Hafeez S. Amarshi

The defendant, Vinusan Arudselvam, was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a breath demand under s. 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle accident.

The defence argued that due to chest pain from the accident, he had a reasonable excuse for not providing a suitable sample and challenged the mens rea requirement for the offence.

The court ruled that the breath demand was lawful and that the mens rea for the offence is knowledge that a demand has been made, not specific intent to refuse.

However, the court found the defendant's testimony credible regarding his chest pain and accepted that his injury constituted a reasonable medical excuse, making compliance extremely difficult or painful.

The police investigation was deemed rushed and poorly conducted, particularly regarding the officer's failure to ascertain the defendant's language difficulties or medical distress.

Consequently, the charge was dismissed.

M.K. brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to a trial without unreasonable delay.

The total delay was 858 days (28 months and 7 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice established in R. v. Jordan.

The court deducted 224 days for the COVID-19 pandemic (an exceptional circumstance) and 50 days for defence-caused delay (due to lack of diligence in filing a trial scheduling form).

The net delay remained 19 months and 1 week (578 days), which was presumptively unreasonable.

The Crown failed to rebut this presumption, with the court noting a lack of institutional resources and flexibility as a prominent cause of delay.

Consequently, a stay of proceedings was granted.

The Crown applied for a preventative order under s. 810.2 of the Criminal Code against the respondent, who had recently completed a sentence for aggravated assault against an intimate partner.

The court first ruled on the admissibility of various documents in the Crown's application record, applying the 'credible and trustworthy' standard to exclude unproven allegations and an unsupported psychological assessment.

Based on the admissible evidence, including the respondent's extensive criminal record of domestic violence, the court found reasonable grounds to fear he would commit a serious personal injury offence and ordered him to enter into a recognizance.

The defendant, Husani Alexander, was charged with three counts of assault against his former partner, Tashina Yorke: assault causing bodily harm on December 22, 2019, assault causing bodily harm on March 10, 2016, and assault on August 24, 2016.

The central issue was credibility.

The court found both the complainant and the defendant to be credible witnesses, albeit with reservations for the complainant.

Regarding the December 2019 incident, the court found the headbutt was accidental, leading to dismissal of that charge.

For the March and August 2016 incidents, the court found both versions of events equally plausible and could not conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, all three charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with firearms and drug offences.

Following the completion of the trial, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the 28-month delay from the date of the charge to the end of the trial was unreasonable.

The Crown argued that the net delay was below the 18-month Jordan ceiling due to defence waivers and exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and case complexity.

The court found that the Crown failed to mitigate delay, particularly regarding late disclosure and inadequate time estimates for pre-trial motions.

The net delay was calculated at over 22 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

Sanveer Singh brought a section 8 Charter application seeking to exclude a firearm and drugs seized during a search warrant execution at his residence, arguing the information to obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds.

The court reviewed the ITO's sufficiency based on the Debot principles (compelling information, credible source, corroboration) and the Garofoli procedure for excising and amplifying the ITO, particularly given the reliance on a confidential informant.

Despite identifying some deficiencies and misleading phrasing in the ITO, the court found that, after excising irrelevant or misleading statements, there remained a sufficient basis for the issuing justice to have granted the warrant.

The application to set aside the search warrant and exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The defendant, M.A.M., was charged with multiple counts of assault and sexual assault against his wife and child.

The central issue was credibility.

The complainant was found to be an unreliable and evasive witness due to significant inconsistencies between her police statement and trial testimony, and her apparent willingness to minimize events.

While the defendant was also found not credible, the court could not make definite findings of fact due to the complainant's unreliability.

Consequently, all charges were dismissed as the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including sexual assault and sexual interference, involving a 15-year-old complainant.

The primary issue at trial was whether the accused had a mistaken belief about the complainant's age and whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the accused's testimony regarding his belief that the complainant was 19 to be not credible and objectively unreasonable.

The court concluded the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

The accused was found guilty of sexual interference, sexual assault, and one count of uttering threats, but acquitted of procuring and administering a noxious substance.

In a sexual assault trial, the Crown applied to admit two out-of-court statements by the complainant (A.M.) as hearsay evidence: a spontaneous utterance to a life skills coach and a videotaped statement to police.

The defence conceded necessity but disputed reliability.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, finding both substantive and procedural reliability for the videotaped statement, particularly due to DNA evidence and corroborating video/audio.

The spontaneous utterance was admitted under the res gestae exception, as it was made under the stress of a startling event (learning video evidence was deficient).

Both statements were admitted.

This ruling addresses a pre-trial application by the accused, Sanveer Singh, challenging a search warrant under section 8 of the Charter.

The warrant relied on a confidential informant, leading to significant redactions in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The Crown conceded the initial redacted ITO was unsupportable.

