HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Farhan Aboubaker
Applicant
-and-
Toronto Transit Commission (Wheel-Trans)
Respondent
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Mark Hart
Indexed as: Aboubaker v. Toronto Transit Commission
APPEARANCES AND WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY
Farhan Aboubaker, Applicant ) Ernest J. Guiste, Counsel
Toronto Transit Commission (Wheel-Trans) ) Frances R. Gallop, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
1This Interim Decision addresses the following Requests by the respondent: (1) to dismiss, or alternatively, to narrow the scope of the Application based on lack of a prima facie case; (2) to dismiss the Application based on the applicant’s non-compliance with the Tribunal’s Rules and directions pertaining to disclosure; and (3) to dismiss additional allegations raised in material filed by the applicant on January 8, 2010.
2I also will address the applicant’s Request for an adjournment of the hearing scheduled for March 11, 2010, which was received on February 20, 2010.
BACKGROUND
3The Application in this matter was filed on September 22, 2008 pursuant to s. 53(3) of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”). The underlying complaint that was filed with the Ontario Human Rights Commission alleges that the applicant experienced discrimination in respect of services because of disability and race contrary to s. 1 of the Code and that he also experienced reprisal contrary to s. 8 of the Code.
4The applicant self-identifies as a person living with polio who is reliant upon a wheelchair. He relies upon the Wheel-Trans service provided by the respondent as a form of transportation. The applicant also self-identifies as a Muslim Canadian of East African heritage.
5The applicant’s complaint sets out a series of interactions between himself and various employees, agents or representatives of the respondent during the period from February to November 2007. However, while it is clear from the complaint that the applicant is a racialized person with a disability and that he alleges that a series of unfortunate events transpired, it is not clear on the face of the complaint how the applicant is alleging that the various events described constitute discrimination against him because of his race and/or disability contrary to the Code or how they support an allegation of reprisal.
6The Case Resolution Conference (“hearing”) in this matter commenced on December 16, 2009. At that time, I raised a concern about how the various events set out in the complaint are alleged to amount to a violation of the Code, and afforded the applicant, who was then represented by counsel, an opportunity to file written particulars based upon the allegations in the complaint specifically setting out how the applicant alleges the Code was infringed in relation to each alleged incident. The material that was filed by the applicant’s then counsel on January 8, 2010 will be addressed below.
7I also afforded the respondent the opportunity to file written submissions regarding its request to dismiss the Application for failure to set out a prima facie case, regarding the applicant’s documents and proposed witnesses, and arising out of the material filed by the applicant on January 8, 2010. These submissions were filed on January 21, 2010.
8The applicant was afforded the ability to respond to these materials by February 5, 2010, but failed to do so. Instead, by letter dated February 11, 2010, the applicant’s then counsel advised that he was no longer representing the applicant in this matter, and indicated that the applicant was seeking to secure new counsel. No request has been received from the applicant for an extension of time to file submissions, and no responding submissions have been filed by the applicant as of the date of this Interim Decision.
9As a result, I will proceed to deal with the issues raised by the respondent on the basis of the material filed.
Failure to set out a prima facie case
10The respondent submits that while the applicant raises a number of allegations of general mistreatment which, if true, may raise some customer service issues, it is not clear how what is being alleged is a violation of the Code and on what grounds. The respondent notes that while the applicant was afforded an opportunity to explain the nexus between the allegations contained in his complaint and any alleged violation of the Code, the material filed does not provide any further information to support such a nexus. The respondent submits that essentially, the Application raises a litany of general complaints and allegations without any nexus between the various allegations and any alleged breach of the Code.
11I share the respondent’s concern with regard to some of the allegations raised in the complaint. However, there are other allegations in the complaint where, in my view, the material filed supports a sufficient nexus at least to establish a prima facie case on the basis of the material filed so as to require some response by the respondent. At this stage of the proceeding and before I have heard any evidence, I need to assess the respondent’s contention that the applicant has failed to make out of prima facie case on the basis that the applicant is capable of proving the allegations set out in his materials.
