Eunwoo Lee

The appellant pleaded guilty to unprovoked aggravated assault against a fellow NCR resident, causing severe life-threatening injuries and permanent serious brain damage.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment, less credit for presentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to further reduce his sentence to reflect the harsh presentence custody conditions he experienced due to his mental illness.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, holding that the sentencing judge expressly considered and gave credit for the appellant's mental health difficulties in custody and imposed a sentence at the lower end of the appropriate range.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Leave to appeal sentence granted; sentence appeal dismissed.

The Crown sought to cross-examine the appellant's former trial and appellate counsel, now a Superior Court judge, on his affidavit evidence submitted in support of a fresh evidence application on appeal.

The appellant and the intervening judge opposed cross-examination, arguing that it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice and proposing written interrogatories as an alternative.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion for cross-examination, holding that judicial immunity does not apply to conduct undertaken prior to judicial appointment and that cross-examination is the norm for affidavit evidence in appellate proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and sexual assault against his wife.

The appellant alleged that the trial judge erred by reversing the onus of proof, failing to adequately explain credibility findings, engaging in propensity reasoning, and improperly applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for intervention and dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility assessments and acceptance of the complainant's testimony as confirmed by a recorded conversation.

An appeal of an Ontario Review Board disposition dated January 29, 2025, concerning whether the Board erred in declining to add a community living clause to a detention order.

The appellant argued that the majority of the Board focused exclusively on public safety and dismissed the attending psychiatrist's opinion that the clause would be therapeutically beneficial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's majority was entitled to determine that adding a community living clause would be therapeutically harmful on balance in the specific circumstances of the case, notwithstanding the psychiatrist's contrary opinion.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a fatal stabbing at a gathering.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting he acted to protect himself and a vulnerable woman from an angry group.

The trial judge instructed the jury to assess the reasonableness of the appellant's response separately for each victim, fragmenting the evidence into isolated incidents.

The jury also asked whether a group could constitute "force" under the self-defence analysis, and the trial judge's response suggested that a group alone could not constitute force without specific action.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions inadequately equipped the jury to evaluate the appellant's self-defence claim by failing to address the group dynamic as a unified threat and by artificially compartmentalizing the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences based primarily on eyewitness identification by the complainant, who recognized the appellant as a former hotel guest.

The trial judge found the identification was corroborated by the appellant's possession of stolen sunglasses and the presence of a co-conspirator during his arrest.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the corroborative evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge did misapprehend the evidence regarding the co-conspirator's presence, this error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The remaining corroborative evidence—the appellant's possession of the stolen sunglasses two days after the robbery—strongly supported the identification.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Pierre Dartiguenave from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Crown requested dismissal on the basis that Mr. Dartiguenave was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Board, and the appellant could not be located.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Lawrence Allen Thompson, appealed his 10-year sentence for sexual interference, kidnapping, and abduction of a four-year-old child.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in the sentencing judge’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors, the fitness of the sentence, or the calculation of pre-trial credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had accepted the seven-year-old complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, relying on the child's description of the assault and his subsequent protective behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapplication of the law and holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for several offences committed during an acute episode of delirium.

The Ontario Review Board subsequently issued a detention order, finding he posed a significant threat to public safety.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, as it failed to identify evidence meeting the high threshold for a significant threat and failed in its inquisitorial duty to probe the equivocal evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the detention order was set aside, and an absolute discharge was granted.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for various offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained his conditional discharge with reduced reporting requirements.

He argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and should be granted an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board reasonably relied on expert psychiatric evidence indicating that the appellant required a longer transition period in independent living to ensure medication compliance and mental stability.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a 15-year-old girl and appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in jury instructions.

The appellant contended that the judge improperly instructed the jury to assess the complainant's evidence from an adolescent perspective and used value-laden language to characterize her testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the instructions, viewed holistically, did not suggest a less stringent standard for the complainant's evidence and that the characterization of her testimony occurred within the summary of the Crown's position, which was clearly delineated for the jury.

The appellant, Adam West, appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and internet luring.

The appeal focused on the mens rea requirement for these offences, specifically whether recklessness as to the complainant's age was sufficient or if actual knowledge or wilful blindness was required.

The Court of Appeal, relying on its prior decision in R. v. Fox, affirmed that recklessness suffices for internet luring.

For the possession charge, the court found that the trial judge's findings of fact clearly established wilful blindness on the part of the appellant regarding the complainant's age, which is legally equivalent to actual knowledge.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault and a Crown appeal from sentence.

The appellant challenged the conviction based on alleged errors in the trial judge’s reasoning, including the *Browne v. Dunn* rule and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

The Crown appealed the two-year less a day conditional sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court declined to interfere with the sentence, finding it was an exceptional case justified by the offender's remorse, commitment to rehabilitation, insight, and the severe family consequences of incarceration.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible due to mental disorder, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition.

The Board had rejected both a conditional discharge and a community living clause, despite the hospital's recommendation for the latter for therapeutic and practical reasons.

The Court of Appeal found the Board erred in rejecting the inclusion of a community living clause, as it was deemed therapeutically beneficial and practically necessary for the appellant's progress and access to appropriate care.

The appeal was allowed to vary the disposition to include the community living provision, while upholding the Board's decision against a conditional discharge.

This is an appeal from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board (ORB) concerning an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for uttering threats and possessing a weapon.

The ORB upheld a detention order, finding the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant challenged the ORB's finding of significant threat, arguing the evidence did not support it under the Winko test, and that the Board erred by not granting a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no fault with the ORB's comprehensive analysis of the Winko test and its decision not to grant a conditional discharge given the appellant's history of substance abuse, medication non-compliance, and aggression following a previous conditional discharge.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges including sexual exploitation and sexual assault.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypical reasoning in assessing the complainant's credibility and by overemphasizing peripheral inconsistencies in the context of childhood abuse.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's repeated focus on why the complainant continued to engage with the respondent, despite knowing the risk of assault, constituted stereotypical reasoning, which is an error of law.

This error was deemed to have materially affected the verdict, as the trial judge's assessment of the respondent's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and child pornography, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in attributing certain periods of delay to the defence and in inferring waiver.

Correcting these errors, the net delay exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling for provincial court cases, leading to a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, J.A., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference following a judge-alone trial.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's and complainant's (S.M.) evidence, specifically regarding the implausibility of the appellant's film project as a ruse and the credibility of S.M. despite his criminal record and the timing of his disclosures.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in such assessments, and finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning or her reliance on common-sense inferences.