The court reviewed and revised the judicial summary multiple times to ensure the defence had sufficient information to challenge the warrant while protecting informant privilege.

The court ultimately found the judicial summary adequate, noting that the defence could make arguments on a hypothetical basis regarding redacted details, such as the informant's knowledge or criminal record, to ensure full answer and defence.

Sean Osborne, a police officer, pleaded guilty to assault committed while on duty.

The assault involved stepping on a restrained young person's head/neck area and twice kicking him in the chest after arrest.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, while the Defence sought a discharge.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, noting that police officers are held to a higher standard due to their position of trust.

Despite significant mitigating factors, including PTSD and extensive community contributions, the court found that a discharge would be contrary to public interest.

A conviction was deemed necessary to convey the seriousness of the offence and breach of public trust.

The court imposed a suspended sentence and 12 months probation with statutory terms.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample following a rear-end collision.

The court acquitted the accused of impaired driving, finding the civilian witness unreliable and the indicia of impairment too frail to support a conviction.

However, the court convicted the accused of failing to provide a breath sample, concluding that despite the accused's limited English proficiency, he understood the breath demand and intentionally evaded providing a suitable sample by blocking the mouthpiece with his tongue.

The accused was charged with five offences: assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and three counts of uttering threats to cause death to his spouse and two children, all occurring between January 2017 and December 2018.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony that she was assaulted and confined by the accused following a financial dispute, resulting in a fractured clavicle and facial injuries.

The accused claimed the complainant fell down the stairs.

The court found the complainant credible and her evidence corroborated by independent witnesses.

The accused's testimony was found to be internally contradictory and implausible.

The court convicted on counts 1 and 2 (assault and unlawful confinement) but dismissed counts 3, 4, and 5 (threatening death) due to insufficient detail in the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The primary issue was whether the appellant, who was operating a motorcycle and stopped at a red light when observed holding a cell phone, was "driving" within the meaning of the statute.

The appellant also argued there was insufficient evidence because the officer conceded the device could have been a GPS unit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court held that the prohibition applies continuously from the time a vehicle is put in motion until it is parked in a position where it can be left unattended, including periods when stopped at red lights.

The distinction between motorcycles and automobiles was found to be immaterial.

A youth was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The Crown and defence agreed that sexual intercourse occurred between the accused and the complainant, both aged 17 at the time.

The sole issue was whether the sexual activity was consensual.

The complainant testified that she did not consent and that the accused forced her into sexual activity despite her verbal and physical resistance.

The accused testified that the sexual activity was consensual and that he obtained the complainant's permission.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness and rejected the accused's evidence.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit a third videotaped statement of a complainant made pursuant to section 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The statement was taken over 14 months after the alleged offence and just over a week before trial.

Defence counsel challenged admissibility on the grounds that the statement was not made within a reasonable time following the alleged offence.

The court admitted the statement, finding that the delay did not significantly impact the complainant's ability to accurately recall events, particularly given her age at the time of the hearing and the fact that the third statement was tethered to earlier statements made shortly after the alleged offence.

The accused was charged with robbery of a cell phone store.

Following arrest, the accused initially declined counsel but later requested to speak with a specific criminal lawyer.

Police made inadequate efforts to contact the lawyer, providing the accused with erroneous information about the lawyer's availability.

The accused then waived his right to counsel without receiving a meaningful Prosper warning.

The court found a serious breach of the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights and excluded the inculpatory statement under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol after being found asleep at the wheel at an intersection.

Upon arrest, the officer delayed reading the right to counsel instruction for seven minutes while securing the vehicle and retrieving notes.

The court found this delay violated the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights, noting a systemic misunderstanding of the immediacy requirement by the police service.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness and repetitive nature of the breach, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.

The court also found a s. 8 breach regarding video monitoring of the cell toilet, but dismissed the s. 9 arbitrary detention claim.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving over 80, and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The fail to comply charge was dismissed on a directed verdict.

The court found that police breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by failing to clarify his right to counsel when he showed obvious confusion, and by failing to facilitate contact with counsel of his choice.

Consequently, the breath test results were excluded under s. 24(2) and the over 80 charge was dismissed.

However, based on the officers' observations of the accused at the scene, including being slumped over the wheel, unsteadiness, and a strong odour of alcohol, the court found the accused guilty of impaired driving.

During a domestic assault trial, the complainant recanted her allegations against her husband.

The Crown brought an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine her on a prior inconsistent statement given to police.

The statement had been taken in Punjabi and translated into English by a bilingual police officer who was not a certified interpreter.

The court found that the officer accurately and contemporaneously documented the statement verbatim, and ruled that the Crown had met its onus to prove the statement was reduced to writing.