12The first allegation raised in the complaint relates to an event that transpired on February 13, 2007, when the applicant was picked up by a taxi driver who appears to have been acting as an agent for the respondent. The applicant alleges that he wheeled himself to the front seat of the taxi cab and asked the driver to let him sit in front, to which the taxi driver is alleged to have responded, “the front is my office, go in the back seat”. The applicant proceeded to open the front door of the cab without the driver’s assistance and got in the car. The applicant alleges that the driver then “immediately grabs my wheelchair like a rag doll without folding nor asking me how to and was forcing it in the trunk”. The applicant states that he started yelling at the driver not to do that, after which it is alleged that the driver threatened the applicant to be quiet or he would call his dispatcher. In an e-mail sent to the Chair of the respondent, the applicant referred to the taxi driver as “untrained and rude” and stated that “guys like him shouldn’t be dealing with the general public let alone servicing people like me who have a physical challenge”.
13The applicant also alleges that, after he arrived home, he called the respondent’s Customer Service to complain, and was told that the incident was his fault because he added “more fuel to the fire for standing up and voicing [his] anger”. The applicant alleges that the Customer Service representative dealt with him in a condescending and patronizing manner.
14In my view, there may be a sufficient basis in this incident at least to support that the applicant has made out a prima facie case on the ground of disability, such that I am not prepared to dismiss this allegation without hearing the applicant’s evidence, including the reason he requested to sit in the front seat.
15The next allegation relates to an incident on March 6, 2007. The applicant’s scheduled pick-up time was between 2:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., but he states that the driver arrived at 3:05 p.m. When the applicant questioned why he was being picked up late, he alleges that the driver “dismissed” him by saying that the applicant wouldn’t understand how the respondent’s scheduling works and that the applicant shouldn’t be asking any questions. When the applicant arrived at his stop, he alleges that the driver saw him taking off the seat belt that was around his waist and said sarcastically, “Oh! I see you can untie your belt maybe you should also undo the rest”, referring to the belt attached to the wheels of the applicant’s wheel-chair. The applicant states that it was the driver’s job to remove the hooks for the belt attached to the wheels, since he is unable to reach these hooks and the driver had attached them to the wheels in the first place.
16The applicant alleges that at this point, he was frustrated and inconvenienced by the driver’s lack of respect and professionalism, and he states that he told the driver to do his job and not cause the applicant further stress. The applicant alleges that the driver proceeded to remove the belts, and then forcibly held on to the back handles of the applicant’s chair as the applicant was turning to leave the vehicle, saying with authority, “You are my responsibility and you will not leave my bus without me escorting you”. The applicant states that he told the driver to take his hands off the wheel-chair, and was able to free himself from the driver’s grip and exit the bus on his own. The applicant alleges that the driver threatened to report the applicant to the inspector on duty at Wheel-Trans. The applicant states that he was visibly upset and shaken from this experience, and called the respondent’s Customer Service to report the driver when he got home.
17The applicant states that the driver violated his right to be free from discrimination on account of his race and disability in relation to this incident. I am satisfied that the applicant has established a prima facie case sufficient to require a response from the respondent, as the respondent disputes the applicant’s version of events.
18The applicant’s complaint states that on March 10, 2007, he received a call from Dean Milton, a Customer Service Supervisor for the respondent, regarding the March 6, 2007 incident. The applicant alleges that he sensed from the tone and nuance in Mr. Milton’s voice that he was more apologetic and concerned about the driver, whom the applicant alleges was dismissive and abusive towards him. The applicant alleges that the driver concocted a story about the applicant abusing him, and that the applicant was lectured by Mr. Milton about how the drivers are stressed and that the applicant is not even supposed to ask why his ride was late. The applicant states that Mr. Milton ended the call by saying that he would investigate further, and that in future the applicant should call Mr. Milton’s direct line.
19The applicant subsequently received a letter from Mr. Milton dated March 12, 2007. This letter addresses a report that the applicant had been verbally abusive to the driver as a result of him arriving late for the applicant’s pick-up, and states that this type of behaviour will not be tolerated. The letter states that the incident will be noted in the applicant’s file, and any further incident could result in a service suspension pending a formal review.
20The applicant alleges that instead of seeking the facts, Mr. Milton violated the applicant’s right to be free from discrimination by failing to conduct a fair and impartial inquiry into the applicant’s complaint and instead treated his complaint in a shabby and dismissive manner. The respondent disputes the applicant’s version of events, but at this stage I must assume that the applicant is capable of proving his allegations. I am satisfied that the applicant has established a prima facie case sufficient to require a response from the respondent in relation to this interaction.
