Frances P. Kiteley

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order granting the respondent $45,000 plus costs.

The appellant argued there were genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial, relying on defences of gratuitous bailment and ex turpi causa.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge correctly applied the full appreciation test from Combined Air.

The motions judge was entitled to evaluate credibility under Rule 20.04(2.1) and properly concluded the appellant's evidence was unbelievable and full of contradictions.

The City of Mississauga, MPAC, and GTAA appealed a decision declaring that Exchange Corporation Canada Inc. was not a tenant of land owned by the Crown and therefore not liable to pay realty taxes for its space at Pearson International Airport.

Exchange cross-appealed the finding that its space was not an 'eligible property' under the Municipal Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in concluding Exchange was a licensee rather than a tenant, and dismissed the cross-appeal, upholding the finding that the property was not an 'eligible property'.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict and a trial judge's ruling on a threshold motion following a motor vehicle accident.

The jury found the appellant 10% liable and awarded $4,000, which was reduced to zero due to income replacement benefits.

The trial judge dismissed the claim for non-pecuniary damages, finding the appellant did not sustain a permanent serious impairment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial accommodations, evidentiary rulings, the threshold decision, the jury charge, the verdict, and alleged trial judge bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's rulings and ample evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The tenants appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board regarding the landlord's implementation of smart metering for electricity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably interpreted the Residential Tenancies Act in concluding that the landlord was entitled to increase rent for adding electricity as a prescribed service and that payments to an independent contractor were not illegal charges.

The court also held that the Board's findings on harassment and coercion were factual and raised no question of law.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding she discriminated against the respondents on the basis of sexual orientation and marital status by denying them a room at her bed and breakfast.

The applicant argued the room was unlicensed and therefore not a service available to the public.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the adjudicator's conclusion that the applicant withdrew the room offer upon learning of the respondents' same-sex relationship was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario summarily dismissing his complaint against the Toronto Police Service and Toronto Police Services Board.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on mental disability, race, and country of origin, as well as threats of reprisal.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal reasonably concluded there was no evidence of discrimination or reprisal.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness or bias.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent transit authority's decision to enter into a contract for diesel multiple units for an air-rail link.

The applicant argued the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to conduct an electrification feasibility study and improperly accepting ministerial direction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to enter a commercial contract did not constitute a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act as it did not determine any legal rights.

Furthermore, the court held that the respondent acted within its statutory authority under its governing legislation.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which confirmed the Registration Committee of the College of Nurses of Ontario's refusal to annul her third unsuccessful attempt at the Canadian Practical Nurse Registration Examination.

The appellant argued she experienced health concerns during the exam.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable as the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence of the nature, extent, and consequences of her illness to justify annulling the exam attempt.

The tenant appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board allowing the corporate landlord to terminate the tenancy for the occupation of the sole shareholder's mother.

The tenant argued the reasons were inadequate and that a corporate landlord could not rely on s. 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act for this purpose.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate and confirming that the definition of 'landlord' includes the sole shareholder of a corporate landlord, permitting eviction for the shareholder's parent.

The applicant sought judicial review of a preliminary decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding its jurisdiction to hear a complaint.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for prematurity, applying the principle that courts should not interfere with ongoing administrative proceedings absent exceptional circumstances.

The court found no exceptional circumstances and noted that the applicant could challenge jurisdiction on a full record after a decision on the merits.

The stay of proceedings was lifted.

The applicant brought a motion for an order compelling the Independent Police Review Director to file a record of proceedings in an application for judicial review.

The respondent argued it had no obligation to provide a record because its decision to screen out the applicant's complaint was not a statutory power of decision.

The Divisional Court held that the statutory scheme of the Police Services Act creates a right for the public to complain and a duty on the Director to deal with the complaint unless specific criteria apply.

Therefore, the decision to screen out a complaint constitutes a statutory power of decision, and the motion to compel the filing of the record was granted.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent contractor the balance owing for home renovations.

