Deborah Krick

The applicant brought an application under s. 680 of the Criminal Code to set aside a detention order.

Because a non-publication order under s. 517 of the Criminal Code was imposed at the bail hearing, and the decision contains information covered by that order, the Court of Appeal withheld the publication of its reasons until the ban ceases to be in effect.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder and kidnapping after a missing cocaine shipment led to the execution-style killings of two men.

On appeal, they challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding prior discreditable conduct, a Vetrovec caution, a third-party suspect defence, and the elements of aiding.

One appellant also appealed the denial of a severance application and his 23-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions or the refusal to sever the trials.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was proportionate to the gravity of the offences.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges relating to the sale of sexual services.

The application judge had struck down sections 286.2 (material benefit), 286.3 (procuring), and 286.4 (advertising) of the Criminal Code, enacted by the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, finding they infringed section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provisions do not violate section 7.

The Court found that cooperative arrangements among sex workers do not constitute a 'commercial enterprise' under the material benefit provision, and that the procuring and advertising provisions are neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate to their objectives.

The Court also rejected arguments that the provisions unjustifiably infringed sections 2(b) and 2(d) of the Charter.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that ordered his continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant argued that a conditional discharge allowing him to return to his independent apartment was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was entitled to deference and reasonably concluded that the appellant required close 24-hour supervision due to his history of decompensation, violent behaviour, and substance abuse.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and released on bail pending appeal.

He subsequently absconded, failing to reside with his surety or surrender into custody as required by his release order.

His counsel brought a motion to be removed as solicitor of record due to a breakdown in communications, which was granted.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss the appeal as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion, dismissing the appeal as abandoned and issuing a warrant for the appellant's arrest.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence following convictions for multiple offences against an intimate partner, including sexual assault with a weapon and forcible confinement.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding his likelihood of recidivism and failed to properly assess the intractability of his conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of the expert evidence on age-related decline in violent behaviour.

The Court held that the sentencing judge's findings on intractability at the sentencing stage could be applied to the designation stage, and that the indeterminate sentence was appropriate given the appellant's poor treatment prospects and high risk of violent reoffending.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder, sought an order under s. 680(1) of the Criminal Code directing a panel of the Court of Appeal to review a single judge's decision denying him bail pending appeal.

The motion judge evaluated the public interest criterion under s. 679(3)(c), focusing on public safety and public confidence in the administration of justice.

The court found no arguable material errors in the bail judge's conclusion that the applicant's involvement in high-level drug trafficking and access to a dangerous weapon posed significant public safety concerns.

Furthermore, the grounds of appeal, including challenges to eyewitness instructions and a Charter claim regarding a vehicle's infotainment system, were deemed relatively weak.

The application for review was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a shooting that occurred during a drug transaction.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in responding to a jury question by failing to instruct the jury on the defence of a third party under former s. 37 of the Criminal Code, and by inadequately addressing the mens rea component of the question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court found there was no air of reality to the proportionality requirement of s. 37, as shooting the victim in the core to defend a third party who was not in immediate peril constituted excessive force.

The court also held that the trial judge's instruction on mens rea was correct and comprehensive.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder after his three children tried to kill their mother.

At trial, the Crown theorized that the appellant used his religious beliefs to influence the children, and made inflammatory remarks during closing submissions comparing the appellant to notorious cult leaders and calling him a 'Jesus nut'.

The trial judge did not correct these remarks or instruct the jury on how to use the evidence of the appellant's religious beliefs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Crown's improper comments and the trial judge's failure to intervene rendered the trial unfair and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to stop at the scene of an accident involving bodily harm and death.

He argued that he rebutted the presumption of intent to escape civil or criminal liability under s. 252(2) of the Criminal Code because he pulled over after the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly concluded the appellant knew his vehicle had been struck, stopped only to assess the damage, and left to avoid liability because he was driving without the requisite licence.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for multiple convictions of cruelty to animals.

The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly inadequate given the gravity of the offences, the respondent's criminal record, his probationary status at the time, and his failure to accept responsibility.

The court allowed the appeal, increasing the sentence to nine months' incarceration and varying the prohibition order to prevent the respondent from residing with any animal or bird.

The appellant was convicted of credit card fraud-related offences after police found skimming equipment, encoded gift cards, and a USB key during a traffic stop and subsequent searches.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the searches of his person, vehicle, and USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights and the evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the pat-down search was lawful, and while the vehicle and USB key searches breached s. 8, the evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2).

The court also affirmed that a conviction for possessing credit card data under s. 342(3) does not require proof that the data could successfully defraud an issuer.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a prolific child sex offender diagnosed as a psychopath, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge conflated risk reduction with risk elimination and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting psychopaths can be effectively treated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied the long-term offender criteria and correctly concluded the appellant's risk could not be safely managed in the community.

The fresh evidence application was also dismissed as it merely offered a concurring opinion to evidence already rejected at trial and lacked sufficient probative value to affect the outcome.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the accused on charges of sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the accused's actions were involuntary and occurred while in an automatistic state caused by a series of small strokes, characterizing it as non-mental disorder automatism.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to presume the automatism was caused by a mental disorder, by treating the medical classification of a brain disease as determinative of the legal classification of a mind disease, and by improperly assessing the continuing danger factor.

A new trial was ordered to determine whether the automatism should result in a verdict of not guilty or not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant pled guilty to multiple charges arising from a series of robberies and break and enters, including robbery with a firearm, unlawful confinement, and use of a firearm in the commission of unlawful confinement.

On appeal, he argued that the Kienapple principle precluded multiple convictions for these offences arising from the same incidents.

The Court of Appeal held that while the unlawful confinement convictions could stand, the convictions for using a firearm in the commission of unlawful confinement must be stayed, as they punished the same criminal wrong as the robbery with a firearm convictions.

The court varied the sentences on the armed robbery convictions to maintain the total sentence of seven years and nine months' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a care or control driving offence and the resulting lifetime driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's factual findings met the essential elements of care or control under R. v. Boudreault.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court was satisfied the appellant received proper notice of the Crown's intention to seek increased punishment and the lifetime prohibition was warranted given the circumstances of the offence and the offender.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and provided two breath samples.

The trial judge found a breach of the accused's right to counsel before the first sample and excluded both samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The summary conviction appeal court affirmed the decision, holding that all evidence obtained after the initial breach was tainted.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the lower courts erred by failing to consider whether the accused's consultation with counsel before the second sample constituted a 'fresh start' that severed the nexus between the breach and the second sample, and by failing to conduct a discrete s. 24(2) analysis for the second sample.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that two jurors demonstrated bias during the challenge for cause process, that the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment to retain counsel of choice, and that the jury instructions on the requisite intent for murder were flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis for juror bias, no prejudice from the refused adjournment as counsel was re-retained on the second day of trial, and no error in the jury instructions regarding the appellant's capacity and intent.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, as well as her sentence, following an incident where she punched her spouse, resulting in a ruptured spleen.

The appellant argued that the Crown failed to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt based on the medical expert's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, noting that scientific proof of causation is not required and common sense inferences may suffice.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellant was convicted of making, possessing, and distributing obscene material through his websites, which featured simulated explicit sex with violence.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing errors in the admission of meta-tags, hyperlinks, written stories, and expert testimony, as well as deficiencies in the jury charge and a failure to grant a stay for delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the $28,000 fine as a fit sentence.