Brian Dickson

Following a collision between two Canadian National Railway trains in Quebec, an inspector from the provincial Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail initiated an investigation under the provincial Act respecting occupational health and safety.

The railway company challenged the investigation, arguing the provincial statute could not constitutionally apply to a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial occupational health and safety legislation, because of its preventive nature, directly regulates the working conditions and management of the undertaking.

Consequently, the investigative powers under the Act are wholly inapplicable to an interprovincial railway undertaking.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was extradited from Brazil to Canada to face fraud charges under an arrangement that prohibited his prosecution for other offences committed prior to the extradition request.

After serving his sentence for the initial charges, the appellant remained in Canada and was subsequently charged with additional offences committed before his extradition.

He argued that the extradition arrangement provided perpetual immunity from prosecution for those prior offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the immunity under the Rule of Specialty and the extradition arrangement only lasts until the fugitive has had a reasonable opportunity to return to the requested state.

Criminal appeal addressing whether cross-examination of an accused on prior convictions under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act infringes the right to a fair hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The majority held the provision is constitutionally valid because prior convictions are admissible on credibility, do not reverse the burden of proof, and can be controlled by limiting instructions, while also recognizing a judicial discretion to exclude such evidence in unusual cases where fairness would be undermined.

On the facts, the majority found no unfairness in admitting the accused's prior non-capital murder conviction given the centrality of credibility and the defence attack on the criminal records of Crown witnesses.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, with a dissent concluding the prior murder conviction should have been excluded and a new trial ordered.

A constitutional appeal concerning whether Quebec occupational health and safety provisions governing protective re-assignment of a pregnant worker applied to a federal telecommunications undertaking.

The Court held that the provincial scheme, though aimed at worker health and safety, in pith and substance regulated working conditions, labour relations, and the management and operation of undertakings.

As applied to federal undertakings, those matters fell within Parliament's exclusive jurisdiction, rendering the provincial provisions constitutionally inapplicable.

The Court rejected reliance on the double aspect theory and held it unnecessary to decide the operational conflict issue.

The Minister of Health and Community Services appealed a decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that set aside a guardianship order and substituted a custody order for two children in protective care.

The Court of Appeal had held that the Minister must prove parental moral turpitude and name specific adoptive parents to obtain a guardianship order.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the guardianship order, holding that the sole criterion under the Family Services Act is the best interests of the child.

The Court found that requiring proof of moral turpitude or the naming of specific adoptive parents contradicts the language and spirit of the Act.

The appellant was convicted under the New Brunswick Motor Vehicle Act for failing to yield the right-of-way while driving on an Indian reserve.

He appealed, arguing that he could only be charged under the federal Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that provincial motor vehicle laws of general application apply ex proprio vigore on Indian reserves in the absence of conflicting federal legislation.

The Court found no conflict between the provincial Act and the federal regulations, as the federal regulations merely incorporated provincial laws by reference without demonstrating an intent to exclusively cover the field.

The appellant, an interprovincial trucking company and federal undertaking, was ordered by a provincial Workers' Compensation Board officer to comply with provincial industrial health and safety regulations regarding safety footwear and safety committees.

The appellant challenged the orders, arguing the provincial regulations were constitutionally inapplicable to a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provincial occupational health and safety regulations relate to working conditions, labour relations, and the management of the undertaking, and therefore cannot constitutionally apply to a federal undertaking.

The appeal was allowed and the provincial regulations were declared inapplicable.

The appellant was charged with unlawful possession of house-breaking instruments contrary to s. 309(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge quashed the indictment, finding the section violated the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 309(1) does not create a reverse onus and does not violate s. 11(d) of the Charter, as the Crown must prove all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant was charged with counselling theft and fraud after offering a hotel security guard money to obtain confidential information containing the names and addresses of hotel employees for a union.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that confidential information does not qualify as property for the purposes of the theft provisions in the Criminal Code, as it cannot be taken or converted in a manner that deprives the owner.

The Court also held that the conduct did not amount to fraud, as the hotel had no intention of dealing commercially with the information and thus faced no risk of economic deprivation.

The appeal was allowed and the acquittals restored.

The appellants appealed their convictions for income tax evasion, arguing that evidence obtained prior to the enactment of the Charter under a provision of the Income Tax Act later found to be unconstitutional should be excluded.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Ontario Court of Appeal that the Charter does not apply retrospectively to searches and seizures conducted before it came into force.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Manitoba Court of Appeal which allowed an appeal from the appellant's acquittal on charges under the Combines Investigation Act and ordered a new trial.

The issue was the admissibility of evidence discovered as a result of an unconstitutional search.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Court of Appeal's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's finding under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Applying the principles from Collins, Sieben, and Hamill, the Court found no error in the lower court's exercise of its jurisdiction to review the trial judge's finding under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed from the bench.

The appellant was stopped at random by a police officer during a spot check.

The officer demanded a breath sample after detecting alcohol, which the appellant refused.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the random stop and the demand for his licence and insurance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the random stop constituted arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under section 1 due to the pressing need to combat impaired driving.

The Court also found that the demand for documents did not violate section 8 as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such documents.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal which found its operations constituted a scheme of pyramid selling under the Combines Investigation Act and issued a prohibition order.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal.

The appellant was stopped by a police officer who detected an odour of alcohol and demanded a breath sample for a roadside screening device.

The appellant refused and was charged with failing to comply with a roadside demand.

He argued his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a roadside breath demand constitutes a detention under s. 10 of the Charter, triggering the right to counsel.

However, the Court concluded that the limitation on the right to counsel implied by the requirement to provide a sample 'forthwith' is a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified under s. 1 of the Charter, given the importance of deterring impaired driving.

The appellant's first two trials on a charge of criminal negligence causing death ended with hung juries.

The trial judge stayed a third trial on the grounds that it would constitute an abuse of process and a violation of section 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while prosecutorial misconduct is not an essential element of abuse of process, a third trial in these circumstances does not violate the community's sense of fair play and decency.

The appellant was charged with failing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 234.1 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the provision was inoperative because it had not been proclaimed in force in all provinces, allegedly violating equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights and s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the non-universal application was justified by a valid federal objective related to provincial law enforcement priorities and resources.

The Court also held that s. 7 of the Charter could not be used to bypass the delayed implementation of equality rights under s. 15.

The appellant was laid off due to a strike by another local of his union at his place of employment.

He applied for unemployment insurance benefits but was denied on the basis that he was 'financing' the strike under s. 44(2)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, because a portion of his mandatory union dues was diverted to the International Union's strike fund.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'financing' requires active and voluntary involvement by the claimant.

The mandatory payment of union dues did not constitute financing the labour dispute, and the appellant was therefore entitled to benefits.

The appellant brought an action for defamation against the respondent newspaper after it published an article identifying him as a representative of the Jewish Mafia.

A jury awarded the appellant $135,000 in non-pecuniary damages, which the trial judge affirmed.

The Court of Appeal reduced the award to $13,500, finding the jury's amount unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the jury's assessment was not so grossly inflated as to be unreasonable in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction to the Court of Appeal and applied to adduce fresh evidence consisting of traffic offence notices.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to admit the evidence but subsequently dismissed the appeal, applying the curative proviso and concluding the evidence could not have affected the verdict.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that once fresh evidence is admitted on the basis that it might reasonably affect the verdict, the court cannot later conclude it had no such effect without usurping the jury's function.

The curative proviso cannot be applied where no error at trial is shown and the issue is solely the admission of fresh evidence.