21The next allegation in the complaint relates to an incident on June 28, 2007. The applicant states that his pick-up time was between 2:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., but he alleges he was “stranded” by Wheel-Trans. As a result, the applicant states that he was compelled to use the respondent’s regular transit system as a result, and had to be carried up and down stairs because some TTC stations were not wheel-chair accessible or their elevators were not working that day.
22The facts relating to this incident as set out in the applicant’s complaint, in my view, do not provide a sufficient basis to support a prima facie case of discrimination. The applicant essentially alleges that the respondent’s Wheel-Trans service was late for his scheduled pick-up. There is no indication in the material filed by the applicant that he followed the direction set out in Mr. Milton’s March 12, 2007 letter to call the respondent’s Priority Line to find out the status of his ride, or to contact Customer Service or Mr. Milton directly. In the absence of taking these steps, it appears that the applicant made a decision to use the respondent’s regular transit service rather than wait for the accommodated service provided through Wheel-Trans. In my view, this is not sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination in relation to this incident, and this allegation is dismissed.
23The next incident raised in the complaint relates to an occurrence on July 23, 2007, when the driver involved in the March 6, 2007 incident arrived to pick up the applicant. The applicant alleges that that the driver “purposely placed him in front of where they hang those big belts of hooks made of metals” and further alleges that the driver still had “his usual tone of ‘do as I tell you or else I’ll call the inspector’”. The applicant states that he decided to leave the bus before he was again accused of doing things to the driver. The applicant states that he reported the driver, and subsequently received a call from Mr. Milton a few days later stating that this driver would no longer be dispatched to pick up the applicant.
24This incident does not provide a sufficient basis to support a prima facie case of discrimination. The mere fact that the same driver was dispatched to pick up the applicant is not sufficient in and of itself to support such an allegation.
25Even if I were to accept the applicant’s allegations in their entirety in relation to the March 6, 2007 incident, this would not in my view be sufficient to support that the driver ought never again be dispatched to pick up the applicant.
26With respect to the July 23, 2007 incident, the only specific allegations relate to the applicant being placed at the front of the vehicle and to the driver’s alleged tone. The applicant’s complaint itself states that there was another person on the vehicle, and no explanation is provided as to how placing the applicant at the front of the vehicle amounts to discrimination in violation of the Code. With regard to the latter allegation, a vague reference to the driver’s alleged “tone” without any specifics provided as to what the driver actually said or did that is alleged to amount to a violation of the Code is not in my view sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination. As a result, the applicant’s allegations in relation to this incident are dismissed.
27The applicant next alleges that on August 9, 2007 he was waiting at Yonge and Bloor Streets for his ride that was scheduled for between 2:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. When his ride still had not appeared by 2:40 p.m., the applicant states that he noticed a female Wheel-Trans driver about a block away at Yonge and Cumberland Streets getting ready to stick a yellow “no show” notice on the wall. The applicant states that he rushed towards her and when he noticed that the note was for him, he said that this wasn’t where he was supposed to be picked up. The applicant states that the driver responded that this was where the applicant had asked her to drop him once, which the applicant acknowledges is true. However, the applicant states that he does not believe that this was a proper reason to “no show” him, and that the driver should have checked with reservations to confirm where the applicant wanted to be picked up.
28In relation to this incident, I fail to see a sufficient basis to support a prima facie case of discrimination. There appears to have been a mix-up as to where the applicant was to have been picked up. This is not, however, a basis upon which to found an allegation of a Code violation, and there is nothing in the materials filed by the applicant to explain on what basis he is alleging that this incident supports a violation of his rights under the Code. As a result, this allegation is dismissed.
29The applicant alleges that later in the evening on August 9, 2007, he had difficulty breathing and was taken to the hospital. The applicant states that he was hospitalized for five and a half days with no phone at his bedside. The applicant alleges that anyone calling on his behalf to Wheel-Trans Customer Service was grilled with questions in a rude manner or was told that the applicant should be the one calling in to cancel any reservations. The applicant states that he later found out that the respondent held these cancellations against him under its “no-shows” policy, which contributed to him receiving a letter dated September 6, 2007 advising him that his Pre-Book service would be discontinued for the month of October 2007.
30As stated above, I need to assess this issue on the basis that the applicant is capable of proving his allegations, which I am aware are in dispute. I note that the applicant has identified a witness (Sue Tupas) as the person who attempted to cancel the reservations on his behalf, and I would need to hear direct evidence from her in order to support the applicant’s allegations. However, at this stage, I find that the applicant has provided a sufficient basis to support a prima facie allegation of discrimination because of disability.
