault.

The defence opposed, arguing the statement was not made within a reasonable time due to delays by both the complainant and the police.

The court found the delays were adequately explained and did not significantly impact the complainant's ability to accurately recall events, particularly given her age.

The application was granted, allowing the videotaped statement to be admitted into evidence.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a vehicle while impaired by a drug (inhalant) on June 3, 2016.

The Crown alleged the accused was in the driver's seat of a running vehicle while under the influence of aerosol inhalants.

The defence argued the accused did not have care or control as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Boudreault.

The court found that although the accused was impaired and in the driver's seat, there was no realistic risk of danger because the accused had a clear plan to remain parked until the effects wore off, the vehicle had a standard transmission with an engaged parking brake requiring multiple discrete acts to set in motion, and the accused's impairment was short-lived with rapid recovery.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking disclosure of the Drug Recognition Expert's rolling logs, which document all tests performed by the expert including the suspect's name, witnessing officer, date, the expert's opinion, and whether the opinion was confirmed by toxicological testing.

The Crown opposed disclosure, arguing the records were third-party records not in Crown possession.

The court granted the application, finding that the rolling logs are relevant for court purposes as mandated by the International Association of Chiefs of Police standards, and that s. 258.1 of the Criminal Code does not prohibit disclosure of anonymized rolling logs as part of the expert's curriculum vitae.

The accused, a 47-year-old American permanent resident and former Chief Financial Officer of Branham Group, was convicted after trial of fraud under section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Between December 2009 and August 2010, she wrote 16 fraudulent cheques to herself totalling $83,322.68 and 38 fraudulent cheques to her spouse totalling $110,169.90, for a total of $193,492.58 drawn from the company account.

The fraud caused significant financial and emotional harm to the business owners.

The sentencing judge imposed an 18-month custodial sentence followed by 18 months probation, with a $100,000 restitution order, balancing the serious nature of the breach of trust and large-scale fraud against the offender's medical conditions and first-time offender status.

The defendant was charged with possessing child pornography found on three devices: a desktop computer, an iPad, and a laptop computer, all seized on March 11, 2015.

A total of 1,288 images and 196 videos constituting child pornography were located across the devices.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence and the assertion that the defendant was the only person with access to the devices.

The trial judge found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the child pornography, as multiple other individuals had access to the devices and the investigating officer failed to investigate alternative suspects.

The charge was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual touching against four young children over a 31-year period, and to possession of and making available child pornography involving over 500,000 images and 25,000 videos.

The Crown sought 13 years imprisonment while the defence sought under 5 years.

The court imposed a total sentence of 9 years imprisonment, less presentence custody, with ancillary orders including DNA sampling, SOIRA registration, firearms prohibition, and lifetime restrictions on contact with minors and attendance at certain locations.

The court applied sentencing principles emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for offences involving abuse of children under 18 years of age.

The accused, an 18-year-old with no criminal record, sought a bail review after being detained on firearms and drug charges.

The Justice of the Peace had denied bail solely on the tertiary ground, finding that public confidence would be undermined if released, despite a strong bail plan involving his parents as sureties.

The Superior Court granted the review, holding that the Justice of the Peace erred by failing to consider the strength of the bail plan and the accused's personal circumstances within the tertiary ground analysis.

The accused was released on strict house arrest with increased sureties.

The accused was charged with three counts of robbery and three counts of unlawful confinement arising from a single incident on August 20, 2013, involving three teenage victims.

The Crown's case relied primarily on identification evidence from one victim who made tentative pre-trial identifications through internet photographs and a police photo line-up, coupled with circumstantial evidence including the accused's use of the nickname "Konvict," which matched the name used by the robber during the incident.

The court found the identification evidence credible and reliable despite its equivocal nature, and convicted the accused on all counts.