Cynthia Petersen

The parties separated after a 30-year relationship and have two adult children: one in university and one with a profound developmental disability.

The court determined the parties' respective incomes for child support purposes, imputing corporate pre-tax income and personal expenses to the respondent father.

The court applied a budgetary approach under s. 3(2)(b) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines to determine child support for the disabled adult child, factoring in his ODSP benefits.

The court also resolved disputes over the control of the children's RESP and RDSP accounts, retrospective and prospective section 7 expenses, and the applicant mother's request for a restraining order and communication protocol, which were dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion for enforcement of a settlement agreement regarding retroactive child support and sought partial summary judgment.

The applicant opposed, arguing the absence of an enforceable settlement or grounds for setting it aside due to non-disclosure or unfairness.

The court found that an enforceable domestic contract existed, despite formal deficiencies, and that the terms were reasonable and the negotiation fair.

The motion for partial summary judgment for $150,000 in retroactive child support plus pre-judgment interest was granted, while the respondent's claims for payment from a family trust and compensation for mortgage expenses were dismissed.

The court emphasized that partial summary judgment was appropriate given the discrete nature of the settled issue.

The respondent brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the applicant's second Motion to Change a final child support order.

The applicant sought to reduce child support and rescind arrears, arguing a material change in circumstances and new evidence.

The court found no new evidence that was not available at the original trial and no material change in circumstances, as the applicant remained intentionally unemployed.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the applicant's Motion to Change, and ordered her to pay all outstanding costs and obtain leave before any further proceedings related to child support due to persistent non-compliance with court orders.

The parties, former spouses and equal partners in two farming businesses, brought cross-motions for interim relief.

The Applicant sought dissolution of the partnership, winding up of the corporation, bifurcation of the trial, and sale of a jointly owned property.

The Respondent sought orders related to financial management, access to business records and accounts, and remedies for alleged oppression and breach of fiduciary duty by the Applicant.

The court dismissed all of the Applicant's motions, finding them premature or inappropriate for interim relief.

The court granted significant portions of the Respondent's motion, finding that the Applicant had engaged in conduct that unfairly disregarded his interests and breached her fiduciary duties, particularly concerning financial transparency and transactions with family members.

Temporary orders were issued to ensure the Respondent's access to financial information and to restrict the Applicant's unilateral financial decisions, especially those involving family.

The appellant, convicted of impaired driving (over 80 mg BAC), appealed his conviction and sentence.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's failure to ensure a fair trial due to late disclosure of crucial evidence (a second 911 call) by the Crown.

The appellant, self-represented, based his defence on the non-existence of this second call.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by not correcting the appellant's misunderstanding about the admissibility of late-disclosed evidence and by not granting an adjournment to allow the appellant to adjust his defence strategy.

This error compromised trial fairness, warranting a new trial.

The appellant's request for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay in sentencing was denied, as the net delay fell within the presumptive ceiling after accounting for delay caused by the appellant's other appeal.

The defendant, Adnan Alex Refaeh, was convicted by a jury of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident where bodily harm was caused.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of 30-36 months, while the Defence requested a conditional sentence or a short intermittent jail term.

The court found that Refaeh engaged in a prolonged high-speed street race, which was particularly dangerous given the urban setting, and that his subsequent actions were aimed at evading criminal liability, not driven by fear.

The victim, a 13-year-old at the time, suffered serious, long-lasting injuries.

Considering aggravating factors such as the prolonged street race, prior driving infractions, and post-offence cover-up attempts, alongside mitigating factors like youth, lack of prior criminal record, and remorse, the court rejected a conditional sentence.

A global sentence of 15 months imprisonment was imposed (12 months for dangerous driving causing bodily harm, 3 months consecutive for failing to remain), along with a 3-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing that the Crown's decision to proceed by direct indictment, bypassing a preliminary inquiry, constituted an abuse of process.

The applicant, a French speaker, contended that this decision was necessitated by the provincial court's inability to schedule a French preliminary inquiry within a reasonable timeframe, thereby violating his linguistic rights under the Criminal Code.

The court found that while there is no absolute right to a preliminary inquiry, the applicant was deprived of its ancillary benefits due to his choice to be tried in French, which constituted a systemic violation of his right to equal access to justice in his language.

The court concluded that this systemic issue amounted to an abuse of process, warranting a stay of proceedings.

This decision addresses the costs of a decade-long family law proceeding.

The Respondent, M.M., sought full recovery of costs, alleging the Applicant, K.K., acted in bad faith.

The court found K.K. engaged in egregious bad faith conduct, including concealing financial information, presenting fabricated evidence, manipulating third parties, and repeatedly breaching court orders to inflict emotional, psychological, and financial harm on M.M. and alienate the children.

Consequently, the court awarded M.M. full recovery of trial-related costs and certain pre-trial costs, totaling $211,441, and stayed the enforcement of previous costs orders against M.M. due to K.K.'s oppressive conduct.

