Cynthia Petersen

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order placing her two young children in the extended care of the respondent children's aid society.

She argued the motion judge erred by denying her request for an adjournment, relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence, and misapplying statutory time limits under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly prioritized the children's best interests and statutory timelines over the mother's late request for an adjournment, and made no reversible evidentiary errors.

During a jury trial for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to stop at the scene of an accident, the Crown brought a mid-trial application to determine the voluntariness of the accused's statement to police.

The defence argued the interviewing officer made implied threats or inducements that undermined the accused's right to silence.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that while the officer's comments implied a subtle quid pro quo, they were not strong enough to overbear the accused's will.

The court concluded the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The defendant, Clyde Williams, was convicted of assault, two counts of sexual assault, and sexual exploitation.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as abuse of trust (as a Senior Pastor), grooming, victim vulnerability (minor and employee), duration and repetition of offences, and the profound harm caused to the victims (M.M. and D.D.).

Mitigating factors included his unblemished record and potential for rehabilitation, though tempered by his lack of remorse and denial of culpability.

The court applied sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and totality, ultimately imposing a global sentence of 8 years imprisonment, with specific terms for each offence.

This criminal trial concerned the identity of the individual who fatally stabbed the victim during a group assault following a drug theft.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, as no direct evidence of the stabbing was presented.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility of several youth witnesses, particularly regarding their observations of the accused's possession of a knife before and after the incident, and alleged adoptive admissions.

The judge found significant inconsistencies and unreliability in key witness testimonies, and determined that the circumstantial evidence did not establish the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted.

The applicant father initiated a parenting review seeking joint parental decision-making, week-about equal parenting time for their 13-year-old son J.K., J.K.'s enrollment in a Brampton high school, international travel permission, and modification of a restraining order.

The respondent mother opposed these requests, seeking to preserve her exclusive decision-making authority, maintain the current parenting schedule, and enroll J.K. in a Toronto school.

The court, conducting a fresh inquiry into J.K.'s best interests under the Divorce Act, found the father had made efforts to address past family violence and parental alienation but still exhibited problematic behaviors undermining the mother's parenting.

The court increased the father's parenting time incrementally but denied his request for joint decision-making and J.K.'s transfer to a Brampton school, citing the need for stability and the mother's demonstrated child-focused decision-making.

Travel restrictions were partially lifted for the father (within Ontario) and fully for the mother.

The accused, convicted of possession of 7.038 kg of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the large quantity of heroin and the accused's association with organized crime, and mitigating factors, such as his non-profit motive, pro-social conduct, and genuine remorse.

The court rejected the Crown's request for a 16-year sentence and the forfeiture of $10,500, finding the latter not proven to be proceeds of crime.

A 10-year weapons prohibition and a $200 victim surcharge were also imposed.

Le requérant, reconnu coupable de possession d'héroïne en vue d'en faire le trafic, a contesté la validité constitutionnelle du paragraphe 5(2) de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances.

Il alléguait que la disposition violait les articles 7 et 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés en criminalisant les « bons samaritains » qui tentent de fournir un approvisionnement sécuritaire aux toxicomanes.

La Cour a rejeté la requête, concluant que la loi ne crée pas de discrimination fondée sur la dépendance et que l'atteinte au droit à la liberté n'est ni d'une portée excessive ni totalement disproportionnée par rapport aux objectifs de santé et de sécurité publiques de l'État.

Patrick Doyle was convicted by a jury of manslaughter and first-degree murder.

The court's task was to sentence him for these offences.

For first-degree murder, a mandatory life sentence with no parole eligibility for 25 years was imposed.

For manslaughter, the Crown sought 10 years, and the Defence sought 5 years.

The court imposed an 8-year concurrent sentence, considering the gravity of the offence, the degree of the offender's responsibility, and aggravating factors such as a lengthy criminal record and firearms prohibition.

The court also considered mitigating collateral consequences of harsh pre-sentence detention conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic, applying a "Duncan credit" as a factor in determining the fit sentence, and a "Summers credit" for time served.

The accused, Suhaib Mustafa, was charged with three counts of possessing and three counts of importing altered Mexican passports in order to contravene the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

The passports were found concealed in his luggage upon entry to Canada.

The court clarified that knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the passports is not an essential element of the offence under s.122(1) of the IRPA, but rather the intent to contravene the Act.

Relying solely on circumstantial evidence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Mustafa possessed and imported the passports with the specific intent to contravene the IRPA, as other reasonable inferences inconsistent with guilt could be drawn from the evidence.

The court found significant gaps in the Crown's investigation.

Consequently, Mr. Mustafa was found not guilty on all counts.

The parties separated after a 12.5-year marriage.

The applicant father sought shared parenting, sole decision-making responsibility, and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent mother sought sole decision-making, exclusive possession of the home, and various financial claims.

The court ordered the immediate sale of the matrimonial home and granted the applicant sole decision-making responsibility due to the respondent's alienating conduct.

The court ordered an equal shared parenting schedule.

The court also resolved complex financial issues, including equalization of net family properties, post-separation adjustments, occupation rent, and retrospective and prospective child and spousal support.

The applicant was ordered to pay a net amount of $3,100 to the respondent after offsetting all financial claims.

The defendant, John Hogan, brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff, Halton Electric Co. Limited, in a construction lien action.

Hogan argued procedural irregularity due to a faxed Notice of Intent to Defend going astray, and also sought discretionary relief.

