Ewan Lyttle

The Crown sought to call Dr. Saumil Dholakia, a treating psychiatrist, as a participant expert to provide opinion evidence regarding his assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of the accused Hue Lam during the period from February 8 to September 30, 2022.

The defence opposed the admission of Dr. Dholakia's opinion evidence, arguing that if qualified as an expert, the jury would improperly compare his opinions with those of Dr. Zeynep Selaman, a litigation expert retained by the defence.

The court ruled that Dr. Dholakia could testify as a participant expert and provide opinion evidence within defined parameters, finding that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by prejudicial effects and that appropriate jury instructions could address defence concerns.

The court ruled on the admissibility of expert psychiatric evidence and hospital records in a first-degree murder trial involving two sisters charged with killing their mother.

The accused sought to introduce seven hospital records as business records and expert opinion evidence from a forensic psychiatrist regarding the accused's mental health condition, the effects of chronic abuse, and related psychiatric concepts.

The Crown opposed both applications on grounds of hearsay, prejudicial effect, and necessity.

The court admitted the hospital records as business records and qualified the expert to provide opinion evidence on psychiatric assessment, diagnosis, causes, and impacts of mental disorders, while restricting the expert from opining on the specific conduct of the accused.

This is a ruling on the admissibility of defence expert opinion evidence in a criminal trial involving two sisters charged with killing their mother.

The defence sought to call Dr. Danièle Bélanger, an expert in Vietnamese society, gender, family, and migration, to provide cultural context evidence.

The Crown opposed the admission of this evidence.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire and ruled that the expert evidence was admissible, finding that it met all threshold requirements under the Mohan framework and that the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effects.

The evidence was found to be logically relevant to issues of credibility, motive, intent, and self-defence, and necessary to assist the jury in understanding the accused's state of mind and the cultural context in which they operated.

The court ruled on whether the defences of self-defence and provocation should be put to the jury in a case where two sisters admitted to killing their elderly mother.

The accused claimed they acted in self-defence based on a lifetime of physical and verbal abuse, which escalated in the week preceding the killing.

The court found an air of reality to the self-defence defence for both accused, considering the chronic abuse, the accused's cultural background, their mental health conditions, and the modified objective test applicable to self-defence.

The court rejected the provocation defence due to insufficient specificity regarding the triggering act and the lack of evidence that the accused acted "on the sudden."

The Crown appealed a sentence, specifically challenging the trial judge's finding that fine in lieu of forfeiture provisions were unconstitutional.

This decision addresses two issues: the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to remit a sentence to the trial court and the terms of a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The court confirmed it lacks jurisdiction to remit sentencing to the trial court on a sentence appeal under s. 687 of the Criminal Code, and, based on joint submissions, imposed a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $74,560 with a default imprisonment term of 18 months and a ten-year payment period.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision that sections 462.37(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code, concerning fines in lieu of forfeiture and default imprisonment, were unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter in certain foreseeable circumstances.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was bound by a prior ONCA decision (R. v. Chung) and, in the alternative, that the provisions do not violate s. 12 as they serve a different purpose than victim surcharges and offer judicial discretion and flexibility.

Marvin Dubois pleaded guilty to possession of a restricted weapon.

The Crown sought 365 days imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 365 days.

The court considered the impact of anti-Black racism on the offender, as per R. v. Morris, and found that while the offence was serious, the moral blameworthiness was mitigated by the context of racism and alienation.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 517 days (18 months less 23 days pre-sentence custody), followed by 12 months probation, a 5-year weapons prohibition, and a secondary DNA order.

The applicant, charged with voyeurism and child pornography offenses, brought a pre-trial application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to proposed trial date was 55 months, 14 days.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was 39 months, 10 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance, rebutting the presumption of unreasonable delay.

The court agreed that the pandemic was an exceptional discrete event and deducted the associated delay.

The remaining delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, shifting the onus to the applicant to demonstrate unreasonable delay.

The court found that the applicant failed to take meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that issues related to venue investigations, First Nations consultations, and "running lists" did not result in unreasonable delay in this specific case.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The appellant, Ali Elenezi, sought leave to appeal a three-year consecutive sentence for contempt of court.

This sentence was imposed after he refused to testify at a murder trial, despite having previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the same incident and affirmed an agreed statement of facts.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge regarding the consideration of the appellant's youth, rehabilitative prospects, or the totality principle.

The court affirmed that denunciation is the primary principle for contempt of court, especially refusal to testify, and that significant jail terms are required to deter such behaviour.

The applicant sought a bail review following his detention on charges including drug trafficking, weapons offences, and assault causing bodily harm.

The reviewing judge found the Justice of the Peace failed to provide sufficient reasons on the tertiary grounds, allowing for a review de novo.

However, the court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to meet his onus on both the secondary and tertiary grounds due to his extensive criminal record, history of breaching court orders, and the gravity of the current allegations.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash an order committing him to stand trial for second-degree murder.

The applicant argued that the preliminary hearing judge exceeded her jurisdiction by failing to consider exculpatory evidence regarding the mens rea element of the offence.

