Grant R. Dow

Deion Campbell was found guilty by a jury of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, following acquittals on aggravated assault and assault with a weapon charges.

In sentencing, the court considered mitigating factors including the possibility of self-defence, a positive pre-sentence report, stable family, no criminal record, and efforts towards education and employment.

Aggravating factors included the public location of the offence, the escalation caused by brandishing the knife, and ongoing non-medicinal marijuana use.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, while the defence requested an absolute discharge.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 12 months of probation, including conditions such as a non-communication order, a prohibition from attending Humber College (unless registered), a 10-year weapon prohibition, and a mandatory $200 victim surcharge.

A request for a DNA sample order was declined.

The applicants sought an order recognizing and enforcing an arbitral award of $400,000 made by a religious arbitral tribunal (Beth Din).

The respondents opposed, arguing the award was not yet binding as the tribunal had indicated a willingness to consider additional issues regarding costs and damages.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitration process was not yet complete and the tribunal was not functus officio, applying the competence-competence principle to defer to the tribunal's jurisdiction.

The accused, Hassan Abdulle, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 9, 11(b), and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The total delay was calculated at 19-20 months, well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The court applied the Jordan framework, requiring the defence to demonstrate both "meaningful steps that demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings" and that the matter "took markedly longer than it reasonably should have." The court found that the defence did not take sufficient sustained steps beyond merely requesting earlier dates and did not waive any procedural steps.

Furthermore, considering the complexity of securing witness testimony and the multiple charges, the court concluded the matter had not taken "markedly longer than it should have." The application for a stay was dismissed.

Judge-alone criminal trial on historical allegations of sexual assault and sexual touching of a child under 16 arising from alleged incidents in a shared household.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and rejected the accused's blanket denial, but nonetheless found that the totality of the evidence left a reasonable doubt, particularly given the circumstances of the alleged incidents, the prior partial disclosure evidence, and reliability concerns arising from the complainant's later use of the allegation during a separate confrontation.

The Crown therefore failed to prove either count beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The plaintiff sought additional reasons following a trial decision regarding a failed real estate transaction.

The court clarified that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment for $43,154.94, in addition to the $100,000 deposit already released, while dismissing the balance of the $247,552.52 claim.

On costs, the court reduced the defendants' costs award to $10,000 to reflect the plaintiff's partial success in recovering damages, despite the defendants' success on the exchange rate differential issue at trial.

The court also awarded the plaintiff $1,809.42 in pre-judgment interest, adjusting the interest period for the deposit to account for both parties' delay in releasing the funds.

The parties, former business partners in several fitness clubs, brought claims and counterclaims against each other following the breakdown of their relationship.

The plaintiffs sought the unpaid balance from the defendants' repurchase of a 50% interest in four clubs.

The defendants counterclaimed for unpaid head office administration fees and shared expenses related to a jointly owned club in Cambridge.

The court reconciled the amounts owed by both sides, finding the defendants owed the plaintiffs $35,000.00 and the plaintiffs owed the defendants $34,713.49.

The court granted judgment to the plaintiffs for the net difference of $286.51, plus pre-judgment interest, and ordered each party to bear its own costs.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's action based on a mandatory arbitration clause in the base trade credit insurance policy.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, relying on a Canadian endorsement that permitted an action against the insurer in Canada and stated that endorsements prevail in the event of a conflict.

The court found that the contract, read as a whole, provided alternative methods for dispute resolution and that the endorsement prevailed over the base policy's arbitration clause.

The motion to stay the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a residential property.

While the defendants admitted liability for the shortfall in the subsequent sale price and carrying costs, they disputed the plaintiff's claim for an additional $104,397.45.

This amount represented the increased cost of repaying US dollar promissory notes due to exchange rate fluctuations between the original and actual closing dates.

The court dismissed this portion of the claim, finding that the exchange rate loss on undisclosed promissory notes used to finance a different property was not reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was formed.

The applicant sought an order appointing an administrator for the respondent condominium corporation, alleging the Board of Directors failed to act in the corporation's best interests, specifically regarding reserve fund maintenance and parking issues.

The court considered five factors for administrator appointment, noting that while the Board's past performance was substandard, recent actions had improved.

The application was dismissed, but without prejudice to a future application, and the respondent was ordered to pay $2,500 in costs to the applicant, acknowledging the applicant's efforts prompted the Board's improvements.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act.

The plaintiff sustained injuries, including blurred vision, but returned to work and did not seek further treatment until his condition worsened over a year later.

The court applied the discoverability principle, noting that an expert ophthalmologist could not have determined the permanence of the eye injury within the first year.

The court found the plaintiff's claim was issued within the two-year limitation period and dismissed the defendants' motion.