The appellant argued the contract was illegal and unenforceable because the respondent did not hold a building renovator's licence under the Toronto Municipal Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the appellant failed to prove the nature of the work required a licence.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a Memorandum of Understanding resolving disputes arising from the breakdown of a common law relationship and corporate control over a property‑holding company.

The defendant argued the MOU was merely a framework for future agreements and that it had been signed under economic duress caused by earlier court orders and the threat of eviction.

The court found the MOU constituted a final and binding settlement agreement, noting the parties’ clear contractual language, extensive negotiations, and the defendant’s subsequent reliance on the agreement.

Allegations that the agreement was procured under duress or that earlier court orders were obtained by fraud were rejected.

The defendant’s motion to set aside prior orders was dismissed and the settlement was enforced.

The moving party, Donald Bartlett Jr., sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed his motion to amend his statement of defence and withdraw admissions made in 1990 regarding a guarantee.

The Divisional Court applied the test under Rule 62.02(4)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the court found good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's findings on two of the three elements for withdrawing an admission, it found no reason to doubt the finding on the second element (inadvertence or wrong instructions).

Furthermore, the court held that the matter did not involve issues of public importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $7,000.

The appellant, acting as estate trustee, brought a motion for a stay of an order requiring her to pay $10,000 as security for costs pending her motion for leave to appeal that order.

The underlying action against her father's former common-law spouse was dismissed on summary judgment.

The appellant argued that a serious issue to be tried existed regarding whether American Sign Language (ASL) constitutes an oral language, which would exempt an alleged agreement from the writing requirement of s. 55 of the Family Law Act.

The court found that the appellant failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, noting the previous judge's finding that the appeal was almost certain to fail.

The motion for a stay was dismissed with costs.

The appellant purchaser appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for the return of a $25,000 deposit after a failed real estate and restaurant purchase.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his findings regarding the vendor's failure to provide a survey, the treatment of stock, and the status of employees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or errors of law in the trial judge's conclusion that the purchaser's breach was not justified.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a costs award made by the motion judge following the dismissal of a motion against two landlords of a bankrupt tenant.

The applicant argued that the reasons for the costs award were unclear and that the costs outline improperly included attendances for mediation and an offer to settle that did not meet Rule 49 criteria.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that there were ample grounds for the motion judge's exercise of discretion, including the urgency of the motion, the resounding success of the landlords, and the significant effort required to prepare materials.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt and requiring him to reinstate a life insurance policy and designate his wife as beneficiary.

The Divisional Court found that while the motion judge did not err in making an order despite there being no current support obligation, she did err in law by ordering the appellant to reinstate a life insurance policy, as s. 34(1) of the Family Law Act only provides jurisdiction to require a spouse who already has a policy to designate a beneficiary.

The appeal was allowed in part, the penalty for contempt was varied to compel the appellant's participation in the proceedings, and a procedural timetable was ordered.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a $2 million advance on an anticipated equalization payment under the Family Law Act.

The respondent acknowledged owing at least approximately $2.1 million after prior advances but resisted an immediate lump‑sum payment and proposed alternative interim payment structures.

The court applied the factors from Zagdanski v. Zagdanski regarding advances on equalization, including certainty of entitlement, financial need, and fairness to both spouses.

Finding little risk that the advance would exceed the ultimate equalization entitlement and that the respondent had the ability to pay, the court ordered a staged advance payment.

The respondent was required to pay $1 million within 14 days and his share of the net proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home upon closing.

The appellant mother appealed a child protection disposition ordering crown wardship without access for two children apprehended at birth.

She argued that the trial judge erred in finding a risk of continued litigation if the children were placed with family caregivers and failed to properly follow the statutory pathway under the Child and Family Services Act in declining supervision or custody orders.

The appellate court held that the trial judge’s inference regarding future litigation was supported by the evidentiary record, including the mother’s litigation history and continuing efforts to regain custody.

Fresh evidence concerning a temporary kinship placement did not demonstrate that the trial judge erred in declining less intrusive alternatives.

The court concluded that the trial judge properly considered the statutory options and reasonably determined that crown wardship without access best served the children’s interests in certainty and finality.