The reviewing court found that the preliminary hearing judge properly considered the totality of the evidence, including the exculpatory statement, and correctly applied the test for committal based on circumstantial evidence of mens rea derived from surveillance video.

The application for certiorari was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to stand trial.

This decision concerns a bail application by Isaah Picody-Naveau, who is charged with second-degree murder and other criminal code offences, including domestic violence.

The applicant sought bail under sections 515 and 522 of the Criminal Code, while the Crown applied under section 524(8) to cancel his prior release.

The court considered the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

Despite the applicant's history of breaching release orders and violent temper, the court granted bail.

Key factors influencing the decision included the significant time spent in custody (over 315 days), a compelling Gladue report highlighting intergenerational trauma and a difficult upbringing, a strong proposed release plan relying on family sureties and GPS monitoring, and the perceived weakness of the Crown's second-degree murder case, particularly regarding the mens rea element.

The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and the right to reasonable bail as articulated in R. v. Antic.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for armed robbery and wearing a disguise, arguing the sentencing judge erred in applying Gladue principles and that a new legal development (Sharma) made a conditional sentence available.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's application of Gladue principles and declined to impose a conditional sentence, affirming the original sentence.

However, due to the appellant's significant post-sentence rehabilitation, the court allowed the appeal for the limited purpose of permanently staying the execution of his remaining incarceration and substituted it with a two-year probation period, also imposing a 10-year weapons prohibition.

Jalaledin Eftekhar was found guilty by a jury of procuring, obtaining sexual services for consideration, common assault, and human trafficking/exploitation.

The court conducted a sentencing hearing, rejecting the accused's version of events and finding the complainant highly credible and vulnerable.

The primary sentencing objectives were denunciation and deterrence.

Considering aggravating factors such as the complainant's vulnerability, the violence involved, and the duration of exploitation, balanced against mitigating factors like the accused's short criminal record, rehabilitative prospects, and lack of material benefit, the court imposed a global sentence of four years for exploitation, with concurrent sentences for the other offences.

Credit for pre-sentence custody and onerous release conditions was applied, resulting in three years remaining to serve.

Ancillary orders included a communication prohibition, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The accused, M.L., was charged with multiple counts of assault, assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault, and breach of a no-contact recognizance.

The trial, which proceeded without a jury for 10 days, focused heavily on credibility issues, with the court finding significant inconsistencies and unreliability in the testimony of both the complainant and the accused.

The court applied established principles for credibility assessment, noting that a criminal trial is not a credibility contest.

Ultimately, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt on the assault and sexual assault charges, leading to acquittals on those counts.

However, the accused was found guilty of breaching his recognizance due to phone calls made to the complainant while under a no-contact order.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and domestic assault offences, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of the complainant's other sexual activity.

The accused sought to introduce evidence of rough sex, belittling, and post-offence sexual encounters to challenge the complainant's credibility and character.

The court dismissed most of the application, finding the proposed evidence relied on stereotypical reasoning and lacked significant probative value.

However, the court permitted a narrow body of rebuttal evidence regarding the complainant belittling the accused's sexual performance, but only if the Crown first leads the complainant's statement that the accused always took sexual advantage of her.

Miles Kempffer-Hossack pleaded guilty to multiple counts of firearms transfer, possession of firearms without a licence, and possession of Schedule I drugs for the purpose of trafficking, arising from an Ottawa Police investigation (Project Sabotage) into gun violence.

The court considered aggravating factors including the quantity and prohibited nature of the weapons, the presence of a booby-trapped window and explosive devices, and the dangerous combination of drugs and guns.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, lack of prior criminal record, guilty plea, and demonstrated efforts towards rehabilitation.

The Crown sought a 10-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought 6 years.

The court imposed a total custodial sentence of 9 years, less pre-sentence custody, along with ancillary orders for DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture.

Steevenson Joseph was convicted by a jury of receiving a benefit from the prostitution of a person under 18, procuring a person to offer sexual services (believing they were over 18), advertising sexual services, and making/possessing child pornography.

He was acquitted of more serious human trafficking and sexual assault charges.

The court considered the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for these offences under section 12 of the Charter, finding them grossly disproportionate in this case and in reasonable hypothetical scenarios.

The judge declared the mandatory minimums for receiving a benefit from prostitution (two years) and making/possessing child pornography (six months, then one year) to be of no force and effect.

Joseph received a suspended sentence with one year probation, with credit for oppressive bail conditions.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was found sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle at 3:11 a.m.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant testified that he had driven to a bar with the plan to take an Uber home if he drank, that he had lost his car key while attempting to retrieve his personal belongings from the vehicle, and that he had no intention to drive.

The court found that the defendant had rebutted the presumption and that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The accused appealed convictions for firearms and drug trafficking offences, challenging production orders used to obtain historical text messages from a telecommunications provider.

The Court held the accused had standing under s. 8 of the Charter because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the electronic conversation records.

The majority concluded that seizure of already sent and received messages from provider storage was lawfully authorized by the production order regime and did not require a Part VI wiretap authorization.

A dissent would have treated acquisition of those messages as requiring Part VI authorization and would have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).