Brian G. Puddington

The applicant sought to prevent prosecution for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking on the basis of issue estoppel.

In an earlier conditional sentence breach hearing, the court had dismissed the allegation after finding the Crown failed to prove possession because the evidence consisted of inadmissible hearsay.

The applicant argued that the earlier finding constituted a final determination of the factual issue of possession.

The court held that the three-part test for issue estoppel was satisfied because the same factual issue had been conclusively determined between the same parties in the prior proceeding.

To avoid inconsistent factual findings and ensure fairness to the accused, the court entered a judicial stay on the trafficking-related possession charge.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The police arrested the accused and searched his vehicle based on information from a confidential informant and subsequent surveillance.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing arbitrary detention and unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found the informant's tip lacked sufficient detail and reliability, and the police surveillance did not adequately corroborate the information to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest.

The court concluded the arrest was unlawful, rendering the subsequent search a violation of section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the seized drugs and cash under section 24(2), finding the police conduct reckless and based on a mere hunch.

The Crown sought detention of the accused on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds following charges of 35 offences related to firearms and controlled substances.

The accused was found in possession of loaded firearms, significant quantities of cocaine, marijuana, and ecstasy, along with 34 cell phones.

The court found no significant risk of absconding on the primary ground but determined the accused posed a substantial likelihood of committing further offences on the secondary ground and that detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice on the tertiary ground.

The accused was ordered detained.

The police responded to a suspected break and enter at an apartment and discovered a large quantity of marijuana, cocaine, and drug paraphernalia.

The appellant, who was present in the apartment, was arrested and his cellphone was seized.

While at the police station, an officer answered a call on the appellant's cellphone from an unknown person seeking to purchase drugs and identifying the appellant by name.

At trial, the judge admitted the evidence of the call as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence of drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting the single call, as it amounted to an implied assertion that the appellant was a drug dealer and was therefore hearsay.

The call did not meet the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled exception to the hearsay rule, nor did the trial judge consider whether its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The offender was convicted by a jury of importing approximately 2.963 kilograms of cocaine into Canada after the drugs were discovered concealed in suitcase linings at Pearson International Airport.

The Crown sought a seven‑year custodial sentence while the defence requested a five‑year sentence, relying on mitigating factors including the offender’s age, lack of criminal record, stable employment history, and role as a courier.

The court reviewed sentencing ranges established by appellate jurisprudence for large multi‑kilogram cocaine importations and emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the primary objectives in drug importation cases.

While recognizing several mitigating factors, the court found they did not justify departing from the established six‑to‑eight‑year sentencing range.

A custodial sentence at the low end of that range was imposed together with mandatory ancillary orders.

The appellant appealed his conviction for importing heroin, arguing the trial judge failed to adequately put the theory of the defence to the jury and erred in responding to a jury request for transcripts of closing addresses.

The Court of Appeal held that the single issue of knowledge was straightforward and the jury understood the defence's position.

Furthermore, although the trial judge initially erred by telling the jury they could not have transcripts without offering to play the audio, he corrected this before taking the verdict, and the jury declined to hear the audio.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for drug offences committed while on probation for the same offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error with the global sentence given the appellant's record and the nature of the drugs.

However, the court agreed that the trial judge erred by failing to give credit for pre-sentence custody.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence on count 6 was reduced to 22 months' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and drug offences, as well as his three-year custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to sever the charges, admitting improper confidential informer hearsay evidence, and failing to credit banked pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the framework for severance, the evidence in question was not hearsay, and there was no proven link between the banked pre-trial custody and the current charges.

The appellant appealed her convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of an imitation weapon, as well as her 36-month custodial sentence.

She argued her arrest was unlawful and challenged the admission of evidence obtained from her cell phone post-arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on informant tips and surveillance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the offences were part of a commercial enterprise and the sentence properly reflected denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police observed her crouch behind a cooler display in a Beer Store where drugs were subsequently found.

She appealed her conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework and engaged in speculative reasoning that reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the circumstantial evidence, correctly applied the core tenets of W.(D.), and did not shift the burden of proof to the accused.

The appellant appealed a forfeiture order, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the preparation of a promissory note.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge's finding that the note was likely prepared after the seizure of the money was not supported by the evidence.

However, the Court held that this erroneous finding did not taint the trial judge's conclusion, as the forfeiture order was otherwise amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reversed the onus of proof regarding his knowledge and control of the property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to infer knowledge and control, and concluding that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

The court also found no basis to interfere with the sentence.

The appellant appealed from the dismissal of a certiorari application to quash his committal to stand trial on charges of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of the proceeds of crime, and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the order refusing to quash the committal and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in her understanding of his employment history and failed to reference his lengthy compliance with bail conditions when denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred regarding the employment history, it did not play a significant role in her decision.

The failure to reference bail compliance was not an error in principle given the seriousness of the offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and his four-month custodial sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his innocent explanation for being at a grow operation, finding knowledge and control, and applying the W.D. framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or inference of knowledge and control.

The court also found no air of reality to a newly raised public duty defence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the sentence was within the appropriate range and a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's prior record.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence of two and a half years.

He argued his rights under sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated during his arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the officers had a legitimate reason to investigate the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was within the appropriate range and no error in principle was made.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after it was found in her luggage at Pearson Airport.

She appealed, arguing the trial judge made errors in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal found two errors: the trial judge improperly instructed the jury that they could only draw inferences from evidence they accepted as fact, which shifted the burden of proof, and improperly instructed them that there was no evidence the cocaine was part of someone else's project, which undermined the core of the defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were investigated by Revenue Canada for claiming fraudulent limited partnership losses related to software valuation.

Search warrants were issued based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) that relied on an outside consultant's opinion, which the deponent incorrectly described as a 'valuation report'.

The appellants applied to quash the warrants, arguing the ITO was deceptive and improperly relied on hearsay.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding no deliberate deception and that the remaining information was sufficient to issue the warrants.

The appellants appealed.

The Crown moved to quash the appeal as moot because the seized items had been returned and no charges laid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, exercising its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

On the merits, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's findings that the mischaracterization was not deliberate and that the deponent was entitled to rely on hearsay from other Revenue Canada employees and hired consultants.