This decision addresses the burden of proof for the statutory defence of "reasonable excuse" under s.320.16 of the Criminal Code, following a jury conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failure to stop after an accident.

The Crown argued the accused bore the persuasive burden, while the defence contended it was merely an evidential burden, with the Crown bearing the ultimate persuasive burden.

The court ruled that the Crown bears the ultimate persuasive burden of disproving the existence of a reasonable excuse beyond a reasonable doubt, finding that Parliament intended to remove the reverse onus with the repeal of s.794(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order placing her two young children in the extended care of the respondent children's aid society.

She argued the motion judge erred by denying her request for an adjournment, relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence, and misapplying statutory time limits under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly prioritized the children's best interests and statutory timelines over the mother's late request for an adjournment, and made no reversible evidentiary errors.

During a jury trial for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, the Crown brought a mid-trial application to determine the voluntariness of the accused's statement to police.

The defence argued the interviewing officer made implied threats or inducements that undermined the accused's right to silence.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that while the officer's comments implied a subtle quid pro quo, they were not strong enough to overbear the accused's will.

The court concluded the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The offender was convicted by a jury of three counts of sexual assault against two female colleagues in their workplace.

The offences involved unwanted sexual touching, including grabbing the victims' breasts and buttocks, and grinding against one victim.

The court found the offences were aggravated by the workplace setting, the multiplicity of incidents, and the offender's exploitation of his managerial position.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of 6 months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively for each count, followed by 18 months' probation and ancillary orders.

The defendant, Clyde Williams, was convicted of assault, two counts of sexual assault, and sexual exploitation.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as abuse of trust (as a Senior Pastor), grooming, victim vulnerability (minor and employee), duration and repetition of offences, and the profound harm caused to the victims (M.M. and D.D.).

Mitigating factors included his unblemished record and potential for rehabilitation, though tempered by his lack of remorse and denial of culpability.

The court applied sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and totality, ultimately imposing a global sentence of 8 years imprisonment, with specific terms for each offence.

This criminal trial concerned the identity of the individual who fatally stabbed the victim during a group assault following a drug theft.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, as no direct evidence of the stabbing was presented.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility of several youth witnesses, particularly regarding their observations of the accused's possession of a knife before and after the incident, and alleged adoptive admissions.

The judge found significant inconsistencies and unreliability in key witness testimonies, and determined that the circumstantial evidence did not establish the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted.

The applicant union sought judicial review of four Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions that required it to enter into a collective agreement with the respondent employer following a final offer vote under s. 42(1) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The union had refused to sign the agreement, arguing it would break a pattern agreement applicable to the non-ICI construction sector.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decisions unreasonable, holding that the Act does not require a union to object to a final offer vote at the outset, and that the Board unreasonably excluded the existence of a pattern agreement as a justification for refusing to sign.

The application was allowed and the matter remitted to a different panel of the Board.

The applicant father initiated a parenting review seeking joint parental decision-making, week-about equal parenting time for their 13-year-old son J.K., J.K.'s enrollment in a Brampton high school, international travel permission, and modification of a restraining order.

The respondent mother opposed these requests, seeking to preserve her exclusive decision-making authority, maintain the current parenting schedule, and enroll J.K. in a Toronto school.

The court, conducting a fresh inquiry into J.K.'s best interests under the Divorce Act, found the father had made efforts to address past family violence and parental alienation but still exhibited problematic behaviors undermining the mother's parenting.

The court increased the father's parenting time incrementally but denied his request for joint decision-making and J.K.'s transfer to a Brampton school, citing the need for stability and the mother's demonstrated child-focused decision-making.

Travel restrictions were partially lifted for the father (within Ontario) and fully for the mother.

Criminal trial arising from allegations that a church pastor assaulted one complainant in a parking lot, sexually assaulted another adult congregant over several years, sexually exploited a younger congregant while she was 16 and 17, and sexually assaulted her by digital penetration on her 18th birthday.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework, rejected the accused’s evidence as disingenuous and unreliable, and accepted the complainants’ evidence in its material respects, including evidence of spiritual manipulation, grooming, controlling communications, and admissions made during a recorded confrontation.

The court held that implied consent had no application to a purported deliverance-based physical restraint, and found beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainants did not consent and that the accused knew of their non-consent.

Findings of guilt were entered on all counts.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order requiring him to pay rent arrears for a basement unit.

He argued the Residential Tenancies Act did not apply because the lease was part of a larger commercial transaction and he never lived in the unit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's application of s. 202(1) of the Act to ascertain the real substance of the transaction.

The court noted the appellant voluntarily entered into a residential lease to avoid paying HST and could not resile from it when convenient.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 20, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $2,500.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of RSJ Ricchetti dated January 17, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the defendant in the amount of $7,500.