W. Danial Newton

The applicant sought leave to extend the time to appeal an order that dismissed his motion for leave to appeal a trial costs decision.

The central issue was whether the motion judge applied the wrong legal test by finding no strong grounds that the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion regarding a last-minute offer to settle.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge applied the correct legal test and confirmed that no strong grounds existed.

The motion for leave to extend the time to appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his status as an involuntary psychiatric patient under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider his mobility issues when assessing his risk of harm to others and erred by refusing to make comments regarding his long-term detention.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, supported by evidence of recent assaults, and that the Board was not required to make comments on the conditions of detention.

The accused applied for judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code while charged with second-degree murder.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds, arguing detention was necessary for public safety and to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The court considered Gladue factors relating to the accused’s Indigenous background, including residential school impacts, foster care history, and substance abuse issues, and reviewed a proposed surety plan involving the accused residing with his grandmother in a remote First Nation community.

Despite acknowledging the suitability of the proposed surety and the presence of Gladue factors, the court found that the accused’s extensive history of violent offences and repeated breaches of court orders created a substantial likelihood of further offending if released.

Detention was therefore ordered on the secondary ground.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained after police conducted a warrantless entry into their apartment while investigating suspected animal cruelty.

Officers forcibly entered despite the occupant repeatedly demanding a warrant and despite the absence of ongoing sounds indicating distress.

The court held that exigent circumstances did not exist and that the Crown failed to justify the warrantless search under s. 8 of the Charter.

Statements made by one accused prior to entry were admissible, but statements by the other accused obtained while she was effectively detained without being advised of her right to counsel violated s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the dog, the presence evidence, and the improperly obtained statement.

The accused applied under s. 520 of the Criminal Code to review a detention order made on the secondary ground that his release would pose a substantial likelihood of further offences.

The defence argued there was a material change in circumstances because the proposed surety, the accused’s grandfather, testified at the review hearing although he had not testified at the original bail hearing.

The court found no error in principle in the justice of the peace’s decision and held that the evidence did not establish a material change in circumstances.

Given the accused’s extensive criminal record and repeated breaches of release conditions, the court concluded there remained a substantial likelihood of reoffending if released.

The applicant sought temporary spousal support following the breakdown of a 14.5-year marriage.

The applicant had retired shortly after separation, while the respondent was on long-term disability.

The court found that decisions regarding retirement made during the marriage triggered entitlement to spousal support.

The court ordered the respondent to pay temporary spousal support of $342 per month, set at the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines to reflect the applicant's obligation to become self-supporting.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a declaration that email communications between counsel constituted a binding settlement agreement resolving a dispute over a $300,000 advance.

The defendants argued the communications reflected only a framework for a potential agreement and that essential terms, including security requiring bank consent, remained unresolved.

Applying the principles governing contract formation and settlement agreements, the court held that the language used in the emails and the need for third‑party consent indicated no final agreement had been reached.

The court also relied on the parties’ subsequent conduct, including continued pleadings, as evidence that neither side considered themselves bound.

In a family trial between unmarried parents, the court awarded sole custody to the mother and continued a structured access regime for the father after finding the mother had been the primary caregiver and that the parties' communication difficulties made joint custody inappropriate.

Applying the best interests analysis under s. 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court emphasized the children's stability and the father's comparatively limited independent parenting role.

On child support, the court averaged the father's seasonal employment income and imputed one half of his non-taxable monthly structured settlement annuity as income because the evidence showed the annuity was used for ordinary living expenses rather than ongoing accident-related care.

Child support was fixed at $693 per month, with s. 7 expenses apportioned 82.5% to the father and 17.5% to the mother.

The applicant, a not-for-profit corporation providing short-term accommodation and transportation to First Nations individuals accessing medical services, sought an exemption from municipal taxation under s 3(1)-12 of the Assessment Act.

The applicant argued it was organized for the relief of the poor because its clients are overwhelmingly poor.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's primary purpose was to address problems of geography and access to medical services, not the relief of poverty.

