Hart Shouldice

The accused, an 18-year-old with no criminal record, sought a bail review after being detained on firearms and drug charges.

The Justice of the Peace had denied bail solely on the tertiary ground, finding that public confidence would be undermined if released, despite a strong bail plan involving his parents as sureties.

The Superior Court granted the review, holding that the Justice of the Peace erred by failing to consider the strength of the bail plan and the accused's personal circumstances within the tertiary ground analysis.

The accused was released on strict house arrest with increased sureties.

The accused sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following a detention order on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused argued that disclosure constituted a material change in circumstances because witness statements no longer clearly placed a firearm in his possession during the incident.

The court applied the criteria for bail review and new evidence articulated in St. Cloud and Palmer.

The court held that even without firearm evidence, the seriousness of the assault allegations, the accused’s lengthy criminal record, repeated breaches of court orders, and weak bail plan meant detention remained justified on the secondary ground.

The alleged change in the Crown’s evidence was therefore not material to the detention decision.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code following a prior detention order based on secondary grounds.

The application relied on new evidence that a responsible adult relative was prepared to act as surety, post a bond, and supervise the accused in another province.

The court considered the criteria for admitting new evidence on review and determined that the proposed supervision plan constituted a material change in circumstances.

Given the credible surety and relocation away from complainants, the court found the risk to public safety could be adequately addressed by release conditions.

The accused was charged with three counts of robbery and three counts of unlawful confinement arising from a single incident on August 20, 2013, involving three teenage victims.

The Crown's case relied primarily on identification evidence from one victim who made tentative pre-trial identifications through internet photographs and a police photo line-up, coupled with circumstantial evidence including the accused's use of the nickname "Konvict," which matched the name used by the robber during the incident.

The court found the identification evidence credible and reliable despite its equivocal nature, and convicted the accused on all counts.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100ml.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, challenging the validity of the Approved Screening Device demand and seeking exclusion of breath readings.

The court found that the officer had articulable cause to investigate the accused based on common law powers, that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol consumption based on the totality of circumstances, and that the ASD demand was validly made forthwith.

The court dismissed the Charter application, admitted the breath evidence, and found the accused guilty of the "over 80" offence while acquitting on the impaired care or control charge due to insufficient evidence.

The accused was retried and convicted of impaired driving relating to an accident from 2010.

At the first trial, the accused was sentenced to a 15-month driving prohibition, which was served in full before the conviction was successfully appealed and set aside.

The Crown sought a new driving prohibition upon retrial and conviction.

The court held that imposing a new mandatory driving prohibition would constitute double punishment and violate principles of sentencing and the integrity of the criminal justice system.

The court interpreted section 259(1) of the Criminal Code to permit credit for time already served under the prior prohibition, and imposed a one-day driving prohibition with notation that 15 months had already been served.