Ernest J. Guiste

The appellant appealed an order of a Master dismissing her wrongful dismissal action for delay.

The appellant argued the Master erred by measuring the delay from September 2006 and ignoring intervening factors, such as a previous order excusing delay and an amended statement of claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master properly considered the entire history of the litigation, correctly applied the law regarding inordinate and inexcusable delay, and properly found the appellant failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Human Rights Commission not to refer his complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the application for delay.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the 17-month delay was inordinate and unexplained.

Furthermore, due to legislative amendments, the court noted it no longer had jurisdiction to remit the matter to the Commission or the newly constituted Tribunal.

The applicant, a probationary receptionist, alleged that her employment was terminated because of her age and place of origin (Scottish accent).

The respondent employer maintained that she was terminated due to performance issues, including using coarse language, impatience with customers, and miscommunicating messages.

The Tribunal found the employer's witnesses credible and noted that the workplace was multi-ethnic and the applicant's predecessor and successor were of similar age.

The Tribunal concluded there was no evidence that the termination was tainted by discrimination and dismissed the application.

The appellant filed written submissions asking to appeal his sentence following a previous hearing.

The Court of Appeal accepted that the appellant had not abandoned his sentence appeal, but ultimately dismissed the appeal for the reasons set out in the Crown's response.

In a bifurcated proceeding, the Tribunal previously found that the respondent's failure to address the applicant's performance issues was tainted by age discrimination, leading to her termination.

In this decision on remedy, the Tribunal concluded that even if a performance management plan had been implemented, the applicant would have been terminated in any event due to her lack of self-awareness regarding her performance deficiencies.

The Tribunal awarded $21,392.48 for lost wages and benefits based on the severance package she likely would have accepted, and $20,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, supported by medical evidence of depression.

Claims for reinstatement, legal expenses, and medical expenses were denied.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing her action for failing to comply with court orders, specifically failing to answer undertakings and pay costs.

The appellant argued the Master failed to give sufficient weight to her impecuniosity and the resulting denial of access to justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master made no error of principle or palpable and overriding error, as impecuniosity is not a shield for a party who consistently fails to act reasonably.

The applicant requested reconsideration of an interim decision that granted an adjournment and removed an individual respondent from the application.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, noting that under Rule 26.1, only final decisions can be reconsidered.

The only final aspect of the interim decision was the removal of the individual respondent, but the applicant's reconsideration request failed to provide specific reasons under Rule 26.5 to challenge that removal or explain the failure to respond to the original request.

The applicant, a person with a disability who uses a wheelchair, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination and reprisal by the Toronto Transit Commission's Wheel-Trans service.

The respondent requested the dismissal of the application for failure to establish a prima facie case, non-compliance with disclosure rules, and improper expansion of the complaint's scope.

The Tribunal reviewed the specific incidents alleged and dismissed several for failing to establish a nexus to a Code ground, while allowing others to proceed to a hearing.

The Tribunal relieved against strict compliance with disclosure rules, struck systemic allegations that improperly expanded the scope of the individual complaint, and denied the applicant's request for an adjournment to retain new counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown's reference to uncontradicted evidence violated section 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act and that the trial judge's answer to a jury question undermined their right to disagree.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that stating evidence is uncontradicted does not amount to a comment on the failure to testify, and that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on their right to disagree.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed her human rights application as barred by section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code due to a concurrent civil action.

The applicant argued that her civil action only raised disability-related claims, while her human rights application included race-based discrimination claims not raised in the civil action.

The Tribunal denied the reconsideration request, holding that section 34(11) applies even if different grounds of discrimination are raised in the two proceedings, to prevent duplication.

The Tribunal also rejected the argument that section 43(2) required oral submissions, as the statutory bar deprived the Tribunal of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict dismissing her action for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation against the police.

She argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the exact words spoken, the police's duty to get her version of events, and the assessment of reasonable and probable grounds.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the charge, noting it fairly focused the jury on whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's decision to deny them costs based solely on the appellant's impecuniosity.

The Court allowed the cross-appeal, holding that impecuniosity cannot be the only factor considered, and awarded the respondents $40,000 in trial costs and $7,500 for the appeal.

The applicant filed two human rights applications against her former employer and her union.

The employer requested dismissal on the basis that the original complaint was dismissed by the Commission and not continued under section 53 of the Code.

The union requested dismissal or deferral pending an ongoing grievance arbitration regarding the applicant's termination.

The Tribunal dismissed the application against the employer for lack of jurisdiction, as the complaint was not a 'continued' complaint.

The Tribunal deferred the application against the union pending the conclusion of the grievance arbitration, finding it fair, just, and expeditious to avoid concurrent proceedings on the same issues.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation claim against his former employer.

The claim was based on the employer submitting a statutory form to employment insurance authorities stating the appellant had been 'dismissed' and a follow-up statement that the dismissal was for breach of policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge.

The court held that the statements were protected by qualified privilege and there was no evidence of malice to overcome that privilege.

The applicant's application for judicial review of a human rights commission decision was dismissed.

The respondents sought costs of $5,000 each.

The applicant argued she should be relieved of paying costs because her case raised public policy issues and she was impecunious.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs against the applicant, finding it appropriate to relieve her of the obligation due to the public interest issues raised and her difficult financial circumstances.

The appellant was unsuccessful at trial, where the trial judge made no order as to costs due to her impecuniosity.

The appellant subsequently pursued an appeal and was again entirely unsuccessful.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondents, holding that they should not be deprived of their costs a second time despite the appellant's financial circumstances.

The appellant, a former Tim Horton's employee, was charged with theft after management viewed a videotape and contacted police.

She was acquitted and subsequently sued the arresting officer and the restaurant owner for malicious prosecution, wrongful dismissal, intentional infliction of mental distress, and defamation.

A jury found against her on all issues.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the definition of theft, failed to outline her position, and improperly allowed the defendants to expand the theft allegation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the jury's verdict and concluding the jury was properly instructed.

The appellant, a former Tim Horton's employee, was acquitted of criminal theft charges and subsequently sued her employer and the arresting officer for malicious prosecution, wrongful dismissal, and other claims.

A jury dismissed all her claims.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the definition of theft and failed to properly outline her position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the jury was entitled to reach its factual conclusions based on the evidence.

The appellants appealed an order granting summary judgment to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the respondents' blanket denials of wrongdoing satisfied the threshold for a Rule 20 motion, and that the appellants' materials failed to raise a genuine issue for trial.

Leave to appeal costs was denied, and costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant police officer was convicted of dangerous driving following an off-duty road rage incident and sentenced to 30 days in jail.

Based on this criminal conviction, a Hearing Officer found the appellant guilty of discreditable conduct under the Police Services Act and ordered his dismissal.

The appellant appealed the disciplinary conviction and penalty, arguing the hearing should have been stayed pending his criminal appeal and that his alternate version of events should have been accepted.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to stay the proceedings absent a Crown request, and holding that the Hearing Officer properly relied on the criminal conviction without re-litigating the facts.

The penalty of dismissal was upheld as there was no manifest error in principle.

The appellant police officer was convicted of dangerous driving following an off-duty road rage incident and sentenced to 30 days in jail.

Based on this criminal conviction, a Hearing Officer found him guilty of discreditable conduct under the Police Services Act and ordered his dismissal.

The officer appealed to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission, arguing the hearing should have been stayed pending his criminal appeal and that his alternate version of events should have been accepted.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Hearing Officer's reliance on the criminal conviction or the penalty of dismissal.