David Grant Boghosian

The infant plaintiff suffered significant injuries after falling from a balcony.

The plaintiffs moved to extend the time to set the action down for trial, and the defendant cross-moved to bifurcate the trial on liability and damages.

The Master granted the bifurcation over the plaintiffs' objections, which was upheld by the Superior Court and Divisional Court on the basis that the court retained inherent jurisdiction to bifurcate non-jury trials without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiffs' appeal, holding that Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure clearly requires the consent of the parties to bifurcate any proceeding, whether jury or non-jury, thereby ousting the court's inherent jurisdiction to do so without consent.

The plaintiff developer built stacked townhouses and applied for a condominium exemption under the Condominium Act to bypass Planning Act requirements.

The City granted the exemption but imposed a condition prohibiting the units from being used as boarding or rooming houses.

The developer sued, arguing the City lacked authority to impose conditions and challenging barrier-free accessibility requirements.

The motion judge struck the condition but upheld the accessibility requirements.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the City had broad authority under the Condominium Act and Municipal Act to impose conditions on exemption approvals to protect health and safety.

The developer's cross-appeal regarding accessibility requirements was dismissed as moot.

The applicants, Laridae Communications Inc. and Family and Children's Services of Lanark, Leeds and Grenville (FCS), brought applications seeking declarations that Co-operators General Insurance Company owed them a duty to defend in a third-party claim and a class proceeding, respectively, arising from a data breach.

Co-operators denied coverage based on "data exclusion" clauses in the insurance policies.

Co-operators also brought an application denying a duty to defend Laridae.

The court found that Co-operators failed to discharge its onus to prove the claims clearly fell within the exclusion clauses and that there was no possibility of coverage.

The court granted the applications of Laridae and FCS, declaring a duty to defend, and dismissed Co-operators' application.

The plaintiffs sought prejudgment interest and costs following a third trial in a long-running personal injury action.

The court granted prejudgment interest on pecuniary damages from the date of the second trial's damage assessment (February 6, 2015) to the third trial's judgment (February 6, 2020), rejecting the Municipal Defendants' arguments for a lower rate or no interest on future losses.

For costs, the court fixed an award of $778,900 (fees, HST, disbursements) for the plaintiffs, excluding costs related to the first trial preparation and accident benefits claims, and denying interest on disbursements.

The court emphasized reasonableness and proportionality, declining to apply Rule 49.10(1) enhancements despite favorable offers from the plaintiffs.

This appeal concerns a dispute between two insurers, AIG Insurance Company of Canada and Lloyd's Underwriters, regarding their respective duties to defend the City of Markham in a personal injury action.

The application judge had found AIG solely responsible for the defence and denied AIG the right to participate in the defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that both AIG and Lloyd's had a concurrent duty to defend the City, and must share defence costs equally, subject to reallocation at the conclusion of the action.

Furthermore, the Court found that AIG has a right to participate in the defence, including retaining and instructing counsel, provided a "split file" protocol with additional safeguards is implemented to manage potential conflicts of interest.

The plaintiffs, former boarding students of Grenville Christian College, brought a class action against the school and the estates of its former headmasters for systemic negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court found that the school operated as a 'total institution' and employed abusive, arbitrary, and humiliating disciplinary practices, including excessive corporal punishment and public shaming, which fell below the standard of care for educational institutions in Ontario.

The court concluded that the defendants breached their duty of care and fiduciary obligations to the students, and that their conduct merited an award of punitive damages.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff had previously sued the defendants for breach of contract through his corporation, which was dismissed on summary judgment and upheld on appeal.

The court found that the defamation action was an attempt to relitigate the same material facts and issues decided in the prior action.

Applying the doctrine of issue estoppel, the court granted the motion and dismissed the action, awarding costs to the defendants.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a head-on collision with a propane tanker on a snow-covered municipal road.

The plaintiffs sued the driver of the tanker and the municipalities responsible for winter road maintenance.

The court found that the road was in a state of non-repair that contributed to the accident, and the municipality failed to prove it took reasonable steps to maintain the road.

Liability was apportioned 50% to the municipal defendants, 33% to the tanker driver, and 17% to the plaintiff for contributory negligence.

This costs endorsement followed a trial where claims of negligence against a regional municipality were dismissed, along with related Family Law Act claims and a cross-claim.

The successful municipality sought partial indemnity costs.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01, including the complexity, importance, and length of the 23-day trial, as well as the conduct of counsel and the financial circumstances of the unsuccessful plaintiffs.

The court found the municipality's requested costs somewhat high and the opposing parties' proposals somewhat low.

A total partial indemnity costs award of $365,000.00 (inclusive of fees and disbursements) was made in favor of the municipality, apportioned 65% to the plaintiffs and 35% to the co-defendant, whose interests were largely aligned with the plaintiffs due to a Mary Carter agreement.

