David Grant Boghosian

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order of Newbould J. that required them to produce Alexander Rovt for examination for discovery on behalf of Princess Gates Hotel Limited Partnership.

The appellants argued the order was final because it disposed of Mr. Rovt's right to refuse to attend as a non-party.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory as it merely determined which individual would be examined for discovery on behalf of a party to the action, and that the order obligated the appellants as defendants to produce Mr. Rovt, not Mr. Rovt himself.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The plaintiff's action for $25 million in damages was dismissed in full against all defendants.

This endorsement addresses the defendants' claims for costs.

The court found the plaintiff's principal, Mr. Lagani, engaged in blameworthy conduct, including misleading the court, intimidating witnesses, and making unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, warranting substantial indemnity costs.

The court declined to award costs against Mr. Lagani personally due to lack of jurisdiction and insufficient notice.

The court also rejected the Berczy Group's claim for equitable set-off against funds owed to the plaintiff, stating set-off cannot be used as a "sword" to proactively claim funds.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to all defendants.

The plaintiff was injured after striking a concrete curbstone on Steeles Avenue, the border between Toronto and Markham.

The plaintiff sued both municipalities, and Toronto cross-claimed against Markham.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against Markham, finding Toronto had exclusive jurisdiction over the boulevard where the curbstone originated, and ordered Toronto to pay Markham's costs via a Sanderson order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, confirming Toronto's exclusive jurisdiction and finding Markham owed no duty of care to Toronto.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, finding a Sanderson order premature since Toronto's liability to the plaintiff had not yet been determined at trial.

The defendants, William and Mary Wade, sought an extension of time to bring a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them, alleging that trees on their property obstructed visibility at an intersection where a serious motor vehicle collision occurred.

The plaintiffs, the Greens, opposed the extension.

The court dismissed the Wades' motion, finding substantial delay without satisfactory explanation, significant prejudice to the plaintiffs, and a risk of inconsistent factual findings if the summary judgment motion proceeded.

The court emphasized that the novel legal question of a private property owner's duty of care to motorists on adjacent roadways is best determined at a full trial, aligning with principles of proportionality, timeliness, and affordability.

The plaintiff sued the municipality for a slip and fall.

The municipality claimed contribution and indemnity from its winter maintenance contractor and the contractor's insurer.

The insurer appointed a single law firm to represent both the contractor and the municipality.

When the insurer later attempted to remove itself from representing the municipality, the municipality brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement for full defence and indemnity.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appointment of joint counsel necessarily implied an agreement to both defend and indemnify the municipality, as any other interpretation would have placed counsel in an untenable conflict of interest.

The plaintiff brought an unsuccessful summary judgment motion in a wrongful dismissal action.

The parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendant sought costs of $88,332.37 payable immediately, while the plaintiff argued costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

The court held that because the plaintiff was unemployed and the motion materials would be useful at trial, ordering immediate payment of significant costs would impede access to justice.

Costs of the motion were reserved to the trial judge.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the calculation of a lender's administrative fee payable to the respondent under a loan agreement.

They argued the application judge erred by not considering the mortgage itself to determine the fee amount.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that while the mortgage provided for the fee, the mortgage commitment letter correctly governed its quantum.

The application judge's reasoning was adopted, and the appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Regional Municipality of Durham appealed the dismissal of its motion requiring Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. to defend it in an automobile negligence action.

Durham was an additional insured under a policy held by its winter maintenance contractor.

The statement of claim included allegations related to the contractor's work as well as other allegations against Durham.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the insurer has an unqualified duty to defend the entire action where pleadings allege facts that trigger coverage, even if the defence furthers the defence of uncovered claims.

The insurer was ordered to provide Durham with independent counsel at its expense, subject to a potential apportionment of costs at the end of the proceedings.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a head-on collision after losing control of her vehicle on a snow-covered and slippery municipal road.

The plaintiffs sued the municipality for negligence in its winter road maintenance.

The court found that the road was in a state of non-repair due to a 'refreeze' of brine, which caused the accident.

The municipality failed to meet its own maintenance quality standards by leaving the road untreated for over three hours during a winter storm.

The court held the municipality liable for the agreed damages of $12 million and found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

A municipal councillor brought a defamation action against the mayor and several councillors arising from a public council statement and related legal opinion criticizing the councillor’s blog posts about senior municipal staff.

The court held the statements were not defamatory and were substantially true in substance, as the plaintiff’s blogs contained disparaging criticism of staff contrary to the municipal code of conduct.

Even if defamatory, the publications were protected by qualified privilege because they were a measured response to the plaintiff’s public letter to the editor and were made to correct the public record.

The court found no evidence of malice and noted the defendants relied in good faith on legal advice before publishing the statement.

The action was dismissed.

A municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence claim arising from a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by a curb stone that had moved from a grassy boulevard onto a roadway.

The dispute centered on which municipality had jurisdiction over the portion of the boulevard from which the curb stone originated.

