Douglas K. Gray

The mother appealed a trial decision that transferred sole custody of her two children to the father due to her relentless campaign of parental alienation.

The trial judge had severely restricted the mother's access, making it conditional on her engaging with a specified expert for counselling and assessment, and ordered a review of access after six months.

The mother also appealed a $160,000 costs award made against her.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had jurisdiction to order a review, did not impermissibly delegate access determination, and properly exercised her discretion in awarding costs given the mother's bad faith conduct.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding spousal support.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge failed to appreciate uncontested evidence that the appellant's income had been reduced by about fifty percent and failed to consult the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (SSAG).

Given the lack of reasons, the court owed little deference to the trial judge.

The appeal was allowed, and spousal support was fixed at $525 per month based on the SSAG.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal that reinstated the respondent's benefits.

The Director argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the respondent filed her appeal more than two years after the Director's decision, contrary to the one-year absolute limit in O. Reg. 222/98.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the regulation valid and holding that the Tribunal acted without jurisdiction by hearing the late appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the Tribunal's order was set aside.

The appellant former landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering her to pay damages for a bad faith eviction, arguing she was denied natural justice.

The initial hearing proceeded in her absence after she was served by mail at the rental unit, despite the Board and the respondent knowing she lived in Florida for most of the year.

The Divisional Court held that proceeding with the hearing when the Board knew the appellant had no actual notice constituted a denial of natural justice.

The Board's decisions were set aside and the matter was remitted for a rehearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Public Service Grievance Board, which found it lacked jurisdiction to hear his wrongful dismissal grievance because he had not been employed by the Crown for at least 12 months.

The applicant argued that new legislation, which removed the 12-month requirement for employees not on probation, should apply retrospectively.

The Divisional Court applied a correctness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, finding that jurisdiction is a substantive matter and the former legislative provisions governed the applicant's crystallized rights at the time of his dismissal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an appeal order of the Director's Delegate, arguing that the Delegate erred in relying on obiter comments from the Court of Appeal's decision in Liberty Mutual v. Fernandes regarding an insurer's ability to access the dispute resolution process to challenge a CAT DAC decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Court of Appeal's comments in Fernandes were an integral part of its decision and constituted binding authority.

The court concluded that the Director's Delegate's decision was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a family law trial decision, seeking a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge failed to mark an actuary's report as an exhibit, failed to assist her as a self-represented litigant, made errors regarding equalization and pension splitting, and failed to grant a divorce.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the exhibit omission was a harmless technical defect and that the trial judge fulfilled her duties to the self-represented parties.

The court found no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or discretionary decisions regarding support and equalization.

The appellant, a self-represented solicitor, appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court action for unpaid legal fees.

The Deputy Judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred, finding the cause of action arose when the legal work was completed in 1999, not when the final bill was rendered in 2002.

On appeal, the appellant argued that under the Solicitors Act, a cause of action does not arise until 30 days after a bill is delivered.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, holding that the Solicitors Act merely creates a procedural hurdle and does not alter the common law rule that a cause of action for services rendered arises upon completion of the work.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a Social Benefits Tribunal decision finding that s. 5(2) of the ODSPA, which denies benefits to individuals whose sole impairment is addiction, violated the Human Rights Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Tribunal's finding that the respondents, who were disabled by alcoholism, were discriminated against.

The Court confirmed that the Tribunal was not required to apply the third, dignity-focused step of the Law test to establish discrimination under the Code.

The moving party, a tenant with an unregistered 10-year lease, sought a stay of a judgment declaring his lease unenforceable against the responding party bank, which held a registered mortgage on the property.

The bank had moved for a writ of possession following the mortgagor's default.

Applying the RJR MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm if the tenant were evicted, and a balance of convenience that favoured granting the stay on strict terms.

The stay was granted on the condition that the tenant pay a lump sum for arrears and ongoing monthly payments pending the appeal.

The Commissioner of the OPP sought to stay a disciplinary hearing pending an application for judicial review based on a reasonable apprehension of bias by the adjudicator.

A motion judge denied the stay, finding the Commissioner lacked standing and failed to meet the test for a stay.

On review, the Divisional Court set aside the motion judge's order, holding that the Commissioner has standing to seek judicial review on procedural fairness grounds and that the proper test for a stay was met, as irreparable harm would result from continuing a hearing tainted by an apprehension of bias.

The stay was granted and the respondents' cross-motion to quash the application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy unless he paid certain arrears and fees.

Prior to the hearing, the appellant paid the required sum of $6,880.11 and remained in the rental unit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot and awarded costs of $750 to the respondent.