31The applicant’s complaint next refers to an incident on October 2, 2007, where he alleges that he was stranded twice and spoken to rudely over the phone by a Customer Service representative. No basis is provided to support that this amounts to discrimination in violation of the Code, and I find that the applicant’s materials do not support a prima facie case of discrimination in relation to this incident. As a result the allegations in relation to the events of October 2, 2007 are dismissed.
32The applicant also states that on October 2, 2007 he was issued a letter from the respondent stating that he had four or more violations of the respondent’s No Show / Late Cancellation policy within a 12 month period and that in September 2007, he had eight late cancellations and two no-shows / cancelled at door, which exceeded the combined policy limit of seven per violation. As a result, the applicant’s Wheel-Trans service was suspended for 30 days to begin 21 days after issuance of the letter. The applicant also was advised that he could call Customer Service within 14 days to appeal this action. The applicant’s materials do not indicate that he took any steps to file an appeal.
33There is nothing in relation to this allegation which supports a prima facie violation of the Code. The respondent has a policy regarding no-shows and late cancellations that it believed had been violated by the applicant. Unlike in relation to the events of August 2007 when the applicant was hospitalized, the applicant has not put forward any disability-related reason to explain why he may have been in violation of the policy. In the absence of a Code-related reason to support his non-compliance with the policy, I find that the applicant has not made out a prima facie case in relation to this suspension and this issue is dismissed.
34Finally, the applicant’s complaint refers to a phone call that he received from Mr. Milton on November 16, 2007, whereupon the applicant refused to speak with him and hung up the phone. There is nothing in this incident to indicate an allegation of any violation of the Code. In this regard, I note that the complaint itself refers to the last incident of discrimination as having occurred on October 2, 2007.
35With regard to the applicant’s allegation of reprisal, s. 8 of the Code is very specific in stating that an allegation of reprisal needs to relate to a person experiencing reprisal for claiming and enforcing his rights under the Code. In his materials, the applicant fails to provide a basis to support that he experienced any reprisal from the respondent for claiming and enforcing Code rights. As a result, the applicant has not made out a prima facie allegation of reprisal, and this allegation is dismissed.
Non-compliance re disclosure
36Following mediation in this matter, the applicant was given until July 10, 2009 to provide all arguably relevant documents, and a statement of any additional facts to be relied upon and description of remedies. The respondent notes that the applicant’s documents were not disclosed until July 29, 2009 and no description of remedies was provided.
37While the respondent registered its objection to the late delivery of the documents, no specific prejudice has been alleged as a result of the late disclosure and the documents will have been in the respondent’s possession for over seven months by the time the hearing is held on March 11, 2010. The respondent submits that there is no point in this Tribunal having Rules if it doesn’t enforce them. While I appreciate that sentiment, I need to be guided by the over-riding principle that this Tribunal is to provide a process to all parties that is fair, just and expeditious. In my view, in the absence of any specific prejudice caused by the late disclosure of documents, it would be neither fair nor just to refuse to allow the applicant to rely upon these documents or to dismiss the Application on this basis. Pursuant to Rule 3.6, I have the power to relieve against strict compliance with the Rules, and I hereby exercise that power in relation to the applicant’s late disclosure of documents.
38In relation to the applicant’s failure to provide a description of remedies sought, I note that the complaint sets out a detailed description of the remedies sought and that the letter from applicant’s former counsel in January 2010 provides particulars of the applicant’s claim for compensation. A claim for compensation already was included in the remedy set out in the complaint. I see no basis in these circumstances to deprive the applicant of any remedy or to dismiss the Application on the basis of any failure to provide a further description of remedies sought.
39Prior to the first scheduled day of hearing on December 16, 2009, the applicant was required to provide a list of witnesses and will-say statements and a list of documents to be relied upon by November 27, 2009. The applicant’s then counsel sought an extension to December 4, 2009 to deliver this material, to which the respondent did not consent. On December 14, 2009, the respondent wrote to applicant’s then counsel to advise that it would seek to have the Application dismissed for failure to comply with the Rules and failure to disclose a prima facie case.
40On December 15, 2009, the respondent received a letter from applicant’s then counsel taking the position that the applicant had complied with his pre-hearing obligations by disclosing his book of documents in late July 2009, which includes a list of witnesses. The respondent objects to this, on the basis that it shouldn’t be left to guess what documents the applicant intends to rely upon at the hearing and what witnesses the applicant proposes to call. I have considerable sympathy for this position.
