David Watt

The appellant appealed his conviction for unauthorized possession of a firearm that was found heavily wrapped under a bed in the bedroom he occupied.

The appellant argued the conviction was unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not meet the standard established in R. v. Villaroman.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the relevant legal principles, did not misapprehend the evidence, and provided cogent reasons for rejecting the appellant's claim that a third party was in possession of the firearm.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the victim surcharge was set aside, but the sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence following his guilty plea to 12 counts of fraud.

The appellant sought to set aside his guilty pleas on grounds of involuntariness and inadequate legal advice, and challenged the trial judge's finding of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the guilty pleas were voluntary and informed, and that the appellant was foreclosed from advancing the s. 11(b) argument once the guilty pleas were upheld.

On sentencing, the court upheld an eight-year federal penitentiary sentence, a restitution order of $6,261,632, and a fine of $6,261,632 in lieu of forfeiture, finding the sentence appropriate given the large-scale, sophisticated Ponzi-like fraud scheme, prior fraud-related criminal record, and significant aggravating factors.

The appellant, a permanent resident, pleaded guilty to eight offences arising from assaults on his spouse.

The day before his plea, an Immigration Enforcement Officer informed him that he could be deemed inadmissible to Canada due to prior convictions and that he would lose his right to appeal a removal order if he received a sentence exceeding six months.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a joint submission of 12 months' imprisonment less 247 days pre-trial custody credit, resulting in a four-month custodial term.

A removal order was subsequently issued.

On appeal, the appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming it was uninformed because he was unaware of the specific immigration consequences regarding appellate rights, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the appellant had adequate understanding of the immigration consequences and failed to establish prejudice.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from sentence for assault against his wife.

The respondent had pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife in 2016 and had received an absolute discharge in 2011 for a previous assault on the same victim.

The trial judge refused to grant a second discharge, citing the first discharge's failure to deter the respondent.

The appeal court allowed the respondent's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in considering the discharge, which was protected from disclosure under the Criminal Records Act.

The appeal court remitted the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The Crown appealed on two grounds: the interpretation of the Criminal Records Act and the appeal court's authority to remit the matter.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter, kidnapping, and offering an indignity to a body arising from the death of the victim.

The appellant ordered the kidnapping of the victim, believing he had stolen from him.

The victim was beaten, kidnapped, bound, and confined at the appellant's automotive shop, where he died.

The appellant's body was subsequently burned.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the actus reus and mens rea of manslaughter were established, and that the sentence was harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to either ground.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting outside an after-hours bar.

The Crown's case relied on surveillance video evidence, detective testimony identifying the appellant through multiple physical characteristics, and DNA evidence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge's exclusion of expert evidence from a physicist regarding whether a white spot on the surveillance video was a chain and medallion, and (2) the trial judge's failure to leave the partial defence of provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of the expert evidence but allowed the appeal on the provocation issue, finding that the evidence satisfied the air of reality threshold for the defence.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the trial judge following conviction on counts of fraud and money laundering.

The trial judge ordered the appellant to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $1,150,000 within five years of release from custody.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in fixing the payment period because he failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did consider ability to pay as a relevant factor, noting that both counsel made submissions on the period for payment and the trial judge's order fell within the range suggested by counsel.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 12 years imposed following conviction on 25 of 34 counts of sexual offences against four complainants.

The trial judge had determined a fit sentence of 13 years and reduced it by one year to account for the appellant's advanced age and health challenges.

The appellant argued that age should be more substantially factored into the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and that a shorter sentence could achieve these objectives for an elderly offender.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and dismissed the appeal, holding that the sentence fell comfortably within the appropriate range and that the weight assigned to age did not reflect error.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder arising from the deaths of two sex trade workers found in different locations in the Niagara Region approximately 29 months apart.

Both victims died of blunt-force trauma to the head, and blood of both victims was found in the appellant's residences.

The trial judge admitted evidence of one count as similar act evidence on the other count and refused to sever the counts.

The trial judge also refused to discharge a juror who had a prior acquaintance with the victim's stepmother, and declined to leave manslaughter as an included offence.

The Court of Appeal found multiple errors: the similar act evidence did not meet the required threshold of striking similarity, the juror should have been discharged to preserve the appearance of fairness, and manslaughter should have been left to the jury.

The court also addressed a Charter breach regarding live monitoring conditions in wiretap authorizations but found the evidence admissible under section 24(2).

The appellant pleaded guilty to four offences arising from a large-scale marijuana grow operation: production of marijuana, theft of electricity, theft of water, and injury to property.