The plaintiff, One Street Digital Inc. (OSD), brought a motion seeking a final order declaring its ownership of proprietary software ("Foundation Framework"), restraining the defendant, Berkeley Payment Solutions Inc. (BPS), from using or altering it, and requesting costs.

The court dismissed OSD's motion, finding that OSD failed to provide sufficient evidence to precisely identify the non-copyrighted proprietary software it claimed.

The court also determined that the relief sought was analogous to injunctive relief, and OSD did not demonstrate irreparable harm, as potential damages related to licensing fees and intellectual property value could be adequately assessed at trial.

The defendants moved for dismissal of the action under Rule 20, while the plaintiff opposed and sought judgment against the individual defendant and a newly incorporated entity, relying on the oppression remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The court found that the individual defendant, after obtaining a default judgment against his initial corporation, ceased its commercial activity and transferred its goodwill and operations to a new corporation he solely directed, without satisfying the judgment.

The court applied the oppression remedy, concluding that the individual defendant abandoned the best interests of the previous corporation in favour of his own, thereby unfairly disregarding the plaintiff's interests as a creditor.

The court reviewed an application under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, following a request from the respondents to dismiss the applicants' proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The judge declined to proceed under Rule 2.1, finding that while the application was related to a prior action, it might contain an independent cause of action and was not entirely frivolous or vexatious.

The court noted that other procedural rules remain available to the respondents for seeking dismissal.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision ordering him to post security for costs in the amounts of $60,000 for CanJet Airlines and $80,000 for 1791949 Ontario Limited (TGAS).

The appeal challenged the Master's findings on impecuniosity, the sufficiency of an adverse cost protection policy, and the plaintiff's chance of success.

The court upheld the Master's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error or misapprehension of evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff, a dentist claiming long-term disability benefits following a motor vehicle accident, brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice prior to trial.

The plaintiff argued the case involved complex medical and financial issues and claims for declaratory relief.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the 'wait and see' approach, holding that the right to a jury trial is a substantive right and the case did not meet the high standard required to strike a jury notice in advance of trial.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff, a creditor of the defendant's bankrupt former spouse, brought a motion to set aside the bankrupt's release of his interest in the matrimonial home.

The bankrupt had released his interest in the home to the defendant in a separation agreement shortly before declaring bankruptcy.

The court held that the bankrupt's right to claim possession of the matrimonial home was personal in nature and not an asset available for distribution to creditors under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment awarding the plaintiff $100,000 in damages for the non-consensual posting of an intimate video.

Applying the five-factor test from Mountain View Farms, the court found that the interests of justice favoured setting aside the liability and damages portions of the judgment, as the defendant had an arguable defence regarding the quantum of damages and had moved relatively promptly.

The motion was granted on the condition that the defendant pay $10,000 in costs thrown away, while the permanent injunctions remained in place.

Wal-Mart Canada Corp. sought a declaration that Intact Insurance Company had a duty to defend and indemnify it in a negligence action.

The underlying tort action involved a plaintiff tripping over cracked pavement in Wal-Mart's parking lot.

Intact argued that its policy, which named Wal-Mart as an additional insured under a contract with C.L. & Sons Property Maintenance, did not cover the claim as C.L. & Sons was only contracted for litter pick-up, not pavement repair.

The court found that the maintenance agreement's scope of work included reporting deficiencies affecting pedestrian safety, and the insurer's own description of C.L. & Sons' business operations included "Maintenance and inspection." Therefore, the court declared that Intact had a duty to defend Wal-Mart.

However, Wal-Mart's request to appoint its own counsel due to a potential conflict of interest was dismissed, with the court directing standard insurer procedures for separate counsel and adjusters for Wal-Mart and C.L. & Sons.

Costs were awarded to Wal-Mart.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order dismissing her motion to continue a certificate of pending litigation against a property now owned by the defendants.

The plaintiff alleged she was defrauded of the property through improper mortgages and sought to set aside the transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the Master's conclusion that the plaintiff no longer had a reasonable claim to an interest in the property, as previous court decisions had already conclusively determined the property could properly be sold.

The court also upheld the Master's finding that the equities favoured the defendants.

The applicant, a condominium corporation, sought to compel the Director of Titles to register an agreement with a commercial owner involving common elements, land transfers, and altered easements.

The Director of Titles opposed, arguing the condominium board failed to follow the required 80% unit holder vote under section 124 of the Condominium Act, 1998, instead relying on section 107.

The court, exercising its broad discretion under section 134 of the Act, found section 124 was the preferable procedure but regularized the process by deeming prior consents as votes in favour, with conditions for notice to unit holders.

No costs were awarded.