41However, once again, I need to be guided by the over-riding requirement to ensure a fair and just hearing. The applicant did disclose and file with the Tribunal a book of documents and a list of witnesses, together with a brief description of what relevant evidence they may have, and this material has been in the respondent’s hands since late July 2009. In these circumstances, I am not prepared to bar the applicant from relying upon these documents, to the extent that they are relevant and admissible, or from calling the witnesses listed. However, I note that as a result of my decision above regarding whether the applicant has made out a prima facie case of discrimination, there are some listed witnesses whose evidence is no longer relevant to this proceeding, including Lee Kichko and Terence Wang and the various staff at the Canadian Business College. In addition, it is not clear to me whether Lilli Bruzese has any evidence that is relevant to the allegations that remain at issue in this proceeding.
42If the applicant intends to call either Edie Fisher and/or Sue Tupas (and perhaps Ms. Bruzese) to appear as witnesses in support of his Application, it is his responsibility to ensure that they attend the hearing on March 11, 2010. The hearing will proceed on that day, and I expect that it will be completed on that day given the narrow scope of the remaining allegations.
The applicant’s January 8, 2010 submissions
43The respondent has raised objections to the submissions filed by the applicant’s former counsel on January 8, 2010 on the basis that they improperly seek to expand the scope of the complaint.
44As noted by the respondent, this is an Application filed under s. 53(3) of the Code, and Rule 6.3 of the Tribunal’s Transitional Rules provides that:
Applications made in accordance with these Rules must be based on the subject matter of the complaint or amended complaint filed at the Commission and the Tribunal will not entertain preliminary requests to add grounds, expand the subject matter of the complaint or add parties to the Application.
45In the January 8, 2010 materials, it is alleged that
the corporate respondent violated the Applicant’s rights by providing an inferior level of service to him and all disabled persons. There is no commitment to timeliness and their staff do not appreciate that simply because one is disabled it does not follow that they do not have a time commitment like everyone else.
46To the extent that this purports to put in issue in this proceeding a broad challenge to the Wheel-Trans system on behalf of “all disabled persons”, this is beyond the proper scope of the complaint as filed. The complaint as filed by the applicant is an individual complaint alleging that his rights under the Code were infringed in relation to certain specific incidents as set out in his complaint, which I have reviewed in detail above. While the complaint does include some specific references to delays in service on certain specific occasions, I have found that the applicant’s materials as filed with the Tribunal fail to make out a prima facie case of discrimination in relation to these specific occasions. As a result, the question of the timeliness of the Wheel-Trans service as provided to the applicant on the occasions cited in his complaint is not an issue in this proceeding.
47The applicant’s former counsel further alleges that “the corporate respondents and Giambrone have violated [the applicant’s] right to be free from discrimination on account of disability by failing to educate their staff and agents to deal with their customers with dignity and respect”. As noted by the respondent, Mr. Giambrone is not a named respondent in this proceeding. With regard to the issue of “failing to educate their staff and agents”, once again this broad framing of the issue improperly seeks to expand the scope of the complaint.
48The remaining issues in this proceeding include the specific events on February 13 and March 6, 2007 and the manner in which Mr. Milton responded to the March 6, 2007 incident, and I will consider whether any violation of the Code has been established on the basis of the evidence tendered at the hearing in relation to these events. In addition, if a violation of the Code is found in relation to any of these specific events, I have the power to consider an appropriate remedial order, which may include training or education. But the broad issue of the respondent’s training of staff and agents unconnected to the specific allegations raised in the applicant’s complaint is not within the proper scope of this proceeding.
49The applicant’s former counsel further alleges that the corporate respondent violated the applicant’s rights under the Code by virtue of its scheduling and cancellation policy, which is alleged to penalize the applicant and others for circumstances beyond their control and which is further alleged not to provide the necessary flexibility or accommodation. Specific reference is then made to the incident in August 2007 when the applicant was hospitalized.
50As I have indicated above, I have found that the applicant at least has established a prima facie case in relation to the circumstances of August 2007 and whether he was improperly penalized for late cancellations or no shows when he was in hospital. Once again, if after hearing all of the evidence I find that a violation of the Code has been established in relation to this allegation, I have remedial authority to consider whether to make an order requiring changes to the respondent’s policy arising out of the specific violation I have found. However, it is not within the proper scope of this proceeding for me to conduct a broad review of the respondent’s scheduling and cancellation policy in relation to other persons who are not parties to this proceeding or in relation to specific issues that the applicant has not raised in his complaint or in respect of which he has not established a prima facie case of discrimination.