Evidence including a survey established that the relevant land fell within the jurisdiction of another municipality that was responsible for roadway maintenance under the Municipal Act.

The court held that the moving municipality had no legal responsibility for the hazard and therefore owed no duty in respect of the curb stone.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action against the moving municipality.

Following dismissal of the main action and the third party claim, the court determined costs among the parties.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant’s costs should be reduced due to inadequate documentary production and the calling of allegedly irrelevant witnesses.

The court rejected most of these objections but applied modest deductions for fairness.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and considering the complexity of the expert engineering evidence, the court applied a 65% partial indemnity factor rather than the typical 60%.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to both the defendant and the third party.

Following an 18‑day personal injury trial and subsequent judgment, the court issued supplementary reasons addressing calculation of net past income loss damages and the costs award.

The court interpreted ss. 267.3, 267.5, and 267.8 of the Insurance Act together with s. 3 of the Negligence Act and held that statutory accident benefits deductions must be applied after apportionment of liability and contributory negligence.

After accounting for accident benefit credits and the plaintiff’s 10% contributory negligence, the municipal defendants’ liability for past income loss was fixed at $50,292.50 plus prejudgment interest.

The court also determined the scope of recoverable costs following a prior appeal that set aside the first trial, permitting recovery of preparation costs for the first trial but excluding the trial costs themselves.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded from the date following a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The plaintiff sued the defendant municipality for damages after a retaining wall on the plaintiff's property collapsed.

The plaintiff alleged the municipality negligently approved the wall's design and failed to follow a third-party engineer's recommendation to conduct a complete visual inspection.

The court dismissed the action, finding the plaintiff failed to prove the existence of an agreement that would create a duty of care regarding the wall's design.

Furthermore, the municipality's prior inspection and repair of the wall constituted a gratuitous undertaking, and there was no detrimental reliance by the plaintiff to ground liability.

The defendant municipality brought a motion seeking an order that the third-party insurer defend it against all claims made by the plaintiffs arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident during a snowstorm.

The municipality argued the claims pertained to winter maintenance, for which it was an additional insured under the contractor's policy.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiffs pleaded independent claims against the municipality, such as negligent road design, which fell outside the scope of the insurance policy.

The insurer was only required to defend the municipality with respect to claims insured for the contractor.

Multiple motions arising from five civil proceedings related to the Algo Centre Mall collapse sought transfer of a certified class action to Sault Ste.

Marie, trial together or common case management of related actions, and appointment of a single motions judge.

The court held that opt-out plaintiffs in separate proceedings lacked standing under rule 13.1.02 to seek transfer of the class action, and in any event failed to show that Sault Ste.

Marie was a significantly better venue than Toronto in the interest of justice.

The court further declined relief under s. 107(1) of the Courts of Justice Act because any transfer necessary to enable common case management or trial together would impose substantial cost and inefficiency, particularly given the existing class action case management structure.

Appointment of a rule 37.15 judge was also refused.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court judgment dismissing their application for a refund of $13,000 plus interest.

The respondent argued the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal agreed and quashed the appeal, holding that under s. 19(1.2)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal from a final order dismissing a claim for less than $50,000 lies to the Divisional Court.

Following a new trial ordered after settlement with some defendants, the court considered municipal highway non-repair liability arising from a winter collision on a snow-covered S-curve involving a passenger vehicle and a propane truck.

Applying s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001, the court held the roadway at Rankins Corner was in a state of non-repair and that the municipality failed to take reasonable steps to address a known winter maintenance hot spot.

The court also found negligence in the truck driver’s operation and contributory negligence by the injured driver, apportioning fault 60% to the municipal defendants, 30% to the truck defendants, and 10% to the injured driver.

Damages were assessed at $300,000 general damages, $130,000 under the Family Law Act, $408,886 in future care excluding attendant care, $2,000,000 in future attendant care, $300,000 past income loss subject to IRB credit, and $1,260,000 future income loss.

Borrowers brought an application seeking a declaration that a lender’s $19,000 administrative fee charged under a mortgage commitment letter contravened the contract because only one draw of $150,000 had been advanced rather than the full $475,000 facility.

The applicants argued the fee should have been limited to 4% of the funds actually advanced.

The court held that the mortgage commitment letter unambiguously established a fixed administrative fee payable for the loan facility, not a percentage tied to individual advances.

Interpreting the contract according to its plain wording, the court rejected reliance on subjective understanding or subsequent documents.

The application was dismissed and the lender was awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs purchased lots in an industrial subdivision and sued the municipality for negligent misrepresentation, alleging they relied on a letter from the building director indicating building permits would be available.

The plaintiffs claimed the letter failed to disclose that the Ministry of the Environment required a section 45 approval before permits could issue.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the letter was not misleading and that the plaintiffs failed to read the subdivision agreement, which explicitly stated the requirement for environmental approval.

The court also held that the action was statute-barred as the plaintiffs ought to have discovered the material facts more than six years before commencing the lawsuit.