The operation consisted of 864 plants with an estimated value between $324,000 and $518,000.

The sentencing judge imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of three years for production, with concurrent 12-month sentences for the remaining counts.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentence.

On appeal, the court found the mandatory minimum unconstitutional and determined a fit sentence of 14 months imprisonment for the production offence, with concurrent sentences for the property offences remaining undisturbed.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 9, 2019.

On consent of both parties, the appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent in the amount of $3,250, inclusive of all fees, disbursements, and applicable taxes.

The costs were to be paid in accordance with the directions provided by the trial judge in the original judgment.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision ordering civil forfeiture of a property located at 855 Darby Road, Welland, and associated Hells Angels Motorcycle Club paraphernalia under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The property was owned by members of the HAMC and used as a clubhouse.

The Crown established that mortgage payments were funded in part by dues paid by HAMC members engaged in drug trafficking, and that the property was used as a meeting place where criminal activity was planned.

The Court of Appeal upheld the forfeiture order, finding the property constituted both proceeds and an instrument of unlawful activity, and that the legitimate owner and responsible owner exceptions did not apply.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for firearm-related offences and possession of marijuana.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's ruling that he was not detained during a police-citizen interaction on a Toronto Community Housing Corporation property, and that evidence obtained should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no detention occurred and that the interaction was a lawful community policing exercise.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to correct a pre-sentence custody calculation error.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking various drugs, challenging the trial judge's refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant on the information to obtain the search warrant and the trial judge's conclusion that the warrant was validly issued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions, finding that while the reasons were imprecise, they were sufficient to permit appellate review when considered in context.

The court found no error in refusing cross-examination on the confidential informant's track record or criminal history, and determined that the information provided by the informant met the Debot criteria for reliability and was sufficiently corroborated to justify the warrant's issuance.

The Crown and Ontario Provincial Police appealed a disclosure order requiring production of a drug recognition expert's rolling log.

The rolling log documented all drug evaluations conducted by the DRE from training through certification.

The respondent was charged with drug-impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge ordered disclosure of the rolling log, and the motion judge affirmed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rolling log was "obviously relevant" material subject to first party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime, and that disclosure was permitted under the exception in section 258.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code even when anonymized.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act.

He requested disclosure of the testing and operating procedures from the user manual for the Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device used to measure his vehicle's speed.

The prosecutor refused disclosure, taking the position that user manuals constitute third-party records requiring a third-party production application.

The justice of the peace ordered disclosure.

The prosecutor obtained a certiorari order quashing the disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the certiorari order was improper and that the disclosure was required as first-party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime.

The appellant applied for release pending determination of his appeal on convictions of child luring under s. 172.1(4) of the Criminal Code and communication for the purpose of prostitution with a person under 16 under s. 286.1.

The appellant was sentenced to one year imprisonment.

The respondent opposed release on the basis that the appeal was frivolous.

The appellant argued that a pending Supreme Court decision in R. v. Morrison regarding the interpretation of s. 172.1(4) would be relevant to his appeal and that his continued custody would be manifestly unjust pending that decision.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the appellant failed to meet the threshold to demonstrate the appeal was not frivolous.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on a winery corporation that pleaded guilty to discharging material into a watercourse in violation of the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The trial judge imposed a fine of $600, invoking section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to relieve the defendant from the statutory minimum fine of $25,000.

The appeal judge increased the fine to $5,000, still below the minimum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and imposed the minimum fine of $25,000, holding that section 59(2) must be applied with appropriate restraint to avoid undermining the deterrent purpose of minimum fines in public welfare legislation.

The appellant, a leader of the Galloway Boyz gang, appealed his convictions for attempted murder and firearms offences arising from a drive-by shooting in April 2004.

The Crown conceded that warrantless wiretap evidence obtained under section 184.4 of the Criminal Code breached the appellant's section 8 Charter rights.

The sole issue was whether the intercepted communications should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The motion judge admitted the evidence, finding that exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal conducted a fresh section 24(2) analysis under the Grant framework and upheld the admission of the evidence, dismissing the appeal.

The appellants were convicted of offences arising from a residential break-in involving assault and property damage.

They appealed on four grounds: conflict of interest of trial counsel for one appellant, erroneous evidentiary rulings regarding prior inconsistent statements, reliance on inadmissible identification and hearsay evidence, and trial proceedings conducted in the absence of one appellant.

The Crown conceded all grounds of appeal and acknowledged that a miscarriage of justice occurred due to cumulative legal errors and the conflict of interest.

The appellate court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial, expressing trust that the Crown would exercise discretion to enter a stay of proceedings.