The court found no procedural irregularity but exercised its discretion to set aside the default judgment, finding a plausible excuse for the default, an arguable defence on the merits (particularly regarding personal liability under s. 13(1) of the Construction Lien Act), and no significant prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court declined to impose conditions for setting aside the judgment.

The parties brought urgent motions regarding an interim parenting schedule for their two-year-old daughter, MV, due to police involvement in exchanges and mutual withholding of access.

The court dismissed non-urgent issues and focused on the interim parenting plan.

The court found no consistent status quo parenting arrangement and rejected the applicant's claims of the respondent's threatening behavior and safety concerns.

The court criticized both parties for inappropriate withholding of the child, particularly the applicant for prolonged denial of access.

Applying the best interests of the child and the maximum contact principle, the court ordered a graduated increase in the respondent's parenting time, including overnights, equal sharing of exchanges, mutual right of first refusal, and specific make-up time for the respondent.

The applicant's request for a police enforcement order was denied.

The plaintiffs sued two law firms and their lawyers for professional negligence related to a commercial asset sale and subsequent arbitration.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions to dismiss the claims.

The court dismissed both motions, finding genuine issues requiring a trial against the FLPC Defendants and deeming partial summary judgment inadvisable for the SWL Defendants due to the risk of inconsistent findings and the central role of credibility issues.

The father (D.R.) and paternal grandmother (C.L.) appealed a trial judge's decision regarding access to the children (K.R., S.R., C.R.) who were in the extended care of Family and Children’s Services of Guelph and Wellington Country (F&CS).

The trial judge had barred access for the father to two daughters, granted limited access to the son, and granted limited supervised access to the grandmother, making the children the access holders.

The appellants sought more liberal access, reunification therapy, and a stay of adoption proceedings.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the children remained in need of protection due to emotional harm risks, primarily from the paternal family's denial of sexual abuse allegations and lack of support for the children's trauma stories.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or legal principles, including the refusal to order reunification therapy without the children's consent and a detailed therapeutic plan.

The three accused, charged with conspiracy to import cocaine and breach of trust, brought applications under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude intercepted private communications.

They alleged their s. 8 rights were violated because the police affiant deliberately misled the authorizing judge regarding the investigative plan to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the wiretap.

The court found the affidavit was materially misleading, though not deliberately so, and that without the misleading information, the authorization lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court concluded the wiretap violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the serious police carelessness and subsequent false testimony by the affiant outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The applicant, Indira Sampath, and respondent, Sandra Deopersad, brought motions concerning the distribution of net refinancing proceeds from a residential property.

Equitable title to the property was held 60% by Sampath and 40% by Sirju Deopersad (Sandra's ex-spouse).

Sandra Deopersad sought to apply Sirju's 40% share to his outstanding judgment debt to her.

Sampath's cross-motion sought reimbursement from Sirju for his share of carrying costs based on unjust enrichment.

The court granted Sandra Deopersad's motion, calculating Sirju's net share after specific transactional cost deductions, and dismissed Sampath's cross-motion, finding that her unjust enrichment claim was not properly pleaded and could not take priority over Sandra Deopersad's judgment enforcement.

The accused, J.E., brought an application under s.638(1)(f) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause on linguistic competence.

J.E. had previously obtained a s.530(1) order for an English trial, despite English being the predominant official language in the trial region (Brampton).

The Crown opposed the application.

The court denied the application, holding that a s.530 order does not automatically mandate a linguistic competence challenge for cause under s.638(1)(f) without an "air of reality" demonstrating a genuine need.

The court found no such air of reality, emphasizing that the standard jury screening process is sufficient in this context and that the s.530 order was not animated by a genuine language rights concern.

The plaintiff's former solicitors, Lofranco Corriero, brought a motion for a solicitor's charging order under s.34 of the Solicitors Act, seeking a first charge on monies (damages and costs) awarded to the plaintiff at trial, in priority to the defendants' right of set-off for their own costs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that no property or fund existed upon which a charge could be imposed.

The trial judge's final order, after applying statutory deductibles, credits, and Rule 49 cost consequences, resulted in a net payment from the plaintiff to the defendants.

The court emphasized that a solicitor's efforts must result in a net benefit or recovery of property for a charging order to be granted, and that severing the trial judge's order to create a fund would undermine the purpose of Rule 49.10.

The plaintiff, Kathleen Anne Cruikshank, on behalf of the Estate of Ross Gerrard Cruikshank, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for the alleged non-repayment of private loans by the defendants, Randy Kennedy and VLC Global Ministries.

The defendants sought dismissal of the plaintiff's motion and summary judgment in their favour.

The court found that the Consolidated Loan was fully repaid through a combination of cash, cheques, and "contra agreements" for services and housing.

For the Second Loan, the court found the plaintiff's evidence unreliable and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the defendant's credible testimony, concluding that the plaintiff failed to prove outstanding debt.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's motion and action.

Following a 14-day jury trial, the offender, Lincoln Lee Dawkins, was convicted of importing cocaine into Canada and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the large quantity of cocaine (17.34 kg), the nature of the drug, and its concealment in a secure airport washroom.

Mitigating factors included being a first-time offender, strong rehabilitation prospects, exemplary conduct on bail for 5.5 years, and significant collateral immigration consequences (likely deportation).

The court rejected the Crown's submission that the offender was a principal, finding him to be a courier, and distinguished his case from others involving airport employees with breach of trust.

Applying principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, restraint, and parity with a co-accused, the court imposed a sentence of nine years and six months' imprisonment.