William A. McMaster

The plaintiff, a dentist claiming long-term disability benefits following a motor vehicle accident, brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice prior to trial.

The plaintiff argued the case involved complex medical and financial issues and claims for declaratory relief.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the 'wait and see' approach, holding that the right to a jury trial is a substantive right and the case did not meet the high standard required to strike a jury notice in advance of trial.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

In a motion concerning monies previously paid into court under an interpleader order following settlement of a motor vehicle accident claim, the court determined competing entitlement claims by a costs creditor and former counsel.

The moving party sought payment of outstanding costs awards with post-judgment interest, while former counsel sought payment of an unpaid settled account.

The court held that although Rule 72.03 does not itself confer authority to determine entitlement, Rule 43.04 permits the court to decide the rights of claimants and direct payment out.

The court ordered payment to the costs creditor and former counsel first, with the balance to the injured claimant, and declined to award costs of the motion.

The defendant retailer appealed a master's order refusing further inspection and testing of ski bindings that were alleged to have malfunctioned and caused a skiing accident.

The master had concluded that the prejudicial effect of destructive testing outweighed its probative value and that direct expert evidence was required to justify the testing.

The court held that the master erred in law by requiring direct expert evidence and by rejecting admissible hearsay evidence permitted on motions under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The master also misapprehended the evidentiary record when assessing the qualifications of the proposed technician and the technical assertions contained in the affidavits.

Applying the correct Rule 32.01 test, the court found a reasonable possibility that further testing could reveal useful evidence and that its probative value outweighed the potential prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and testing of the binding was permitted.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and initially applied for income replacement benefits (IRBs).

The insurer determined the applicant's IRBs to be nil because he had no reported pre-accident income.

The applicant then sought to elect non-earner benefits.

The arbitrator held that the applicant was not entitled to elect non-earner benefits because he was employed at the time of the accident, which qualified him for IRBs and disqualified him from non-earner benefits.

The fact that his IRB quantum was nil did not change his substantive qualification.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to claim non-earner benefits within the required 30-day period without a reasonable explanation, prejudicing the insurer.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until they were terminated by the insurer following an insurer examination.

More than three years later, after the applicant underwent knee and hip replacement surgeries and applied for arbitration, the insurer requested a further examination by the same doctor.

The applicant refused to attend.

The arbitrator held that the applicant was not precluded from proceeding to arbitration, finding that the requested examination did not meet the requirements of section 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator concluded that the primary purpose of the examination was to prepare for the upcoming arbitration hearing rather than to determine entitlement to a benefit.