The mother brought a motion to extend the time to perfect her appeal from a crown wardship order.

The underlying issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in making the child a crown ward instead of approving a customary care agreement supported by the mother, the First Nation, and the children's aid society.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed the extension.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal, finding the mother had a firm intention to appeal, reasonably explained the delay due to health issues, and raised important issues regarding customary care agreements.

The motion was granted, allowing 90 days to perfect the appeal.

The applicant father sought unsupervised access to his five children and a reduction in child support arrears.

The respondent mother sought continued supervised access and payment of child support arrears.

The court found that due to a history of domestic violence and the children's reluctance to attend access visits, immediate unsupervised access was not in their best interests.

The court ordered continued supervised access with a transition plan involving individual and family counseling.

On the issue of child support, the court calculated arrears based on an interim order but reduced the outstanding amount by half to reflect the father's actual income, fixing the remaining arrears at $7,773.42.

On a status hearing motion under Rule 48.14, the moving defendants sought dismissal of a commercial misrepresentation action for delay.

The court held that the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay, including difficulties arising from prior counsel's solicitor's lien and file transfer, and that the alleged prejudice was either attributable to the existence of the claim itself or too speculative to justify dismissal.

Balancing the plaintiff's right to a determination on the merits against the defendants' interest in timely litigation, the court declined to dismiss the action.

The parties were ordered to file an agreed timetable or return to the case management judge.

The defendant moved to strike the claim based on repeated failure to comply with discovery undertakings and prior consent costs orders.

The court held that striking a claim is a last resort reserved for abusive non-compliance that threatens the integrity of the justice system.

Although the delay was inexcusable and the motion was necessary to prompt compliance, the defendant failed to establish actual or potential prejudice amounting to a substantial risk that a fair trial would not be possible.

The motion to strike was dismissed, but motion costs were awarded to the moving party.

On a motion to temporarily vary a final family order, the applicant mother sought increased child support, contribution to special and extraordinary expenses, continuation of employment health coverage for the child, and designation of the child as beneficiary of the respondent father's life insurance.

The court accepted the father's projected annual income from his paystub evidence after declining to admit late responding financial documentation contrary to an earlier production order.

Temporary child support was increased retroactive to December 1, 2014, special expenses were apportioned by income, and orders were made respecting health benefits and life insurance coverage.

The court also awarded the mother costs, finding the motion was necessitated by the father's inadequate financial disclosure.

On a family law motion to change, the respondent mother sought to vary a final order respecting access, child support, and spousal support arrears after the applicant father's employment circumstances materially improved.

The court amended access to reflect the father's out-of-town rotating work schedule, recalculated retroactive and ongoing child support based on actual and projected income, and rejected any shared-custody offset because the father did not meet the 40 percent threshold.

The court also apportioned unpaid section 7 expenses according to the parties' incomes and reactivated enforcement of spousal support arrears.

Costs were awarded against the father because his failure to comply with disclosure obligations made the motion necessary.

On a family law motion, the responding party sought to strike the applicant's amended application for non-compliance with a prior disclosure order, failure to file an affidavit listing documents, and failure to pay prior costs.

The court declined to strike the pleading immediately, but ordered full compliance with the earlier disclosure order by a fixed deadline and authorized a future motion to strike upon default.

The applicant's separate production motion was adjourned.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the moving party in the amount of $1,250 plus HST, payable after disposition of the adjourned production motion.

On a family law motion, the applicant sought to strike the respondent's answer for non-compliance with a prior disclosure order, amend her application to add a constructive trust claim against the respondent's pension, and obtain costs.

The amendment was granted on consent, and the disclosure issue became moot when an appraisal report was finally produced before the hearing.

The court held that a party cannot unilaterally decide that court-ordered valuation evidence is unnecessary, and found that the delay caused unnecessary expense and slowed the proceeding.

Costs of the motion were fixed in favour of the applicant.