Brian Edward McNeely

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting post-hypnosis identification evidence, failed to properly instruct the jury on eyewitness identification and alibi evidence, and delivered an unbalanced charge that favoured the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the post-hypnosis evidence was properly admitted, the trial judge committed serious errors in his jury instructions regarding the frailties of the identification evidence and the requirements for finding a fabricated alibi.

Furthermore, the jury charge lacked fairness and balance, compromising the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the scope and effect of an officer's contact with the jury and in failing to conduct an inquiry of the affected jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the requirement to dispel a reasonable apprehension of bias and made no error in principle in exercising his discretion not to examine the jurors, especially given defence counsel's position at trial that nothing untoward had occurred.

The appellants, parents of a three-month-old child who died from severe injuries, appealed the dismissal of their application for certiorari to quash their committal for trial on charges of second degree murder.

They argued that the preliminary inquiry judge found no evidence indicating which parent caused the fatal injuries or that they acted in concert, and thus they should be discharged or committed only for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the inquiry judge correctly concluded there was sufficient circumstantial evidence—including exclusive opportunity, motive, and awareness of the child's deteriorating health—upon which a properly instructed jury could find either or both appellants guilty of second degree murder as principals or parties.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 13 years' parole ineligibility.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by delivering an improper jury exhortation, admitting out-of-court statements, failing to relate evidence to the defence theory, improperly instructing on reasonable doubt, and giving inadequate Vetrovec warnings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upholding the period of parole ineligibility as fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing and transferring firearms after selling starter pistols to an undercover officer.

The appellant argued the pistols were deemed not to be firearms under s. 84(3)(b) of the Criminal Code because they were designed exclusively for firing blank cartridges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if the pistols were designed exclusively for blanks, the appellant knew the officer intended to convert them to fire live ammunition, thus failing the second conjunctive requirement of the exemption.

The appellant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to two murders committed by a principal.

The Crown relied on the principal's murder convictions to prove the principal committed the offences.

While the appellant's appeal was pending, the principal's murder convictions were quashed, and the principal subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal admitted the quashed convictions and the manslaughter pleas as fresh evidence.

The Court dismissed the appeal but substituted the appellant's conviction for the included offence of being an accessory after the fact to manslaughter, imposing a sentence of time served.

The appellant was convicted of being an occupant in a motor vehicle knowing there was a restricted weapon present.

During deliberations, the jury asked for clarification on the time frame of being aware of the weapon, and the trial judge merely re-read the charge without explaining that the appellant must have had a reasonable opportunity to remove himself or the weapon.

The trial judge also failed to instruct the jury on the use of the main Crown witness's criminal record to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred on both grounds.

The Court of Appeal released an addendum to address the appellant Johnson's sentence appeal, which was inadvertently omitted from the original endorsement.

As no oral or written submissions were advanced in support of the appeal, the court found it had no merit and dismissed it.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing the evidence did not establish their identity as the perpetrators.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including the appellants' presence in the vehicle used during the robbery, matching physical descriptions, and possession of the victim's stolen property and firearms—permitted a reasonable inference of guilt.

The court also noted the appellants' failure to testify could be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the verdict.

The sentence appeal by Black was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury, the admission of evidence, and the handling of the complainant's emotional state.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, finding no merit in the respondent's jurisdictional arguments and concluding that the trial judge made no errors in the circumstances of the case.

The respondent attempted to register a Mini-Uzi submachine gun as a restricted weapon.

The registrar determined it was a prohibited weapon because it could be easily converted to fully automatic, and a Provincial Court judge ordered its forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal set aside the forfeiture, holding that 'capable' meant capable in its present condition.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that 'capable' in the definition of prohibited weapon includes the potential for conversion to an automatic weapon in a relatively short period of time with relative ease, given the legislative purpose of protecting the public.