David Lepofsky

The appellant railway challenged an environmental prosecution arising from controlled burns that released dense smoke onto neighbouring properties, roads, and residences.

The appeal focused on whether Ontario's broad pollution prohibition in s. 13(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court held that, in the environmental regulatory context, broad language may be constitutionally valid where the provision provides sufficient guidance for legal debate and does not capture merely trivial or imaginary impairments.

The Court rejected the vagueness and overbreadth claims, affirmed the constitutional applicability of the provision to the federal undertaking, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, a federal undertaking, appealed a decision regarding the application of the provincial Environmental Protection Act to the maintenance of its right-of-way.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal on the first ground, holding that the provincial environmental legislation constitutionally applies to the appellant based on established precedent.

The complainant, a Seventh Day Adventist, was terminated from her employment as a laboratory technician because her religious beliefs prevented her from working a scheduled Saturday shift.

The Board of Inquiry found that both the employer and the union engaged in adverse effect discrimination on the basis of creed.

The employer failed to reasonably accommodate the complainant by not specifically offering to allow her to work on Sunday at straight time or to arrange a shift swap, and did not establish that such accommodations would cause undue hardship.

The union also failed to reasonably accommodate the complainant by refusing to agree to an exemption from the collective agreement's overtime provisions.

The respondents were ordered jointly and severally to pay damages for lost wages and interest, and to review their work rules to prevent future discrimination.

The respondents brought a motion to quash summonses issued by the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the complainant requiring the production of documents by the respondent employer.

The Board of Inquiry held that the Commission's investigative powers under the Human Rights Code do not preclude it from requesting a summons under the Statutory Powers Procedures Act.

The Board further found that the descriptions of the documents in the summonses met the test of reasonable distinctiveness and were relevant to the inquiry.

The motion to quash was dismissed, though one duplicate summons was quashed to avoid redundancy.

The applicant sought an exemption from paying union dues to OPSEU under section 53 of the Colleges Collective Bargaining Act, citing religious objections to the union's affiliation with the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL), which had passed pro-choice resolutions and made donations to a pro-choice organization.

The applicant also alleged a breach of the duty of fair representation.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that the duty of fair representation complaint did not involve representation in relation to the employer.

Regarding the religious exemption, the Board held that OPSEU's mere affiliation with the OFL and the OFL's actions were too remote to establish that the applicant objected to paying dues to OPSEU because of his religious convictions.

The appellant police officer was convicted of discreditable conduct for engaging in a secondary retail business without the consent of the Commissioner, contrary to section 61 of Regulation 791 under the Police Act.

He appealed the conviction and the penalty of forfeiture of three vacation days to the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the business was a commercial venture extending beyond a hobby, and that the Commissioner reasonably exercised his discretion to deny consent.

The Commission also rejected the appellant's argument that the prohibition violated his rights under sections 6(2) and 15 of the Charter, concluding that the limitation was reasonable and not discriminatory.

The appellant police officer was convicted of insubordination for disobeying an order to cease physical involvement in a secondary business (an outfitters store).

On appeal, the officer argued that he was merely counselled, not ordered, and challenged the authority to give such an order.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission found that the written memorandum and subsequent telephone conversation constituted a clear order to comply with the law regarding secondary employment.

The appeal was dismissed and the penalty of a reprimand was confirmed.