Charles T. Hackland

The Wabauskang First Nation applied for judicial review of a decision by the Director of Mine Rehabilitation acknowledging a Production Closure Plan submitted by Rubicon Minerals Corporation for a gold mining project.

The First Nation argued that Ontario failed to fulfill its duty to consult and accommodate and improperly delegated this duty to the mining company.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that Ontario's assessment of the potential claims was reasonable, that it fulfilled its duty to consult and accommodate, and that it only delegated procedural aspects of the consultation to the proponent while retaining ultimate legal responsibility.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity contrary to ss. 83.19 and 465(1)(c) of the Criminal Code after a recorded meeting in which he discussed forming a group to support violent jihad with two individuals already engaged in a terrorist conspiracy.

The Crown relied heavily on wiretap evidence capturing the meeting and argued that the accused had agreed to join the conspiracy.

The accused testified that he only feigned agreement to avoid confrontation and had no genuine intention to participate.

The court rejected significant portions of the accused’s testimony but concluded that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he sincerely intended to join the conspiracy.

The court held that while the accused may have sympathized with jihadist causes, the evidence left a reasonable doubt as to whether he had the requisite mens rea to agree to the conspiracy.

In a professional negligence action arising from accounting advice regarding eligibility for Canadian Controlled Private Corporation status, the defendant accountants moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim.

The defendant also brought a third party claim against the plaintiffs’ solicitors alleging negligent misrepresentation and seeking contribution and indemnity.

The court held that the accounting negligence claim involved complex factual disputes, credibility issues, and professional standards unsuitable for determination on summary judgment and therefore required a trial.

However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the third party claim against the solicitors, finding no duty of care and no reasonable reliance by the accountants on the solicitors’ confirmations regarding a shareholders’ agreement.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action following termination without cause after approximately 16 years of service in a specialized technical role.

The court determined that the reasonable notice period and mitigation issues could be resolved on the summary judgment record, while claims for aggravated, punitive, and certain special damages required viva voce evidence at a summary trial.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court found a 16‑month reasonable notice period appropriate given the employee’s age, long service, specialized duties, and limited re‑employment prospects.

The employer failed to establish a failure to mitigate.

Judgment was granted for damages for lack of reasonable notice, with remaining issues reserved for a summary trial.

The defendant corporation brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff for breach of contract in the amount of $426,767.51.

The defendant alleged the judgment was obtained through sharp practice and misleading information and sought to challenge a related default order in a separate action.

The court found the litigation had become a cycle of unproductive without‑notice orders involving an insolvent company and adjourned the motion to allow responding materials and potential settlement discussions.

The court clarified that the default judgment did not impose personal liability on non-parties and imposed interim restrictions preventing enforcement of judgments or bankruptcy proceedings without leave.

The judge seized himself of both related proceedings pending further developments.

The applicant brought a motion to change a prior child support order based on a material increase in the respondent’s income.

The respondent argued that payment of the full guideline amount would cause undue hardship because he had a legal obligation to support three additional children from a subsequent relationship.

The court considered the undue hardship provisions under s. 10 of the Child Support Guidelines and balanced the competing household obligations.

While the court accepted that full guideline support would create undue hardship, it found an increase was still warranted.

The prior order was varied to require increased monthly child support plus a contribution toward extraordinary expenses.

The accused was convicted after trial of offering a bribe to foreign public officials contrary to s. 3(1)(b) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.

The bribery scheme involved a sophisticated plan to pay millions of dollars to officials of a foreign airline and a cabinet minister to secure a lucrative technology contract.

The court emphasized that bribery of foreign officials undermines the rule of law and Canada’s international obligations and that the dominant sentencing principles are denunciation and general deterrence.

Although the accused had no prior criminal record, cooperated extensively, and the scheme ultimately failed, the court found that the seriousness and planning of the offence required a penitentiary sentence.

A custodial term of three years was imposed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $6,945.18 for waste removal services.

The appellant, who suffers from a sleep disorder and admits to hoarding, argued that the contract only required him to pay the amount he received as a disability tax credit refund.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Deputy Judge's conclusion that the contract was unambiguous, there was no misrepresentation, and the appellant was fully aware of his legal obligations.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Assessment Review Board (ARB) decision dismissing its tax appeals for the 2003 and 2004 tax years as out of time.

The Divisional Court found that the ARB's interpretation of the limitation period under s. 357(3) of the Municipal Act was unreasonable because it failed to balance competing policy objectives of finality and equity, and failed to properly analyze the statutory provisions.

The court set aside the ARB's decision and remitted the matter for reconsideration, holding that the limitation period runs from the year the taxes are levied, not the calendar year to which they relate.

The applicant, a former student, sought judicial review of York University's actions, including issuing a trespass notice and a cease and desist letter, and its handling of his records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding that judicial review is a public law remedy and the University's actions were taken as a private landowner.