51Finally, the applicant’s former counsel alleges that the respondent “violated the Applicant’s right to be free from discrimination on account of disability by virtue of them failing to provide adequate services to disabled people compared to able-bodied persons”. Once again, the adequacy of the respondent’s services to “disabled people” in general is not within the proper scope of the complaint as filed with the Commission. The issue in this proceeding is whether the applicant’s rights under the Code were infringed in relation to the specific events raised in his complaint where I have found that he at least has made out a prima facie case of discrimination.
52While it may be possible for an individual to raise a systemic issue in an Application filed with this Tribunal, that is not how the applicant’s complaint was framed in this case and there is no sufficient basis in the material filed that would support an allegation of systemic discrimination of this nature and breadth. In this regard, I further note that in the Tribunal’s Guide to Section 53(3) Applications states that the expedited process provided under that section of the Code is best suited for applications that do not raise public policy issues and that do not involve complex questions of fact or law.
53The applicant’s complaint as filed with the Commission is based upon his individual experiences with the respondent and its Wheel-Trans system, and will be addressed in this proceeding in the manner it was framed before the Commission and in accordance with the Tribunal’s Rules and my decision herein.
REQUEST FOR ADJOURNMENT
54The hearing in this matter is scheduled to resume on March 11, 2010. The hearing was scheduled by Notice from the Tribunal dated December 23, 2009 after consultation with the parties and upon agreement of all parties, including the applicant.
55By letter dated February 11, 2010, applicant’s former counsel advised the Tribunal that he was no longer acting as counsel in this matter and that the applicant was seeking to retain new counsel. On February 20, 2010, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal to request an adjournment of the March 11, 2010 hearing date on the basis that he was in the process of seeking new counsel and because the few lawyers he had spoken to expressed that they needed at least four to five months to prepare and look at his case.
56The respondent has objected to the request for an adjournment.
57While the Tribunal’s Information Bulletin on Scheduling of Hearings and Mediations, Rescheduling Requests and Requests for Adjournments does not specifically apply to Transition Applications, nonetheless the principles set out in this Information Bulletin are equally applicable to Transition Applications.
58The Tribunal’s Information Bulletin provides that requests to reschedule must be made within five (5) days of receiving the Confirmation of Hearing and that thereafter, adjournments will be granted only in extraordinary circumstances. The Information Bulletin states the following regarding requests for adjournments:
Requests for adjournment, particularly last minute requests for adjournments are a significant impediment to fair and timely access to justice.
The Tribunal’s approach to scheduling and rescheduling mediations and hearings is designed to give the parties a fair opportunity to find suitable dates. Therefore, the Tribunal discourages adjournment requests, and will only grant adjournments in extraordinary circumstances such as illness of a party, witness or representative.
The Tribunal will not automatically grant adjournments even when all parties consent. Consent of all parties will be a factor which the Tribunal will consider where a request to adjourn a mediation or hearing is made, but it is not the only, or even the main factor.
Where a party seeks to adjourn a previously scheduled mediation or hearing, they must contact the Registrar as soon as the need arises. If practical, they should contact the other parties to seek their consent, and to discuss alternate dates for the rescheduling of the mediation or hearing. Alternate dates for mediation must fall within five (5) months of the date of the Notice of Application. Alternative dates for a hearing must fall within five (5) months of the date of the Confirmation of Hearing.
The party making the request should contact the Registrar and provide the reason for the request and the alternative agreed upon dates. Where the request is on short notice, the party must contact the Registrar by telephone or email.
59The reasons for the Request do not constitute exceptional circumstances that would permit an adjournment. While it is unfortunate that applicant’s former counsel is no longer able to continue to act on the applicant’s behalf, the Tribunal does not have any indication from the applicant that he will be able to retain new counsel within a reasonable time. All that has been stated to the Tribunal is that the applicant is still looking for new counsel and that certain unidentified lawyers have said that they would need four to five months even to look at his case let alone agree to represent him in this proceeding. This is not a basis upon which an adjournment request of this nature will be entertained.
60The request for adjournment is denied.
Dated at Toronto, this 26th day of February, 2010.
“Signed by”
Mark Hart
Vice-chair