The City of Markham brought an application seeking a declaration that AIG had a duty to defend it in an underlying personal injury action, and that the City was entitled to appoint independent counsel at AIG's expense due to a conflict of interest.

AIG conceded the duty to defend but disputed the right to independent counsel, pre-tender costs, and argued Lloyd's should share defence costs.

The court found a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest, entitling the City to independent counsel.

The court denied pre-tender costs based on policy wording and held AIG responsible for all defence costs, including uncovered claims, subject to a right of reimbursement from Lloyd's.

The City of Markham brought an application seeking a declaration that AIG had a duty to defend it in an underlying personal injury action, and that the City was entitled to appoint independent counsel at AIG's expense due to a conflict of interest.

AIG conceded the duty to defend but disputed the right to independent counsel, pre-tender costs, and argued Lloyd's should share defence costs.

The court found a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest, entitling the City to independent counsel.

The court denied pre-tender costs based on policy wording and held AIG responsible for all defence costs, including uncovered claims, subject to a right of reimbursement from Lloyd's.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment seeking declarations of share ownership, directorship, invalidity of mortgages, and financial disclosure in a dispute over the sale of a hotel.

The defendants opposed, arguing a trial was necessary due to significant credibility issues and the inappropriateness of partial summary judgment, and also brought their own cross-motion for summary judgment.

The court dismissed both motions for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning witness credibility and the inability to readily bifurcate liability from remedy without risking inefficient duplication or inconsistent findings.

The infant plaintiff suffered a severe head injury after falling from a balcony.

The plaintiffs sought to extend the time to set the action down for a non-jury trial to assess damages, while the defendant cross-moved to bifurcate the trial on liability and damages.

The master granted the bifurcation over the plaintiffs' objections, and the decision was upheld on appeal.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Divisional Court, arguing that Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit bifurcation of a non-jury trial without consent.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Rule 6.1.01 did not abolish the court's inherent jurisdiction to bifurcate non-jury trials in exceptional cases without consent.

This decision addresses two evidentiary motions brought at the commencement of the third trial in a motor vehicle accident case.

The defendant municipalities sought leave to call an additional expert witness despite non-compliance with a court-ordered deadline and to admit an excerpt from "The Driver's Handbook" as filed evidence.

The court granted leave for the expert to testify, balancing the need for court orders to have "teeth" against the interests of justice and the opposing party's ability to respond without undue delay.

However, the court dismissed the motion to admit the handbook excerpt directly, suggesting it could be introduced through expert testimony instead.

The plaintiff was catastrophically injured in a single motor vehicle collision when the vehicle, driven by the defendant driver, lost control after traversing a dip in a rural road.

The plaintiff sued the driver and the municipality, alleging the road was in a state of non-repair.

The plaintiff and the driver entered into a Mary Carter agreement and jointly pursued the municipality for liability.

The court found that the dip in the road did not constitute a state of non-repair, as it did not pose an unreasonable risk to an ordinary reasonable driver.

The court concluded the collision was caused by the driver's excessive speed and distraction from opening a beverage bottle.

The action against the municipality was dismissed.

Following a 16-day jury trial where the plaintiff's claim against the police defendants was dismissed, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $296,602.70 based on an offer to settle and allegations of intentional torts against an officer.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the offer did not trigger such consequences and the allegations did not warrant them.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $127,000 all-inclusive, after deductions for travel time and a second counsel.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court decision.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and relevant taxes.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing its claim against the City of Markham and Markham Public Library.

The trial judge found that the operative contract terms permitted the respondents to terminate the agreement without cause on 30 days' notice, and that the respondents exercised this right in good faith.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's contractual interpretation or factual findings and dismissed the appeal.

The court also rejected allegations of procedural unfairness and declined to grant leave to appeal the costs order.

The appellant sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing its appeal for delay.

The respondent City consented to setting aside the dismissal but sought security for costs as a condition.

The appellant opposed the security for costs order, arguing it was impecunious and that the appeal had merit.

The court considered whether the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, whether the appellant was impecunious, and the merits of the appeal.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious, the appellant was impecunious, and while the appeal had little chance of success, ordering security for costs would effectively prevent the appeal from proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion for security for costs and set aside the Registrar's dismissal.

The applicants, two municipalities, sought a declaration entitling them to appoint their own counsel and manage their defence in a main action at the expense of the respondent insurers.

The municipalities argued a clear conflict of interest existed because the insurers were also defending contractors (Miller and Langley) against whom the municipalities had alleged negligence and sought indemnification.

The court found an irremediable conflict of interest, as the insurers' pecuniary interests in limiting the contractors' liability directly conflicted with the municipalities' defence strategy.

The application was granted, allowing the municipalities to appoint independent counsel at the insurers' expense and be reimbursed for past defence costs, with reporting limited to settlement issues of covered claims.