The court also held that the Charter did not apply to the University's actions as they were not governmental in nature, and noted that complaints regarding criminal conduct, human rights, or privacy must be pursued in other forums.

The appellant in a wrongful dismissal action sought to review a single Divisional Court judge's order dismissing her motion to admit fresh evidence on her pending appeal from a Master's order.

The Master had refused to allow amendments to the statement of claim, finding the limitation period had expired and rejecting the appellant's argument that she was incapable due to mental health issues.

The Divisional Court panel held that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by applying the Palmer test to reject the fresh evidence before the appeal was heard on its merits.

The panel set aside the order, directing that the admissibility of the fresh evidence be determined by the judge hearing the appeal.

Following a successful opposition to a motion seeking to stay or dismiss an action for non-payment of prior costs, the plaintiff sought costs of the motion.

The court applied the presumption of partial indemnity costs under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While accepting the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rate, the court reduced the preparation time claimed and fixed the costs at $8,000 plus disbursements and HST.

The court further ordered that the awarded costs could be set off against outstanding costs owed by the plaintiff to the moving party.

Following the dismissal of a motion seeking to add two former solicitors as defendants in a professional negligence action, the non-party solicitors sought costs.

The court confirmed that the solicitors had successfully resisted the motion and were entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

In assessing costs under Rule 57, the court considered the importance of the issues, the significant damages claimed, extensive cross‑examinations, documentary record, and preparation required due to late abandonment of certain claims.

A moderate downward adjustment was applied to the hours claimed.

The court fixed reasonable costs payable by the plaintiffs to each solicitor.

Following a motion in which the plaintiffs successfully opposed the Attorney General’s attempt to strike portions of a statement of claim under Rules 21.01 and 25.11, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The plaintiffs sought approximately $19,586 in fees on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant argued for a reduced range of $10,000 to $12,000.

Applying the Rule 57.01(1) factors and relevant authorities on partial indemnity costs, the court assessed the complexity of the duty of care issue, the parties’ litigation conduct, and the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates and bill of costs.

The court concluded that a reduced but significant award was appropriate.

The federal Crown brought a motion to strike an action for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation relating to a construction contract for the replacement of a dam in Quebec.

The court held that the contractual claim arose in Quebec because the project, contract administration, and relevant decisions occurred there.

Although the alleged negligent misrepresentation claim was connected to Ontario because tender documents were obtained and relied upon in Ontario, the contract constituted a complete code governing compensation for extra costs and delays.

Interpreting the contract, the court concluded that the parties had excluded concurrent liability in tort.

As a result, the negligent misrepresentation claim was struck and the remaining contractual claim, which arose in Quebec, could not be heard in Ontario under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing a counterclaim alleging misrepresentation, breach of contract, and intentional interference with economic relations on the basis that it was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The counterclaim asserted claims virtually identical to those raised by the respondent in an earlier action that had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction following enforcement of a forum selection clause by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court held that the Limitations Act, 2002 is exhaustive and does not permit courts to decline to apply statutory limitation periods based on special circumstances.

As the claims were discovered years earlier and no statutory exception applied, the counterclaim was statute‑barred.

The court granted summary judgment striking the counterclaim and ordered the respondent to pay funds into court pending resolution of an indemnity claim, failing which judgment would issue.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by an adjudicator under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicant had requested security footage and reports from the University of Ottawa regarding an alleged attempted theft of his backpack.

The adjudicator upheld the University's decision to withhold portions of the records, finding that the search was reasonable, there was no obligation to provide certified copies, and the withheld records contained personal information of third parties whose disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of privacy.

The Divisional Court found the adjudicator's decision reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The appellant father appealed a motions judge's decision finding that the Ontario Superior Court had jurisdiction to determine custody, access, and support issues for the parties' child, rather than the Quebec Superior Court.

The father also appealed the costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motions judge correctly applied the law and made factual findings supported by the evidence, including that the child was habitually resident in Ontario and that a prior Quebec parenting agreement was void due to reconciliation and lack of notice to the mother.

The court also dismissed the father's motion to introduce fresh evidence and upheld the costs award.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel upholding the revocation of his licence for misappropriating funds from his family's company and his former law firm.

He argued that his absolute discharge from bankruptcy estopped the Law Society from finding he misappropriated funds, and that the panel failed to account for proper disbursements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that issue estoppel did not apply because the Law Society was not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings and the issues were different.

The court also found the panel's factual findings regarding the misappropriation were reasonable.

A defendant in a defamation action moved to dismiss or stay the proceeding due to the plaintiff’s failure to pay prior costs awards totaling $46,500 from a pleadings motion and $25,000 from an appeal.

The plaintiff deposed that she had paid $35,000 to certain other defendants and was currently impecunious while residing outside the jurisdiction.

The court recognized its broad discretion regarding non-payment of costs and noted the appellate court had characterized the claim as arguable.

Given that the action remained at the pleadings stage and another motion to strike the amended claim was pending, the court found the request premature.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to a potential future motion for security for costs.