M. Day

The accused, Mark Stordy, was charged with two counts of agreeing or making an arrangement to commit sexual assault with a person he believed to be under 16 years, specifically an 11-year-old and a 7-year-old, contrary to s. 172.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on telecommunications between Stordy and an FBI agent posing as a mother with two young daughters.

Stordy claimed he was conducting a private investigation to identify a parent endangering children.

The court rejected Stordy's defence, finding him not credible.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stordy had the specific intent to actually travel and meet the fictitious individuals, concluding his communications were merely fantasy roleplaying.

The charges were dismissed.

In a criminal trial alleging historical sexual offences against a former foster child, the accused brought a lost-evidence application seeking a stay after police destroyed a 2002 written statement made by the complainant.

The court held that the statement was relevant disclosure and that the Crown failed to discharge its burden of showing the destruction did not result from unacceptable negligence, thereby establishing a s. 7 Charter breach.

However, the court found no substantial or material prejudice because the defence had extensive alternative material with which to cross-examine the complainant and test credibility.

A stay was refused, and the remedy granted was an inference that the lost statement would not have assisted the Crown, together with consideration of the missing statement in assessing the complainant's credibility and reliability.

The accused, C.L., was found guilty of sexual assault after a jury trial.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's age (17), the nature of the assault (intercourse), and the accused's disregard for the victim's feelings, balanced against mitigating factors such as the accused's youth (20 at the time of offence, 25 at sentencing), lack of prior criminal record, and a positive pre-sentence report indicating low risk of reoffending.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and considering the usual range for similar offences, the court imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm under s. 249(3) of the Criminal Code after colliding with another vehicle at a red light on Ogilvie Road in Ottawa.

The collision caused the victim to suffer a stroke requiring emergency neurosurgery.

The court applied the modified objective test from R. v. Beatty and R. v. Roy, finding that while the accused's failure to stop at the red light constituted civil negligence, it did not constitute a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.

The court found the accused not guilty, emphasizing that the momentary lapse of attention caused by an obstructed street sign, combined with the accused's unfamiliarity with the area, did not rise to the level of criminal culpability.

The appellant, Kriss Stewart, appealed his conviction for impaired driving under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was based on two grounds: an alleged violation of his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and a misapprehension of evidence regarding indicia of impairment.

The appellate court reviewed the trial judge's decision on the s. 11(b) application, finding no error in the calculation of institutional delay or the consideration of relevant factors, and noting the defence's contribution to delays.

Regarding the second ground, the court found that the trial judge had sufficient evidence of impairment from four witnesses and adequately considered and rejected alternative explanations for the appellant's physical symptoms.

The court found no error of law in the trial judge's reasoning or conclusion.